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Abstract
This thesis examines the contributions of three major ﬁgures in heterodox economic
thought - Thorstein Veblen, Joan Robinson and Michaª Kalecki - to the identiﬁcation
of what Else Øyen describes as `poverty producing processes'. It is argued that to date
no distinct heterodox theory of the causes and consequences of poverty exists. This is
surprising, not least because questions of social power, asymmetrical access to resources,
and inequality are among the core themes in heterodox thought. This thesis demon-
strates that Robinson, Kalecki and Veblen have devoted considerable time and eﬀort to
the investigation of poverty-related issues. Combined, they have discussed four key pro-
cesses that contribute to poverty production: conspicuous consumption, mark-up pricing,
industrial sabotage and hegemonic policy-making. This thesis suggests that these four
core processes amount to a distinct heterodox perspective on poverty production, and
may serve as a basis for a comprehensive enquiry into the causes of poverty in advanced
capitalism. Being in essence a history of economic thought analysis of post-Keynesian
and institutionalist theorising on poverty, this thesis contributes to economic poverty re-
search, the history of economic thought and the development of an integrated heterodox
approach.
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1 Introduction
The only reason, the only excuse, for the study of economic theory is to make
this world a better place in which to live. (Mitchell, quoted in: Ramstad,
1989, p. 762)
This is, condensed in one sentence, the major motivation for indulging in the daunting
task of doing theoretical research on poverty. It is also the only excuse I can bring to my
defence for hiding for a good three years behind innumerable books and so ignoring the
dictum that `an ounce of action is worth a ton of theory'. For I do honestly believe that
action in order to be successful has much to gain from well-founded theory. But why,
out of all the pressing problems we face in modern capitalism, did I choose to work on
poverty? This is the question I will set out to answer in the next section.
1.1 Why do research on poverty?
I grew up in a very conventional Austrian family. We had a car, we had a house (even if
in reality it was owned by the bank), we were properly clothed and we had a TV. Yet, for
most of my life my family would have been considered poor according to contemporary
standards. Despite appearances - for an outside observer we probably looked much like
any other middle class family - there were times when my parents did not know on
Friday where to take the money from to buy food on Monday and there was a time when
we almost ended up losing our home. None of these circumstances would have been
suspected by either my class mates or our neighbours. Our poverty was almost invisible
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from the outside.
Two aspects of this experience were particularly formative for me:
Firstly, the ﬁrst-hand experience of how much suﬀering this relative (and at times also
absolute) poverty entails, however well masked it is. I realised that even if we were much
better oﬀ than the starving people in parts of the African continent, we were very far
from being well oﬀ. And I perceived it as cynical to hear people playing down poverty in
modern capitalism. It never felt that way. Poverty, in my experience, is a manifest and
often very painful problem, even in advanced capitalist welfare states such as Austria.
Secondly, I witnessed a very irritating paradox: my parents, being self-employed, for
most of the time worked more than the average full-time job and earned less. Yet, they
still believed that everyone can get rich if only they worked hard enough. Witnessing
my parents' ﬁnancial and professional situation for many years, I could not be quite
convinced by this idea and soon started to enquire into other inﬂuence factors residing
outside of the poor individual itself.
These two realisations laid the foundations for what now ﬁnds its preliminary culmi-
nation in the present thesis: a vivid interest in the comprehensive explanation of poverty
in advanced capitalism.
Current poverty statistics conﬁrm the ongoing societal relevance of what may otherwise
be considered my own personal project: according to data from EU-SILC 16.4% of the
population of the 27 EU member states lived in poverty in 2010. The United Kingdom's
poverty rate lies slightly above the EU average at 17.1%. The fact of still having about
one-sixth of the population living in poverty despite impressive economic development
over the last 100 years certainly conﬁrms the need to thoroughly enquire into the reasons
for the perseverance of this phenomenon. Any analysis of poverty, however, needs to be
clear on how the problem is actually conceptualised. This is what I will clarify in the
next section.
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1.2 Deﬁning poverty
This subchapter will ﬁrst set forth the conceptual diﬀerences between absolute and rel-
ative deﬁnitions of poverty. It will then go on to explore Amartya Sen's attempt at
formulating a comprehensive measure, combining absolute and relative elements, the ca-
pabilities approach. Based upon these analyses, I will ﬁnally state the case for adopting
a relative deﬁnition of poverty as the conceptual basis of the present study.
Poverty research, in its beginnings, was built upon a so-called absolute measure of
poverty. Charles Booth, one of the UK's pioneers working on poverty, in 1899 deﬁned as
poor families with a weekly income of 18s to 21s. All those families with a lower weekly
income than 18s were considered to be very poor. Poor people, in Booth's understanding,
were struggling to make ends meet but able to cope somehow, whereas very poor people
lived in a permanent state of unfulﬁlled needs. From what is known today, Booth seems
to have calculated his poverty threshold of 18s per week from the average income of 30
families he considered to be poor. This income threshold is not adjusted according to
family size, but seems to presuppose an average family (Holman, 1978, p. 3). Booth's
deﬁnition of poverty can thus be said to be on the one hand very arbitrary - calculating
the average income of 30 poor families living in East London can hardly be taken as
representative - and on the other hand, taken its complete ignorance of diﬀerent family
structures, rather imprecise.
Consequently, Seebohm Rowntree who, inspired by Booth, conducted a comprehensive
survey of poverty in York aimed at a more precise and less arbitrary deﬁnition of poverty.
Trying to calculate an absolute subsistence minimum, he posited that poor households
need to spend income on food, rent and certain basic household expenditures. He then
proceeded to calculate the amount of money needed for food by relying on Atwater's
suggestion that a man working under moderate physical strain needs 3500 calories a
day to survive. Next, he devised a diet ensuring a suﬃcient daily calorie intake and
priced the necessary ingredients in the cheapest shops in town. Thus, he calculated
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that the weekly cash requirement for food was 3s 3d for a man, 2s 9d for a woman
and between 2s 7d and 2s 1d for children. To this he added average housing costs
resulting from his survey data plus something extra for fuel, clothing etc. The resulting
grand total constituted Rowntree's poverty line. Unlike Booth, it needs to be stressed,
Rowntree adjusted the poverty threshold to family structure and size (Holman, 1978,
pp. 4-6). Thus, in certain respects, his deﬁnition of poverty is indeed less arbitrary than
Booth's. Nonetheless, critics point out that his deﬁnition as well, despite holding up
the appearance of objectivity, is biased by numerous arbitrary judgements. On top of
that it does not take into account the reality of the poor (ibid., p. 10). Rowntree himself
concedes that the poor would most probably lack the nutritional knowledge necessary to
devise the diet he proposes. Besides that, this diet was not aimed at feeding people well,
but rather at providing for some bare subsistence minimum. Furthermore, Rowntree
does not allow for any expenditure on leisure or community activities or even to buy
furniture (ibid., pp. 7-8). It is thus highly unlikely that people would actually be able to
live of the subsistence minimum proposed by Rowntree.
The subsistence approach to poverty, pioneered in the UK by Booth and Rowntree,
consequently, in the course of time, came heavily under attack. Nevertheless, in some
contemporary variations it continued to be used and is still in use today. Oﬃcial US
poverty statistics, for example, still rely on an absolute poverty threshold calculated in
1963 by Mollie Orshansky1(Slesnick, 1993, p. 3).
One of the most inﬂuential critics of the subsistence approach to poverty was the
British sociologist Peter Townsend. Townsend fervently criticised the subsistence ap-
proach for being inﬂicted with all sorts of methodological problems in its attempts at
deﬁning an absolute poverty threshold (for a detailed discussion see Townsend, 1962). He
argues convincingly that it is impossible to scientiﬁcally devise objective minima even for
nutritional requirements, let alone allowances for clothing and other human needs (ibid.,
1The actual values of the US poverty threshold, of course, are adjusted for inﬂation.
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215ﬀ). To put it in Townsend's words:
Poverty is a dynamic, not a static, concept. Man is not a Robinson Crusoe
living on a desert island. He is a social animal entangled in a web of rela-
tionships  at work and in family and community  which exert complex and
changing pressures to which he must respond, as much in his consumption of
goods and services as in any other aspect of his behaviour. And there is no
list of the absolute necessities of life to maintain even physical eﬃciency or
health which applies at any time and in any society, without reference to the
structure, organization, physical environment and available resources of that
society. (Townsend, 1962, p. 219)
Townsend thus never tired of arguing that a conceptualisation of poverty needs to take
account of the conventions sanctioning membership of [the] community (Townsend,
1954, p. 133) to which one belongs. The attainment of an absolute subsistence minimum,
in his understanding, is not suﬃcient to be considered as non-poor . On top of being
able to physically survive individuals are expected to be able to participate in the social
life and live up to the social conventions of their respective communities. Townsend thus
proposes an alternative conceptualisation of poverty, which came to be known as the
relative approach to poverty (Townsend, 1962). He deﬁnes poverty as follows:
Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty
when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the
activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary,
or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies in which they
belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the av-
erage individual or family that they are, in eﬀect, excluded from ordinary
living patterns, customs and activities. (Townsend, 1979, p. 31)
Critics of the relative approach often argue that it reduces poverty to just another word
for inequality (Sen, 1983, p. 156). This criticism is eloquently countered by Townsend
who points out that in order to be considered poor it is not suﬃcient simply to earn
less than others. The relative lack of resources must be so pronounced as to prevent full
participation in social life (Townsend, 2006, p. 6). In his paper A Sociological Approach to
5
the Measurement of Poverty Townsend (1985) explains how a relative poverty threshold
can be established:
There seems to be not just a continuum of deprivation in accordance with
ranked income (or total resources). Below an approximate threshold of in-
come, deprivation seems to intensify, accelerate or multiply disproportion-
ately. It is as if people strive to conform with what is expected of them
when income shrinks (they economise in what they do but still undertake the
same activities) but once it shrinks below a particular level they withdraw
(or withdraw their children) from fulﬁlling certain social obligations or well-
established customs or activities. They no longer meet friends, children are
occasionally absent from school, heating is turned oﬀ, conventional diets are
no longer regularly observed, visitors are not longer invited into the home,
ill-health and disability become more common. (Townsend, 1985, p. 662)
He goes on to point out, however, that the existence of such a threshold has [not]
yet been systematically demonstrated (ibid., p. 662). Further work would be needed
in order to empirically conﬁrm the existence of a nonarbitrary relative poverty line.
Townsend repeated this concession 20 years later in his short article What Is Poverty?
An Historical Perspective (Townsend, 2006, p. 6), thus showing that the problem remains
unsolved. It is most likely because of this lack of better funded alternatives that measures
of relative poverty usually rely on some percentage of median income as a proxy for the
establishment of a relative poverty line. Townsend has complemented his discussion of
income poverty with the concept of relative deprivation (Spicker, Leguizamon-Alvarez
and Gordon, 2006, p. 49). Consequently, it has been pointed out in the literature that
In order to measure poverty accurately, it is necessary to measure both re-
sources and deprivation. Following Townsend (1979), poor people/households
have increasingly been identiﬁed as those who both have a low `standard of
living' and low resources (e.g. Callan et al. 1993). (ibid., p. 49)
The above mentioned operational problems notwithstanding, the relative conceptualisa-
tion of poverty has one considerable advantage over the absolute approach: it gives far
more consideration to the multidimensionality of human needs (Holman, 1978, pp. 12-
14). Consequently, it came to be the dominant approach in use for the measurement of
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poverty in advanced capitalism. The oﬃcial EU poverty threshold of 60% of median
income, for example, can be attributed to this group of poverty measures. Fully in line
with Townsend's stress on the relevance of both income and deprivation measures, the
EU complements this measure by an indicator of material deprivation, the material de-
privation rate. The material deprivation rate deﬁnes poverty as the inability to aﬀord at
least three out of nine items (Eurostat, 2014):
1. to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills;
2. to keep their home adequately warm;
3. to face unexpected expenses;
4. to eat meat or proteins regularly;
5. to go on holiday;
6. a television set;
7. a washing machine;
8. a car;
9. a telephone.
However, the relative approach does not escape criticism either. The most prominent
critic of a purely relative deﬁnition of poverty probably is Nobel laureate Amartya Sen.
Sen acknowledges the necessity to introduce a relative element in the conceptualisation
of poverty, yet still tries to retain an irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty
(Sen, 1983, p. 159). In order to achieve this he formulated his capabilities approach to
the deﬁnition and measurement of poverty. This approach, Sen argues, occupies middle
ground between the two extremes of absolute and relative poverty (ibid., p. 153).
7
Poverty, according to Sen, can be deﬁned as a lack of capabilities to achieve certain
necessary functionings (Sen, 1983, p. 160). Capabilities in this context should neither be
confounded with the ownership of speciﬁc goods nor with utility, as
the constituent part of the standard of living is not the good, nor its char-
acteristics, but the ability to do various things using that good or those
characteristics, and it is that ability rather than the mental reaction to that
ability in the form of happiness that, in this view, reﬂects the standard of
living. (ibid., p. 160)
In the realm of basic capabilities to function, Sen argues, poverty needs to be understood
as an absolute concept (ibid., p. 161). A certain minimum level of capabilities exists which
individuals should be able to achieve, irrespective of the level of capabilities achieved by
other members of the same community (ibid., p. 159). These capabilities, Sen argues,
can vary from such elementary physical ones as being well-nourished, being
adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, etc., to
more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life of the com-
munity, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on. (Sen, 1992,
p. 110)
The appropriate way to attain these capabilities, contrary to the capability itself is rela-
tive to the speciﬁc community in question. Considerable diﬀerences exist between com-
munities as to what commodities are needed in order to achieve a certain capability.
And the amount of goods necessary to attain a certain minimum standard of capabilities
tends to increase the wealthier a society becomes (Sen, 1983, pp. 161-163). Besides inter-
communal diﬀerences in the amount of money necessary to reach a certain standard,
Sen also stresses important interpersonal diﬀerences: chronically ill, old, or handicapped
people, for example, may need a higher income to attain the same level of capabilities
to function than a healthy 20 year old. Physically hard working people have a higher
daily calorie requirement and thus need more money to buy food than people in oﬃce
jobs (ibid., p. 168). This list probably could be extended inﬁnitely. Thus, poverty, in
Sen's understanding, has an important relative component, but always refers back to a
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list of capabilities deﬁned in absolute terms. Even this absolute core, however, it needs
to be stressed, is far more generous than the subsistence minima deﬁned by Booth and
Rowntree.
Interestingly enough, however, despite considerable theoretical interest in Sen's capa-
bilities approach the dominant approach to the measurement of poverty in policy as well
as in empirical research still appears to be some version of the relative poverty threshold
pioneered by Townsend. I too have decided, in the context of this dissertation, to adopt a
relative understanding of poverty. There are three main reasons underlying this decision:
1. Adopting a relative understanding of poverty ensures conceptual compatibility with
great parts of contemporary research on poverty.
2. With regard to future empirical research conceptual compatibility with oﬃcial
poverty statistics is advisable. As I have pointed out above, the oﬃcial poverty
threshold adopted by the EU relies on a relative deﬁnition of poverty.
3. A relative understanding of poverty can be argued to be backed by Kalecki's, Ve-
blen's and Robinson's writings. Robinson (Robinson and Eatwell, 1974, pp. 204,
308-309) and Veblen (Veblen, 1998 [1899]; Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 177-178) are
indeed quite explicit in their adherence to a relative understanding of poverty.
Kalecki, to my knowledge, does not explicitly take position on this question.
I will thus build the following analysis on a relative understanding of poverty, poor people
being deﬁned as not being able to fully participate in the life of the community due to
low income and/or material deprivation.
1.3 Poverty production
A novel approach to the analysis of poverty has been introduced by Norwegian poverty
researcher Else Øyen. She observes that whilst the enquiry into the causes and eﬀects
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of poverty has always been part of poverty research very little is known as to the com-
mon nature of the causes and the way they interrelate (Øyen, 2004b, p. 305). Thus
she proposes the concept of poverty production as a means of organising the confusing
multiplicity of causes. The aim of this approach is to identify poverty producing actors
and processes, a poverty producing process being deﬁned as:
(a) an enduring phenomenon, (b) that follows a repetitive pattern, (c) where
certain actors behave in such a way that poverty increases or is sustained,
and (d) where the victims/poor people are placed within a structure that
gives few or no opportunities to change the situation. (Øyen 2004 quoted in
Spicker, Leguizamon-Alvarez and Gordon, 2006, p. 157)
This approach, according to Øyen, implies a shift in the focus of poverty research in at
least three respects: ﬁrstly, it re-embeds poverty research into research into the func-
tioning of society as a whole and thus brings into focus the symbiosis of the poor and
the non-poor parts of society. Mainstream poverty research almost exclusively focuses
on an analysis of the lives of the poor, taking very little account of the interrelations
between the poor and the non-poor. Secondly, the analysis of poverty production starts
from a conﬂictual model of society, that is explicitly acknowledges conﬂicts of interests
between diﬀerent social groups. Mainstream poverty research, on the other hand, builds
upon a harmony model of society, assuming that it is in everyone's interest to abolish
poverty. Thirdly, the poverty production approach brings into focus those agents and
those actions who create and sustain poverty (Øyen, 2004b). Consequently, it forces the
researcher to be very concrete rather than to contend herself with locating the causes of
poverty in such general phenomena as
evil forces, personal greed, moral decay, paternalism, historical determinism,
capitalism, globalisation, and the spirit of multi-national corporations. (ibid.,
p. 305)
In identifying the actors beneﬁting from and causing poverty, Øyen proposes to use
human rights language and to distinguish between ﬁrst-order, second-order and third-
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order perpetrators (Øyen, 2004b, pp. 306-307). She illustrates this with the example of
an African mining company oﬀering problematic working and living conditions to their
employees:
Within this mode of analysis the ﬁrst-line perpetrator in this fairly simple
example is the management of the industry that gives the orders. The second-
line perpetrators are the members of the board of the company. The third-
line perpetrators are the shareholders and their persistent demand that their
investments give the best possible return. Removed from the direct line of
perpetration, but still part of the poverty producing process, is a government
that refrains from interfering in the mining industry on behalf of its citizens.
(ibid., p. 307)
Poverty production, Øyen stresses, takes place on all levels of society (ibid., p. 306).
A further way to distinguish between diﬀerent types of poverty production is according
to the level of intentionality of the respective poverty producing actors. Øyen diﬀeren-
tiates between direct, or intended, poverty production on the one hand and unintentional
poverty production on the other hand (ibid., p. 308).
The greatest part of poverty production, she holds, is unintentional in that it is the
unintended by-product of processes aiming at the achievement of some other goal (ibid.,
p. 308). Examples listed by Øyen are public spaces as well as social norms and institu-
tions designed to serve the interests of the non-poor majority population without taking
account of the adverse eﬀects these may have on the poor parts of the population. A
precondition for changing these poverty producing processes would be to raise public
awareness of their harmful consequences (ibid., p. 308).
The situation is very diﬀerent in the case of direct poverty production. This category
comprises all those situations in which the respective actors consciously and deliberately
produce poverty in order to further their own interests (ibid., p. 309). As examples Øyen
names dictators and elites whose power is built on uneducated and poor people who
cannot mobilise resistance (ibid., p. 309).
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Although Øyen's focus evidently lies on developing countries, the concept of poverty
production undoubtedly is general enough also to be applied to poverty in advanced
capitalist nations. In fact, the poverty production approach promises to be very fruitful
as a means to support social policy-making in these countries, as knowledge about poverty
production provides an essential precondition for successful poverty reduction. As long
as poverty production continues unhindered, policies aiming at poverty reduction can be
little more than a ﬁght against windmills.
Despite its importance, poverty production is an underresearched ﬁeld (Spicker,
Leguizamon-Alvarez and Gordon, 2006, p. 157). The concept has hardly been taken up
in poverty research and Else Øyen herself has retired from active research and thus dis-
continued her work on the subject as well. What little further research there is primarily
focuses on underdeveloped countries on the South-American continent. In the abstract to
a paper presented at a conference in 2004 Øyen puts forward three reasons why poverty
production has so far been ignored in academic and policy discourses (Øyen, 2004a):
Firstly, out of a simple lack of knowledge about poverty producing processes. Secondly,
due to the inﬂuence of strong vested interests who beneﬁt from poverty production and
are opposed to the public exposure of their activities. Thirdly, enquiry into poverty pro-
duction is often associated with the radical left (ibid.) and is consequently presented
as being ideologically biased and not to be taken seriously.
Thus, there is still a long way to go until we can hope to have accomplished a compre-
hensive and well-established analysis of poverty production. One particularly promising
way forward for the fruitful implementation of the poverty production approach, I want
to argue, is its integration into economic poverty research. Whilst not employing the
terminology proposed by Øyen, several heterodox traditions in economics, most notably
Marxism, institutionalism and post-Keynesian economics, can indeed be shown to follow
a `poverty production approach' in the sense of showing that poverty plays a functional
role in modern capitalism rather than being an unfortunate by-product. The detailed
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discussion of my proposed mode of integration will be the subject of the next section.
1.4 Integrating poverty production into economic poverty
research
Neoclassical economics deﬁnes itself as the discipline which studies the allocation of
scarce means to alternative ends. The neoclassical economist tries to optimise resource
allocation under constraints. The aim of this endeavour is Pareto eﬃciency, which is
deﬁned as a state in which no one could be made better oﬀ without making someone
else worse oﬀ. Reaching this state is the ultimate goal of neoclassical economics. Pareto
eﬃciency does not, however, make any normative claims about distribution: a state in
which one person controls all resources while the rest of the population does not have
access to any resources at all can be Pareto eﬃcient as well. Economics so deﬁned, thus,
is not interested in matters of distributive justice and poverty. These issues are relevant
only insofar as they constrain the eﬃciency of resource utilisation. According to the
neoclassical paradigm, eﬃciency is accomplished when everybody gets according to their
input.
Institutional economists have agreed on a very diﬀerent deﬁnition of the subject of
economics: they argue that economics is the science of social provisioning (Dugger,
1996, p. 31). This term has been introduced by Allan Gruchy and describes the way
in which every society must decide what to produce, how to produce it and how to
distribute it (Stabile and Dodge, 1987, p. xii). The neoclassical evaluation criterion of
Pareto eﬃciency is substituted by the criterion of `social eﬃciency':
Social eﬃciency is measured in real, rather than in pecuniary, terms. Ef-
ﬁciency is identiﬁed with the consequences, in terms of serviceability and
reasonableness, of the application of particular policies to speciﬁc problems.
It is a matter of how well the community can be made to work for its in-
habitants; the extent to which productive participation, the realization of
potential, the nurture and protection of the vulnerable and the powerless is
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facilitated; and the extent to which polarization and isolation is thwarted.
(Miller, 1995, p. 126)
Institutionalist economists thus are per deﬁnitionem much more concerned about mat-
ters of distributive justice and poverty than their neoclassical colleagues. The task of the
economist, from their point of view, is to analyse the processes that expand or retard
social provisioning (Dugger, 1996, p. 36) in order to give policy advice. As this thesis is
devoted to a theoretical enquiry into poverty, those processes that retard social provision-
ing are most relevant to the present analysis. Following the above deﬁnition by Gruchy
these span not only the sphere of distribution but the sphere of production as well. It
would thus be misleading to speak of theories of income distribution. Questions of in-
come distribution are part of the problem but do not exhaust it. I thus want to suggest
that the analysis of those processes which retard social provisioning be operationalised
through the above discussed concept of poverty producing processes.
The concept of poverty production perfectly complements the institutionalist concept
of `social provisioning': Apart from delineating a speciﬁc part of the social provision-
ing process, it refers to group conﬂict (that some people or groups gain from producing
poverty) and the concept of power (that some people are in the position to produce
poverty). Additionally, poverty production is a dialectical concept that points on the
one hand to the necessity of investigating into structural causes of poverty, and on the
other hand helps identify those actors or groups of actors who are responsible for causing
or enhancing poverty. It is a concept which well serves the institutionalist ambition to de-
velop an analysis of social processes that goes beyond the predominant structure-agency
dichotomy. Introducing `poverty production' into their analysis can provide institutional
economists with a powerful tool for enquiring into the social problems of our time. It
re-introduces poverty as a central concern in economic theory and gives due regard to the
observation that an analysis of poverty needs to go beyond mere enquiry into distribution.
However, although poverty and distribution have always been central to institutional
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thought no coherent institutional explanation exists. I would argue that this is at least
in part due to the focus of their research: While trying to overcome the micro-macro-
dichotomy in economics, institutionalist thought still is far better developed on micro
issues. Institutionalists have focused on the explanation of institutional change, power
structures and consumer choices. Macroeconomic relations are analysed in a rather ad-
hoc fashion. In order to develop a heterodox economic theory of poverty production it
seems expedient to complement institutional economics with a theory that has a more
macroeconomic focus. Post-Keynesian economics, while sharing most of the basic as-
sumptions of institutionalism is very strong on macroeconomic analysis. However, it
remains rather sketchy on the microeconomic level. I will thus investigate whether, when
taken together, institutional economists and post-Keynesian economists have developed
the basis for a heterodox economic theory of poverty production.
1.5 Research method
This section will explain the two key methodological decisions taken in this thesis: the
choice of the appropriate approach to the history of economic thought on the one hand
and the selection of the authors to be included on the other hand.
History of thought
As outlined above, the aim of this thesis is the development of a heterodox economic
theory of poverty production. Theory development can have two starting points: new,
so far insuﬃciently explained empirical observations or conceived (analytical) weaknesses
of existing theories. I have opted for the second starting point. My aim is to contribute to
the further development of a heterodox theory of poverty through re-focusing and tackling
a few of the weaknesses of institutionalist and post-Keynesian theories. In order to do
so, I will go back to the works of ﬁrst generation institutionalist and post-Keynesian
theorists. My work can thus be understood as an exercise in the history of economic
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thought.
History of thought is often conceived to fall into two categories: contextual (also called
`intellectual history' - IH) and analytical (also called `history of economic analysis' -
HEA) (Dow, 2002, p. 320).
The former, according to A.M.C. Waterman (1998, 304), represents "an at-
tempt to discover some features of the past as it really was," while the latter
is designed to "trace the lines of descent to leading analytical themes in eco-
nomics and to study intellectual connections between the diﬀerent lines," or
doctrinal history. One way of putting the distinction is that IH oﬀers a histor-
ical reconstruction, while HEA oﬀers a rational reconstruction (Blaug 1990;
Winch 1998, 355). (ibid., p. 320)
These two categories are understood as two fully separate ﬁelds of research. History of
thought in mainstream economics mostly belongs to the second category. The main-
stream of the profession builds on an ahistorical understanding of theory building and
accordingly is interested in past economic thought only insofar as it can be integrated into
their theories (e.g. the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis, which Joan Robinson tellingly
called `bastard Keynesianism' and the New Institutional Economics).
Institutionalism, Post-Keynesianism and other heterodox economic schools build on a
very diﬀerent understanding of theory: they stress that theories always are a product of
their time and thus must be analysed in their historical context. Accordingly, heterodox
economists are more inclined to follow a contextual approach to the history of economic
thought. A purely contextual approach, however, would become problematic as soon
as theory development is concerned. This is no issue in mainstream economics, where
the history of economic thought is considered as a separate discipline, largely irrelevant
for most practitioners of economics. It is more of a problem, however, in heterodox
economics, where the history of economic thought is considered to be an integrative part
of the discipline and of theory development. A purely contextual approach in this case
would hinder theory development. A history of ideas in heterodox economics thus needs
to contain analytical as well as contextual elements. It needs to be analytical because
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theory development always rests on abstraction and builds on past ideas. And it needs
to be contextual in order to avoid falling into the trap of over-generalised, empirically
irrelevant theory building. Heterodox economists thus had to ﬁnd a way to reconcile
their belief in the historicity of knowledge and the necessity to build their theories on
past knowledge. They developed a tradition in the history of economic thought that
does not ﬁt into either of the two above mentioned categories (Dow, 2002, pp. 320-321,
330-333). The following statement by Sheila Dow, although focused on Post-Keynesian
economics, well describes the overall heterodox position:
While history of thought is pursued primarily to inform modern economics
(and thus is not IH), this goal is seen as being best served by building up a
historian's understanding of older texts (and thus not HEA). While it may
be argued that some of this is done well and some badly, like anything else,
the point to be made here is that post-Keynesian history of thought does not
allow for a separation between history and economies in the manner entailed
by the IH/HEA distinction. It consists of a "looking backward in order to
look forward." (ibid., p. 321)
This heterodox economic tradition of dealing with the history of thought is the context
in which I would like the present thesis to be understood. Although my work will be
based on a historical literature analysis I want to emphasize that I do not intend to stop
there  my aim is to use and transcend and not merely to rehearse the old (Warren J.
Samuels quoted in Wilber and Harrison, 1978, p. 79), as Samuels has put it.
In practical terms this approach has ﬁve major consequences for theory building: First,
theorists always need to contextualise their work and lay open the presumptions on which
they build. Second, this includes explicitly stating the epistemological and methodo-
logical foundations. Third, when trying to apply an existent theory to a new case, appli-
cability (particularly with regard to the basic assumptions) has to be checked. Fourth,
the validity of an existent theory for a new case can only be established empirically.
Fifth, the consideration of new cases leads to a reconsideration and further reﬁnement of
the theory.
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The explicit discussion of the philosophical foundations is particularly important when
it comes to synthesising two (or more) theories. It certainly is possible to integrate
theories that are based on very diﬀerent philosophical premises (see for example the
neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis in mainstream macroeconomics), but such an approach
is bound to violate the basic premises of one of the two theories. Such a construct is an
integration of external concepts into a dominant theory rather than a synthesis of two
theories on an equal footing. In order to be able to reach a real synthesis, the respective
theories must have suﬃciently similar philosophical foundations (epistemological and
methodological).
Choice of theorists
As it is not feasible, in the context of this dissertation, to examine in detail the whole
post-Keynesian and institutionalist literature a preselection of the most relevant theorists
had to be made. I have made the ultimate goal of this thesis, namely the synthesis of post-
Keynesian and institutionalist thought in order to develop a heterodox economic theory
of poverty production, the guiding criterion in the choice of theorists. The selection pro-
cess was eﬀectuated in two steps: I have ﬁrst compiled a list of those post-Keynesians
and institutionalists who have a strong interest in issues of poverty and income distribu-
tion. Out of these theorists I have then opted for those post-Keynesian theorists whose
approach I regarded as being most consistent with and complementary to institutional
economics and vice versa. The original result of this exercise was to include Thorstein
Veblen and John Commons on the institutionalist side and Michaª Kalecki as well as
Joan Robinson on the post-Keynesian side. Further on in the research process it turned
out that whilst my original evaluation was correct as far as the compatibility of Veblen,
Kalecki and Robinson is concerned, Commons did not ﬁt in well with the others in terms
of both research focus and approach. Thus, I decided to concentrate on the other three
authors.
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On top of their general concern for questions of distributive justice and poverty, Veblen,
Kalecki and Robinson share three commonalities which make their research a particularly
suitable starting point for an analysis of poverty production: Firstly, they incorporate
power in their theories. Secondly, they share a conﬂictual outlook on social dynam-
ics, as opposed to the harmony-myth of neoclassical economics. Thirdly, they build on
suﬃciently similar epistemological and methodological foundations to be combinable.
This approach has the drawback of not including most younger theoretical develop-
ments. It also has a number of advantages, however, which by far outweigh its downsides:
Firstly, post-Keynesians as well as institutionalists still draw heavily on the works of their
founders. Secondly, the decision to return to ﬁrst generation theorists, in the case of the
post-Keynesians, stems from the observation that their work had a stronger politico-
economic perspective than their successors' who came to rely increasingly on elegant
mathematical modelling. In the case of evolutionary institutionalism the reason for this
move lies in the fact that the focus of later generations has been a strongly empirical one
so that most theoretical insights can already be found in the work of the ﬁrst generation
and in particular Thorstein Veblen.
1.6 Research question
This thesis aims to answer the following research question: What heterodox economic
theory of poverty production can be deduced from the theories of Veblen, Kalecki and
Robinson?
This overall research question can be split further into two sub-questions:
1. What poverty producing processes are described in the work of Veblen, Kalecki
and Robinson and do they overlap?
2. Can these diﬀerent processes be synthesised into a theory of poverty production?
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Question one will be answered in chapters four to seven, question two will be the subject
of chapter eight.
1.7 Original contribution
This thesis, I want to argue has three distinct original contributions to make: it con-
tributes to economic poverty research, to the history of economic thought and to the
development of an integrated heterodox economic approach.
Economic poverty research
Economic poverty research is predominantly an empirical discipline, with some notable
theoretical exceptions. Theoretical contributions to poverty research in mainstream eco-
nomics are largely behaviouristic, locating the causes of poverty in the sphere of un-
favourable individual behaviour. Post-Keynesian and institutionalist contributions, while
providing a more multidimensional analysis, still suﬀer from being very partial and frag-
mented. This thesis contributes a synthesis of a number of previously distinct theoretical
strands, thus providing a more comprehensive analysis. On top of that, it introduces a
novel theoretical framework - the analysis of poverty producing processes - thus proposing
a promising new tool for the comprehensive analysis of poverty in advanced capitalism.
History of economic thought
In the history of economic thought literature this thesis contributes to analyses of the
theoretical legacy of Veblen, Kalecki and Robinson. It is based on an extensive reading
of primary literature by the three authors and thus in part also covers diﬃcult to ac-
cess and seldom quoted works. On top of that, the very detailed and thorough analysis
necessitated by the aim to on the one hand detect all major poverty producing processes
and on the other hand compare and contrast the contributions of the diﬀerent authors
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enabled me to work out theoretical details which have so far been overlooked in the post-
Keynesian and institutionalist history of economic thought literature. This thesis thus
contributes new insights into some theoretical details of post-Keynesian and institution-
alist analysis, such as Veblenian pricing theory, Kaleckian analysis of consumption and
diﬀerences between Robinson's and Kalecki's understanding of mark-up pricing theory.
The development of an integrated heterodox approach
Several attempts have been made in the post-Keynesian and institutionalist literature to
achieve a synthesis of the two approaches (see for example Brazelton, 1981; Dillard, 1980;
Eichner, 1985; Hodgson, 1989; Keller, 1983; Wilber and Jameson, 1983; Todorova, 2009).
None of them, to my knowledge, have attempted a synthesis of Veblenian institutionalism
and the Kaleckian/Robinsonian tradition in post-Keynesian economics. In elaborating
on the diﬀerences and complementarities between the works of Robinson, Kalecki and
Veblen, this thesis opens up a new and promising direction for the development of an
integrated heterodox economic approach.
1.8 Structure of the argument
The argument of this thesis can be said broadly to unfold in three steps: chapters 2
and 3 set the scene for the rest of the argument, chapters 4 to 7 discuss in detail major
poverty producing processes deduced from the works of Robinson, Kalecki and Veblen
and chapters 8 and 9, ﬁnally, present a preliminary synthesis, resume and point out ways
to go to further develop the poverty production framework outlined in this thesis.
Chapter 2 reviews the state of the art in economic poverty research. It evaluates
mainstream economic, Marxist and post-Keynesian and institutional contributions and
argues that the latter two provide the most promising starting point for a multidimen-
sional analysis of poverty. Nevertheless, it is argued, much more work still needs to be
done in order to arrive at a comprehensive theoretical framework for economic poverty
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research.
Chapter 3 takes us one step further towards the development of a post-Keynesian
institutionalist theory of poverty production in that it expounds the philosophical foun-
dations underlying Veblen's, Robinson's and Kalecki's work. It is demonstrated that all
three authors can be said to broadly build on the same philosophical foundations, namely
historicity, openness, holism and interdisciplinarity. Their approaches are thus shown to
be compatible on the philosophical level - a precondition for the theoretical synthesis
developed in chapter 8.
Chapter 4 constitutes the ﬁrst of four chapters analysing in detail speciﬁc poverty pro-
ducing processes. The poverty producing process in focus in this chapter is conspicuous
consumption. The concept of conspicuous consumption is ﬁrst traced back to the work of
Thorstein Veblen and then complemented by Robinson's analysis of the adverse social ef-
fects of unregulated consumption. Finally, two special cases are examined: Toporowski's
analysis of the highly disruptive eﬀects of conspicuous consumption on supply-restrained
markets on the one hand, and the contemporary literature on the interrelation between
conspicuous consumption and household debt on the other hand. It is shown that con-
spicuous consumption constitutes a powerful poverty producing process according to
Øyen's deﬁnition presented above.
Chapter 5 closely connects to the argument developed in chapter 4 in that it analyses
the poverty producing eﬀects located in the pricing mechanism on capitalist markets.
Starting from the observation that the great majority of ﬁrms in advanced capitalism
operate on oligopolistic markets, the focus lies on Kalecki's theory of mark-up pricing.
It is shown that the determination of the mark-up is an important locus of distributive
struggle and thus of great importance for poverty production. Even more so, as in this
framework entrepreneurs, through their pricing decisions, can be shown to have the ﬁnal
say on the level of real wages.
Chapter 6 scrutinises a further poverty producing process originating in the work of
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Thorstein Veblen: industrial sabotage. Industrial sabotage, according to Veblen, consti-
tutes the single most important hindrance to social provisioning in advanced capitalism.
I argue that the most common strategy of industrial sabotage in use today might well be
the so-called `planned obsolescence' of goods, an industrial strategy not foreseen by Ve-
blen himself but discussed later on by Robinson. Unlike older Veblenian interpretations
of the concept, the strategy of planned obsolescence is shown to be compatible with a
post-Keynesian mark-up pricing framework and thus contributes a further piece to the
framework of analysis developed in this thesis.
Chapter 7 introduces hegemonic policy-making as a very particular poverty producing
process. Of the four poverty producing processes discussed in this thesis, this is the
only one which does not directly refer to one speciﬁc process. Rather, it is used as
an umbrella term to cover all poverty production resulting from hegemonic inﬂuences
on public policy-making. Wide-spread examples of this phenomenon are the strong
political focus on inﬂation targeting at the expense of active employment policy as well
as regressive taxation. These poverty producing processes, it is argued, need to be taken
into account in order to complement the other processes' focus on the private sector. As
was pointed out above, poverty production takes place on all levels and in all sectors of
society.
Chapter 8 wraps up the analysis of the foregoing chapters and provides answers to
three key questions: Can Kalecki's, Robinson's and Veblen's theories be synthesised into
a coherent theory of poverty production? What are the diﬀerences between this poverty
production approach and mainstream economic and Marxist poverty research? And
ﬁnally, what are the most promising routes for further research in order to enhance and
strengthen the new approach?
Chapter 9 concludes.
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2 Literature review
In this chapter I will attempt to brieﬂy summarise the state of the art in economic
poverty research. The start will be made by an exposition of empirical and theoretical
contributions to mainstream economic thinking. Next follows a short discussion of the
Marxian view of poverty, focusing particularly on the mode of production, social strat-
iﬁcation and the role of the state. The third part of this chapter presents an overview
of the analyses of poverty to be found in other heterodox traditions. Finally, a short
section will investigate contributions dealing with the nexus between poverty and the
welfare state. Due to the sheer scope of economic poverty research this review cannot
claim to be exhaustive. Despite its limitations, however, I believe this literature review
to be suﬃciently comprehensive to allow some general conclusions to be drawn. Most
importantly, it will be shown that, despite eﬀort being made to theoretically understand
poverty, no comprehensive analysis of poverty seems to be available in the literature.
Moreover, it will be argued that post-Keynesian and institutionalist approaches share
the advantage of being able to combine a diversity of explanatory dimensions, such as
agency, institutions and structural constraints. We will thus see that these approaches
provide a good starting point for a comprehensive theoretical exploration of poverty.
2.1 Mainstream economics
This section provides a brief overview of mainstream economic thinking on poverty. To
this aim it is divided in ﬁve subsections, each covering one major thematic bloc arising
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from the literature. First, the vast amount of literature enquiring into the interrelation
between economic growth and poverty will be reviewed. Second follows an overview of
the literature discussing the explanatory value of other macroeconomic variables, e.g. un-
employment and increasing earnings inequality, for the understanding of poverty. Third,
a very small part of the literature considers questions concerning exclusion from con-
sumption and the role of prices and inﬂation. Despite being far from well established
in the mainstream this provides an interesting link to the main argument of this thesis
(see particularly chapters 4 and 5) and will thus be included in this review. Fourth,
a recurrent topic in the mainstream literature are questions regarding the inﬂuence of
diﬀerent ﬁscal policies on poverty. Last but not least, while the focus of the major part
of the above cited literature is empirical - with some notable exceptions which will be
highlighted in the relevant section - the last part of this subchapter will show that most
theoretical attempts at explanation start from behaviouristic premises. Poverty, accord-
ing to these approaches, can be explained by behavioural diﬀerences between the poor
and the non-poor. A number of diﬀerent analyses along these lines will be discussed.
Let me conclude this overview with one important caveat: The lion's share of the
discussion of poverty related questions in the mainstream literature, I would argue, con-
cerns the measurement of poverty1. Nearly all of these papers refer to Sen's 1976 paper
Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement in which he proposes a new way of mea-
suring poverty. Despite being so important in terms of scope, this vast literature will not
be included in this review for two reasons:
Firstly, because discussions of the measurement of poverty, important as they may be
for empirical studies, do not provide much to relate to in a theoretical analysis. On top
of that, most empirical studies ignore this measurement discourse and continue to rely
on exactly those traditional poverty measures, such as the head-count ratio, which Sen
1see for example Atkinson (1987); Blackorby and Donaldson (1980); Chakravarty (1983a); Chakravarty
(1983b); Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984); Foster and Shorrocks (1988); Foster and Shorrocks
(1991); Kakwani (1980); Ravallion (1996); Sen (1976); Takayama (1979); Thon (1983). For a good
review article see Seidl (1988).
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aimed to replace in his seminal paper.
Secondly, the measurement literature is largely technical in nature, focusing on the
discussion of very speciﬁc problems arising from diﬀerent ways of econometric modelling.
This tendency reinforces the limited link to the main part of this thesis which aims at
avoiding mathematical formalisation.
2.1.1 Economic growth and poverty
Since the publication of Kuznets' seminal article Economic Growth and Income Inequal-
ity in 1955 the question of the relationship between economic growth and inequality
has been the subject of a vast and ever growing literature. I would argue that, apart
from measurement issues, it can be considered as the single most researched question in
mainstream economic poverty research.
Kuznets' original argument reads as follows: studying historical data on the United
States, England and Germany, Kuznets observed a changing relationship between eco-
nomic growth and income inequality over diﬀerent phases of industrial development
(Kuznets, 1955, p. 18):
One might thus assume a long swing in the inequality characterizing the
secular income structure: widening in the early phases of economic growth
when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was
most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later
phases. (ibid., p. 18)
In other words, Kuznets argued that a temporary increase in inequality during the process
of industrialisation will be followed by a long-term decrease in inequality as economic
growth continues. He presents some empirical justiﬁcation for this argument, always
stressing, however, that, due to the limited availability of data
The paper is perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95 per cent spec-
ulation, some of it possibly tainted by wishful thinking. (ibid., p. 26)
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Nonetheless, he argues, keeping in mind these caveats, little harm and much good may
result (Kuznets, 1955, p. 26) from further enquiry into the questions opened up by his
paper.
Let us now return to Kuznets' main argument. The observation of a decrease in income
inequality in developed economies, he argues, is a puzzle because there are at least two
forces working in the opposite direction (ibid., p. 7):
1. Diﬀerences in savings-propensity between high-income and low-income groups (only
the rich save) result in an increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of the
higher-income groups. This in turn can be expected to generate even higher future
income and thus increasing inequality (ibid., p. 7).
2. Industrial development results in a shift away from agriculture, a process usually
referred to as industrialization and urbanization (ibid., p. 7). This yields two po-
tential increases in inequality: First, the general level of income tends to be higher
in urban areas than in rural areas. Second, the income distribution within the
urban population tends to be more unequal than within the rural population. Ur-
banisation thus can safely be expected to increase overall income inequality (ibid.,
pp. 7-8).
Yet, despite these forces working in the opposite direction, Kuznets observes a trend
towards decreasing inequality. In order to account for this, Kuznets presents four groups
of factors which may counteract the inequality increasing eﬀects of the above-mentioned
trends:
1. Economic and social policy aimed at counteracting or limiting the processes of
income concentration (ibid., pp. 8-9).
2. Due to superior possibilities of birth-control, the rich as a group are growing much
more slowly than the poor. Thus, they make up an ever smaller percentage of the
total population (ibid., pp. 9-10).
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3. Rapid technological change makes it more diﬃcult for the possessing classes to pre-
serve their business advantage and opens up possibilities for new entrants (Kuznets,
1955, p. 10).
4. Even the upper-income brackets depend to a large extent on service income, which,
as Kuznets points out, for a number of reasons is likely to increase less for high-
income groups than for low-income groups (ibid., pp. 10-11).
Taken together, these four trends may be strong enough to oﬀset the inequality increasing
eﬀects of the increasing concentration of savings and urbanisation. Nonetheless, Kuznets
is quick to stress that
Yet while the discussion answers the original question, it yields no deter-
minate answer as to whether the trend in income shares of upper groups is
upward, downward, or constant. Even for the speciﬁc question discussed, a
determinate answer depends upon the relative balance of factors  continuous
concentration of savings making for an increasing share, and the oﬀsetting
forces tending to cancel this eﬀect. To tell what the trend of upper-income
shares is likely to be, we need to know much more about the weights of these
conﬂicting pressures. (ibid., p. 11)
It is thus hard to determine exactly the cumulative eﬀect of economic growth. However,
the empirical data presented by Kuznets suggest that the overall eﬀect of economic
growth has been to reduce inequality (ibid., p. 4). This has been made the starting point
for numerous analyses arguing that we need economic growth in order to decrease poverty
and inequality.
The validity of this argument, however, has been questioned by more recent empirical
studies showing a weakening of the negative correlation between growth and poverty
since the 1980s (see for example Blank et al., 1993; Danziger and Gottschalk, 1986).
Nonetheless the proponents of the argument that `a rising tide lifts all boats' still retain
dominance.
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2.1.2 Other macroeconomic variables
Apart from general economic growth levels the major inﬂuence on poverty rates discussed
in the literature certainly is unemployment. In an economic system in which the largest
part of the population is ﬁnancially dependent on wage labour, unemployment is likely
to bear a high risk of falling into poverty, even though most advanced economies oﬀer
some sort of unemployment insurance. Thus, the strong interest in unemployment as
explanatory variable for poverty is hardly surprising.
One particularly important publication analysing - amongst other macroeconomic fac-
tors - the correlation between unemployment and poverty is Blank and Blinder's often
cited book chapter Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Poverty which has been
published in 1986. Using data covering the US economy between 1959 and 1983, the
authors estimate that every one percent increase in prime-age male unemployment
(Blank and Blinder, 1986, p. 188) is accompanied by a 0.7 percent increase in poverty.
This positive correlation is shown to be even stronger in the long-run, increasing to a
1.1 percent increase in poverty rates per 1 percent rise in unemployment (ibid., p. 188).
Unemployment, the authors conclude, is a regressive tax (ibid., p. 184), redistributing
income from the poor to the rich strata of society.
High unemployment has signiﬁcant and systematically regressive eﬀects on
the distribution of income: the poorer the group, the worse it fares when
unemployment rises. (ibid., p. 187)
Yet, the severity of the negative eﬀects of unemployment not only depends on socio-
economic status, but is also correlated with diﬀerences in age, race and sex (ibid.,
pp. 190-191). Blank and Blinder show that non-white males are most severely aﬀected
by increasing unemployment, with their group-speciﬁc unemployment rate rising over
three times more than base-level unemployment rates (ibid., p. 190). White women, in
contrast, are least hit by increasing unemployment levels. This, the authors argue, can at
least partly be explained by what they call the discouraged worker eﬀect(ibid., p. 191),
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that is, women voluntarily dropping out of the labour market in times of increasing un-
employment. Non-white women and white males occupy intermediary positions in terms
of sensitivity to changes in unemployment levels (Blank and Blinder, 1986, p. 191). Sum-
ming up, there is strong empirical evidence that unemployment is not only `a regressive
tax' but also casts a greater burden on minority groups, particularly non-white men.
The importance of general unemployment levels as explanatory variable in the analysis
of poverty has also been highlighted by Tobin (1994) and Atkinson (1998). Referring to
empirical work by Hagenaars et al., Atkinson points towards a further aspect that should
not be overlooked in an analysis of the poverty producing eﬀects of unemployment: The
same unemployment level, he argues, can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on poverty depending
on the distribution of employment between households (Atkinson, 1998, pp. 75-76).
Poverty rates are lower (except in Luxembourg) in two earner households.
The diﬀerence between one- and two-earner households is, however, less
(apart from Belgium) than that between one-earner and no-earner house-
holds. A change in the labour market which leads to x one-earner households
becoming no-earner households and x one-earner households becoming two-
earner households is neutral as far as total employment is concerned, but not
necessarily neutral as far as poverty is concerned. (ibid., p. 75)
Thus, focusing on the overall level of unemployment only, without taking account of the
distribution of employment, may conceal important information for the understanding
of changes in poverty levels.
Another important issue to be considered when analysing the correlation between
unemployment and poverty is the availability of poor people for the labour market.
Danziger and Gottschalk (1986) argue that the anti-poverty eﬀects of rising employment
levels are limited by the fact that two-thirds of poor households have weak attachment
to the labor force (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1986, p. 405). That means,
because only about one-third of poor households have heads who are expected
to work, most poor households will not beneﬁt from improved labor market
conditions. (ibid., p. 410)
30
Nonetheless, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of unemployment on poverty have been demon-
strated. However, similar to what has been said for economic growth, the eﬀect of unem-
ployment seems to have diminished since the 1980s (Atkinson, 1998, pp. 80-81). Atkinson
shows that
a number of the European Union countries have not experienced the rise in
poverty of the magnitude which might be expected given the rise in unem-
ployment. (ibid., p. 76) [. . . ] Both the UK and Sweden have larger increases
in poverty than expected; Germany is very close to the prediction; and all the
other ﬁve countries have a much smaller increase in poverty than expected,
including four with no increase (or a fall). (ibid., p. 77)
Nevertheless, he urges the Europeans not to become too complacent regarding unem-
ployment levels. Unemployment, Atkinson holds, still remains an important factor to
take into account (ibid., p. 77).
In addition to insuﬃcient economic growth and unemployment a third hypothesis ad-
vanced in mainstream poverty research is the explanation of increasing earnings inequality
by a phenomenon referred to as `skill-biased technological change' (see for example Goos,
Manning and Salomons, 2009, p. 58). The argument goes as follows: Over the last decades
technological change has resulted in a shift of the demand for labour in favour of highly-
skilled workers. As a result of this shift, the wages of high-skill workers have increased,
whilst the wages of low-skill workers have decreased. This simple supply-and-demand
argument is by far the most cited explanation of the increase in earnings inequality since
the 1980s (Ackerman, 2000, p. 3). Nevertheless, some critical voices have been raised as
well. Atkinson, for example, while accepting the general supply-and-demand framework,
argues that analysis should not stop there. He points out the relative impoverishment
of contemporary research and advocates the return to earlier works which also included
non-market factors into the analysis (Atkinson, 1997, pp. 309-310).
The present-day hegemony of the supply and demand story contrasts markedly
with earlier writing on wage diﬀerentials, where there has been a creative ten-
sion between market force and alternative explanations of wage diﬀerentials.
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(Atkinson, 1997, p. 309) [. . . ] It seems to me that these alternative approaches
have merits which have been too hastily discounted by supply and demand
theorists. There are good grounds to try and build bridges. (ibid., p. 310)
The result, he suggests, should be the enrichment of the supply-and-demand framework
with non-market variables such as social norms (ibid., p. 310).
Another critique of the skill-biased technological change model has been formulated
by Goos, Manning and Salomons who put forward the argument that the shift in labour
demand has been from employment in the middle of the distribution (manufacturing and
routine oﬃce jobs) (Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2009, p. 58) to both the high-skilled
and the lowest-skilled employments, rather than from the low-skilled to the highly-skilled.
Thus, they argue, the trend which has been observed in many advanced capitalist nations
over the last decade should correctly be deﬁned as job polarization (ibid., p. 58).
Notwithstanding the disagreements over the details of the analysis, all of these studies
agree on one important stylised fact, namely that the increasing earnings inequality
witnessed throughout the last decades is one of the key explanatory variables for the
simultaneous increase in poverty rates.
2.1.3 Consumption, prices and inﬂation
A third thematic block which is explored in mainstream economic poverty research is the
correlation between consumption, prices, inﬂation and poverty. This strand of thought
is certainly less well developed than the ones discussed above but nonetheless expounds
some interesting and important ideas. On top of that we will see that a number of the
ideas presented here have been discussed in some detail by Veblen, Kalecki and Robinson.
I will thus come back to these issues in the main part of the thesis.
In The Role of Prices in Measuring the Poor's Living Standards Broda, Leibtag and
Weinstein (2009) point out that since the early 1960s numerous researchers have con-
ﬁrmed that the poor indeed pay more than households of higher income for the goods
and services they purchase (Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein, 2009, p. 77). They then go
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on to argue that these results were biased by measurement errors and insuﬃcient data.
Using a big and highly detailed dataset containing actual purchases of around 40,000
households (Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein, 2009, p. 78) they are optimistic to be able
to overcome the methodological weaknesses of previous studies. They re-evaluate the
question as to whether poor households pay more for the same goods than better-oﬀ
households and come to the following conclusion:
we show that poor households systematically pay less than richer households
for identical goods. The poor pay less in part because they shop in cheaper
stores and in part because they pay less for the same goods even in the same
store. (ibid., p. 78)
These results directly contradict the established wisdom of the time arguing that for a
number of reasons (e.g. fewer discount stores in poor areas) poor people actually have
to pay more (ibid., p. 77). Thus, they re-open the question as to the correlation between
poverty and the prices paid for consumption.
Irrespective of the question of price diﬀerentials for consumption by poor and rich
people Tony Atkinson argues that general inﬂuences on prices may in eﬀect restrain
poor people's access to speciﬁc consumption goods and thus lower their living standards
(Atkinson, 1998, pp. 88-92). He stresses that
The conditions under which goods are supplied is an aspect which is over-
looked in the analysis of poverty. The decisions of ﬁrms about the prices and
availability of products determine whether or not the poor are excluded from
consumption. (ibid., p. 69)
Starting from the assumption of a proﬁt maximising monopolist Atkinson points out that
the monopolist may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply less at a higher price and thus exclude
poor people from consumption. This tendency may be reinforced in times of a general rise
in living standards when demand by higher income groups increases (ibid., pp. 88-89).
He concludes that
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In this way, we have made a  perhaps unexpected  connection between the
theory of imperfect competition and the idea of exclusion which one ﬁnds in
the poverty literature. (Atkinson, 1998, p. 89)
This connection, as we will see, contrary to its marginal position in mainstream eco-
nomics, is a major focus of Kalecki's, Robinson's and Veblen's work. The same holds
true with respect to a second issue raised by Atkinson:
People may be excluded from the market not just by price but because the
goods they would choose to buy are simply no longer available. There are
limitations on the range of goods which are available. (ibid., p. 92)
Atkinson does not go into the details of this analysis but stresses the fact that the
possibility of such negative side-eﬀects of economic development needs to be taken into
account (ibid., p. 99).
The main point of this account, Atkinson argues, is to demonstrate the need to
consider the conditions under which goods are supplied (ibid., pp. 98-99). This, it will
be shown in the main part of this thesis, has been achieved in post-Keynesian and
institutionalist economics.
Given the importance of prices for the standard of living of poor people one might
expect inﬂation to be correlated with poverty too. This question has been explored in
a number of empirical studies, most notably in Blank and Blinder's Macroeconomics,
Income Distribution and Poverty (1986). The authors show that inﬂation actually has
very little statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on income distribution and what little signiﬁcant
eﬀects there can be found suggest that inﬂation is a somewhat progressive tax (Blank
and Blinder, 1986, p. 188). That is, inﬂation tends to redistribute income from wealthy
people to poor people. Blank and Blinder's seminal study, however, dates back to 1986.
As has been mentioned above, some economic dynamics appear to have changed consid-
erably over the last decades. Thus it would be important to re-evaluate these ﬁndings in
light of the current economic situation.
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Summing up, I would argue that whilst some authors have pointed out the relevance
of questions of price and consumption in the analysis of poverty, much more work needs
to be done in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis of these matters.
2.1.4 Fiscal policy
For the sake of completeness another explanatory variable needs to be mentioned: the role
of public policy in the creation of poverty. This certainly does not seem to constitute a
major focus of mainstream economic poverty research. Nonetheless it has been discussed
by some authors, most notably Atkinson (1997) and Blank and Blinder (1986).
Atkinson's analysis focuses on empirically establishing the relevance of taxes and trans-
fers for explaining changes in the poverty rate. He shows that increases in post-tax income
inequality in the second half of the 1980s have been far more pronounced than increases
in pre-transfer income inequality (Atkinson, 1997, p. 306). Thus, he concludes that
it is not just the dispersion of labour income that we need to understand -
important though that is - and it is not just private incomes that need to be
considered. The determinants of public redistribution are part of what has
to be explained. (ibid., p. 307)
This ﬁnding prompts him to argue for interdisciplinary analysis, integrating insights on
the behaviour of public bodies from political science. Unfortunately, staying true to the
economist that he is, Atkinson quickly narrows down political science to public choice
theory (ibid., p. 315).
Blank and Blinder, on the other hand, skip the background discussion and jump di-
rectly to an empirical analysis of the redistributive eﬀects of changes in taxation (Blank
and Blinder, 1986, p. 198). They focus on changes of the tax structure in the US between
1950 and 1983. Scrutinising in detail changes in tax structure on the federal, state and
local level, the authors come to the conclusion that, primarily due to increases in payroll
taxes, the tax system has become more regressive and thus the tax burden on the poor
has become greater (ibid., p. 203).
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Thus, both Atkinson and Blank and Blinder univocally come to the conclusion that
the redistributive eﬀect of public policy has declined.
Most of the authors discussed so far have followed a strictly empirical approach with
little consideration of theory. Two notable exceptions were Kuznets and Atkinson whose
analyses included both theory and empirical data. Apart from these, the great majority
of theoretical analyses to be found in mainstream economic poverty research may be sub-
sumed under the umbrella of behaviouristic theories. In the ﬁnal part of this subchapter
I will thus review three of those behaviouristic explanations of poverty.
2.1.5 Behaviouristic theories
The classical mainstream economic explanation of income diﬀerentials and thus poverty
is marginal productivity theory. According to this theory everyone's earnings correspond
to the value of their input to the production process. As marginal productivity cannot
be measured directly, it is indirectly derived via the wages received. Thus, the marginal
productivity theory of income distribution can be criticised for relying on a purely circular
argument, marginal productivity being the determinant of relative incomes, while at the
same time being approximated by the existing distribution of income. Rather than
providing us with a theoretically valid explanation of poverty, marginal productivity
theory simply appears to assume that at any point of time the distribution of income
is determined by some mythical variable called `marginal productivity', a variable which
unfortunately can never directly be measured. Marginal productivity theory also can be
said to contain an important normative element as an income distribution corresponding
to diﬀerences in marginal productive input is deﬁned as a just distribution. Consequently,
as the underlying argument is circular, income distribution can per deﬁnition never be
anything else than just. Marginal productivity theory thus serves perfectly well as a
ﬁg leave covering and legitimating whatever income distribution may be in place at any
point of time. It does not, however, provide us with a theoretically valid answer to the
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question it is set out to answer (Hamilton, 1967, pp. 315-316).
This marginal productivity argument is a prime example of a behaviouristic theory
of poverty. On the following pages I will provide an overview of three more recent
variations of the behaviouristic theme in mainstream economic poverty research. These
contributions, whilst sharing some common ground with general marginal productivity
theory, all introduce some distinct element into the analysis.
By far the most prominent author oﬀering a behaviouristic explanation of poverty is
George Akerlof (2002). In his speech on the occasion of receiving the Bank of Sweden Price
in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel he puts forward the following explanation
of the enduring income disparities between African-Americans and the white majority
population. Starting from the observation that the African-American poverty rate is
three times higher than the white poverty rate, he argues that standard economic theory
is incapable of convincingly explaining the weak economic position of African-Americans
(Akerlof, 2002, pp. 426-427). He then goes on to expound a theory of minority poverty
(ibid., p. 427) he has developed in cooperation with Rachel E. Kranton. According to
this theory the dispossessed races and classes face a Hobbesian choice (ibid., p. 427):
they can either decide to assimilate into the majority culture or develop an alternative
identity. Choosing to adapt to majority culture, according to Akerlof and Kranton,
can be very costly psychologically and socially in cases where family and friends do not
choose to do the same (ibid., p. 427). In addition to that it has the disadvantage that
full acceptance by members of the dominant culture is unlikely (ibid., p. 427). Thus,
there lies a great appeal for members of the minority in going for the second option of
developing an alternative cultural identity. This identity, however, according to Akerlof
and Kranton constitutes itself in opposition to the mainstream culture (ibid., p. 427).
Since the prescriptions of the dominant culture endorse "self-fulﬁllment,"
those of the oppositional culture are self-destructive. The identity of the
oppositional culture may be easier on the ego, but it is also likely to be
economically and physically debilitating. (ibid., p. 427)
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Akerlof and Kranton thus seem to explain African-American poverty in terms of an
unfortunate identity choice of individuals. Seeing that in introducing the topic Akerlof
mentions slavery and the Jim Crow discrimination that followed it (Akerlof, 2002,
p. 426) it is astonishing how in their theory the authors seem to blank out completely
possible structural and institutional causes of African-American poverty.
In Cognitive Dissonance, Status and Growth of the Underclass Oxoby (2004) oﬀers a
very similar model aiming at explaining poverty in general. He starts oﬀ by criminalising
the poor arguing that
Poverty, while typically deﬁned in economic terms, is accompanied by a myr-
iad of social behaviours. Crime, welfare dependency and substance abuse,
behaviours considered characteristic of the underclass, are often concentrated
among those living in poverty. (Oxoby, 2004, p. 727)
He then goes on to argue that an analysis of poverty needs to take account of research
in psychology showing
that individuals choose a subjectively deemed characteristic as status worthy
based on their social position and ability to attain status on that character-
istic. (ibid., pp. 727-728)
As soon as they realise that they cannot excel in majority yardsticks, the theory goes,
poor people will be tempted to
change their attitudes regarding status and compete for social position on
another index. (ibid., p. 728)
Thus, very much along the lines of Akerlof and Kranton, poverty is understood as the
result of individual choices. Oxoby seems to be less pessimistic than the former, however,
since he argues that this unfortunate process may be stopped by redistributing income to
the poor before they make this choice of their preferred method of dissonance reduction
(ibid., p. 746), that is early on in their childhood. Thus, from this theoretical point of
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view, there is particular appeal in the idea of a political focus on the reduction of child
poverty (Oxoby, 2004, p. 745).
Despite acknowledging the relevance of psychological factors for analyses of poverty, I
want to argue that Oxoby's exclusive focus on these issues appears to be very simplistic.
On top of that, in case the paper is not only aimed at providing policy advice but also at
understanding the origins of poverty, I cannot fail to notice that the proposed argument
is highly circular: poverty produces poverty-producing behaviour. But where does it
start?
Lawrance (1991) provides us with some ideas of where it might have started. Using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics she claims to provide empirical evidence
that the rich are more `patient' than the poor (Lawrance, 1991, pp. 55-56). Lawrance
points out that a negative correlation exists between work income and time preference
(ibid., p. 55). This allows for two possible interpretations, she argues:
First, since it is diﬃcult to borrow future labor income, impatient individuals
may prefer jobs with ﬂat wage paths, as opposed to careers that promise high
wages only after a period of training or education (a period during which
very low wages are earned). If the constraints are severe enough, impatient
individuals will prefer the former kind of jobs even if their long-run earn-
ings potential is reduced. Thus capital market imperfections could explain a
negative correlation between time preference and education achievement and
between time preference and permanent income. A second explanation for
this paper's results is that time preference is culturally acquired. Substantial
sociological evidence supports this view (LeShan 1952; Cohen and Hodges
1963; Lewis 1966; Banﬁeld 1974; O'Rand and Ellis 1974). (ibid., p. 55)
These interpretations follow a slightly diﬀerent line of argument than Akerlof and Kran-
ton and Oxoby. Nonetheless, they share the former's tendency to attribute poverty to
individual decisions and character failures of the poor. Personally, I ﬁnd it alarming
to observe how common it seems to be to carelessly handle causality in some economic
analyses of poverty. Nowhere does Lawrance consider the possibility that the poor may
be impatient because they simply cannot aﬀord to wait.
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Summing up, the three theoretical explanations of poverty just discussed amount to
little more than the traditional `culture-of-poverty' story which in non-economic poverty
research has been put into question decades ago (Holman, 1978, pp. 94-99). Thus, it can
be concluded with some conﬁdence that mainstream economic poverty research does not
yet seem to have succeeded at developing the theoretical tools to explain poverty. On
top of that, its almost exclusive theoretical focus on questions of individual agency make
it an unlikely starting point for a comprehensive analysis of poverty.
2.2 Marxist economics
Marxists criticise mainstream poverty research for mistaking the symptoms of poverty for
its causes (Wachtel, 1971, pp. 1-2) and claim to have formulated a truly economic theory
of poverty (Ankarloo, 2005, p. 99). In a Marxist framework poverty is understood to be
a structural feature of capitalism whose causes are located in the basic modus operandi
of capitalist economies.
Several diﬀerent Marxist explanations of poverty can be found in the literature. With
few exceptions, e.g. Lapidus' and Figart's Comparable Worth as an Anti-Poverty Strategy
(Lapidus and Figart, 1994), most Marxist accounts tend to have one thing in common:
a stress on the importance of the capitalist mode of production for an understanding of
poverty. This distinguishes them sharply from most mainstream accounts who give little
thought to the role of the sphere of production as a possible source of inequality and
poverty. Apart from this shared analytical starting point, however, important diﬀerences
arise amongst the various Marxist accounts of poverty. Some authors, most notably
Ankarloo (2005), only analyse causes originating in the capitalist mode of production.
Others also consider social stratiﬁcation within the working class to be an important ex-
planatory variable. Finally, the role of the state too is discussed (see for example Sackrey
(1973) and Wachtel (1971)). On the following pages I will provide a short discussion of
these diﬀerent levels of Marxist analysis. Furthermore, some concluding thoughts as well
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as a brief evaluation of the advantages and drawbacks of Marxian approaches to poverty
will be presented.
2.2.1 The mode of production
Ankarloo's Marx on Poverty - A Theoretical Exposition provides us with a good starting
point as it discusses in some detail a number of causal factors arising from the capitalist
mode of production. Ankarloo focuses his exposition on Marx' theory of alienation,
the social relation of wage-labour and capital, and the contradictory process of capital
accumulation (2005, p. 79). He justiﬁes the inclusion of alienation by arguing that it is
an integral part of a description of individuals, who are left in a condition of constraint,
dependence and enforced self-denial. Aspects of wage-work, which themselves form a
part of poverty as opposed to wealth (Ankarloo, 2005, p. 85). This notwithstanding he
concedes that the concept of alienation does not contribute to the explanation of the
production and distribution (ibid., p. 79) of poverty. The following discussion will thus
focus on the other aspects of Ankarloo's analysis.
The key explanatory variable for poverty to be found in Marx, according to Ankarloo
is the wage relation, that is the relationship between workers and capital. Workers are
those members of capitalist society who do not own any means of production and thus
depend on selling their labour-power to those who do. Labour-power, in the Marxist
framework, is conceptualised as a commodity and is thus subjected to the same pricing
principles as any other commodity (ibid., p. 88). Marx argued that commodities are
priced according to their cost of reproduction. The price which has to be paid for labour
power - the wage - thus has to cover the costs of the physical reproduction of the labour
force, that is, subsistence. Ankarloo points out, however, that Marx also took account
of the general standard of living in the respective society. Wages thus cover the amount
of money necessary for the material reproduction of the labour force and a mark-up
which depends on the general standard of living. Consequently, Ankarloo stresses that
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Marx had a relative understanding of poverty rather than using an absolute poverty line
(Ankarloo, 2005, p. 88).
The observation that wages correlate with the cost of reproduction of labour-power
rather than with the actual productivity of the same could be argue to denote one of the
most important poverty producing element discussed in the Marxist literature: Poverty is
produced within the capitalist wage-relation because capitalists - by making use of labour-
power's unique capacity to produce more than its own value - per deﬁnitionem exploit the
working class. The capitalist class' very survival is contingent upon its ability to extract
surplus-value. And this surplus can only be gained through the exploitation of labour
(ibid., pp. 90-91). Thus, at the heart of the capitalist wage relation, according to Marxists,
lies a distributive struggle between workers and capitalists. The more successfully the
capitalists exploit labour, the poorer the workers get. The capitalist system, which
depends on accumulation and thus exploitation, thus out of necessity generates poverty
(ibid., p. 92). It is important to remember, however, that Marxist theory builds on
a relative understanding of poverty. In times of economic upswing workers may well
gain in absolute terms, but, according to Marx, they always loose in relative terms
(ibid., p. 93). Therefore, capitalism can be said to work on an intrinsic tendency towards
increasing inequality (ibid., p. 94). Even if absolute poverty falls in the course of capitalist
development, relative poverty increases (ibid., p. 93).
Nevertheless, economic upswing is the best thing that could happen to workers, for the
working class fares even worse in times of economic crisis (ibid., pp. 92-94). Economic
crises, which according to Marx are an inherent feature of capitalist economies, have two
eﬀects which negatively impact the economic wellbeing of the working class. Firstly, the
falling rate of proﬁt induces capitalists to try to rescue their businesses by saving on wage
payments (ibid., p. 97). Wages are cut and the incomes of formerly non-poor workers who
received wages just above the poverty line are likely to fall below the poverty threshold.
Consequently, the working poor population can be expected to grow in numbers during
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economic downturns.
In addition to wage cuts capitalists most likely also lay oﬀ part of the workforce thus
ﬁlling the ranks of the industrial reserve army (Ankarloo, 2005, p. 97). The industrial
reserve army, while swelling in times of economic crisis, is argued to be an essential
feature of capitalist economies at all stages of the business cycle (ibid., p. 98).
Summing up, Ankarloo argues that from a Marxist perspective poverty is best under-
stood as directly resulting from the capitalist wage relation. The exploitation inherent
in the capitalist wage relation is exacerbated in times of economic crisis and a growing
relative surplus population.
From this analysis Ankarloo derives the following characteristics of Marx' account of
poverty:
First, Marx's conception of poverty is genuinely economic, in the sense that it
traces the causes of poverty in the economic logic of society, and not outside
of it. [. . . ] The second distinctive trait in Marx's conception is the focus on
relations of production. The causes of inequality and poverty do not so much
lie in the exchange relationships, or the distribution mechanisms of capitalism
(which to Marx are merely derivatives of the relations of production) but in
the relations of production themselves. [. . . ] This points to a third distinctive
trait in Marx, the inherent radicalism of his theory (radical in its original
meaning of going to the roots.) Since his conception of the capitalist econ-
omy, its inequalities and its production of poverty in the midst of wealth,
is based in the economic relations of production, the analysis points to the
demand for a change, not only of policies and of distribution, but of the very
mode of production itself. (ibid., pp. 99-100)
A very similar argument to the one put forward by Ankarloo can be found in Peet's 1975
paper Inequality and Poverty: A Marxist-Geographic Theory. In fact, the theoretical
framework laid out in these two papers is so similar that I will conﬁne myself to men-
tioning two additional aspects discussed by Peet which cannot be found in Ankarloo's
analysis: the poverty producing eﬀects of a changing organic composition of capital and
the relevance of income inequalities within the working class.
Peet points out that Marx predicted the organic composition of capital, that is the rela-
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tive importance of constant capital (machinery) and variable capital (labour), to change
during the course of capitalist development (Peet, 1975, p. 566). Technical innovation
enables capitalists to increasingly replace labour power with machines, so that
[p]roduction costs are more-and-more the costs of depreciating machinery,
and less-and-less the costs of hiring labor. (ibid., p. 566)
This shift results in a falling relative demand for labour and thus a growing relative
surplus population. The changes in the organic composition of capital which are inherent
in the capitalist system, thus, can be said to, in a way comparable to economic crises,
aggravate the problem of the industrial reserve army. A relative surplus population is
on the one hand needed in order to discipline those workers who are in employment;
on the other hand, it fulﬁls an important function in so far as it provides a resource
that capitalists can draw on in times of economic boom. The changes in the organic
composition of capital, Peet states, are particularly harmful for low-skilled workers as
these are usually the ﬁrst to be replaced by machines (ibid., p. 566). Higher-skilled
workers, on the other hand, may even proﬁt from the creation of new jobs in organization,
administration, supervision and sales (ibid., p. 570).
In addition to this basic diﬀerentiation between the active labour force and the in-
dustrial reserve army, Peet draws attention to the signiﬁcance of wage diﬀerentiation
within the active labour force. He points out that the costs of the reproduction of labour
do not only include the means for physical reproduction and health but also education
and training. As diﬀerent groups of workers require diﬀerent levels of skill and educa-
tion these groups also diﬀer in terms of their costs of reproduction. Accordingly, higher
skilled workers receive higher wages (ibid., pp. 564-565). This, according to Peet has
three important consequences:
As a ﬁrst result, therefore, income inequality is necessary to produce the vari-
ety of labor needed by the various levels of a multitude of diﬀerent economic
activities. Secondly, by allocating the costs of social reproduction through the
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wage mechanism, by allowing each race of workers to produce its replace-
ment, the capitalist system ensures inequality of access to the skill hierarchy
within the working class. Thirdly, inequality of access to education and skills
allows groups of wage and income earners to exaggerate the income diﬀerences
inherent in the skill hierarchy by partially monopolizing, and thus restrict-
ing, the labor supply into certain levels of the labor hierarchy. Inequalities of
income and opportunity within the class of wage and salary earners are thus
built into the wages system. (Peet, 1975, p. 565)
Peet thus seems to argue that conﬂicts of interest indeed arise not only between capi-
talists and workers but also within the working class. This, in my view, prompts the
question whether it would be more accurate to replace the two-class analysis by a more
diﬀerentiated multiple-class-model. Peet, however, does not ponder this analytical ques-
tion but rather calls for the abolition of the wages system! (ibid., p. 565) altogether.
Nevertheless, his analysis shows that it is important to keep in mind the fact that the
working class itself is not a homogenous group. Diﬀerences in economic status which
must be accounted for theoretically do exist even within the working class.
In a nutshell Peet sums up his argument as follows:
The essence of the Marxist argument, therefore, is that inequality is not a
temporary aberation nor poverty a surprising paradox in advanced capi-
talist societies; instead inequality and poverty are vital to the normal opera-
tion of capitalist economies. Inequality is necessary to produce a diversiﬁed
labor force, because of its role in the production of an expropriatable sur-
plus, and because of its function as an incentive to work. Unemployment,
under-employment, and poverty are inevitably produced by mechanization,
automation, and the uneven course of economic development. Inequality un-
derlies our whole economic way of life. (ibid., p. 567)
2.2.2 Social stratiﬁcation
A historical account as well as an attempt at the theoretical explanation of the intra-
class diﬀerences touched upon by Peet ﬁgures prominently in David M. Gordon's book
Theories of Poverty and Underemployment (Gordon, 1972).
Gordon starts his analysis from the postulate that radical theory [. . . ] combines the
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radical concept of class with orthodox notions of supply and demand (Gordon, 1972,
p. 65). He states that an individual worker's wage depends on two factors:
First, a complex set of individual, social, economic, and technological forces
determines an individual worker's productivity (expressed as average pro-
ductivity) on a speciﬁc job. This average productivity varies both with the
worker's capacities and with the characteristics of his job. Second, the rel-
ative power of employers and employees determines the share of the worker's
total product paid to the worker in wages. He receives some of the product as
wages and the employer receives the rest as surplus product. The worker's ﬁ-
nal wage thus depends both on his individual productivity and on the relative
power of the class to which he belongs. (ibid., pp. 64-65)
The forces of supply and demand, Gordon argues, inﬂuence the relative productivity of
individual workers through their inﬂuence on market prices and thus on the value of
the worker's product. He hastens to add, though, that the relative productivity of the
workers is also inﬂuenced by inter-class dynamics such as the relative power of workers
and capitalists:
An individual's class, ultimately, will aﬀect both his productivity, through
the allocation of social resources to investment in the workers of his class
and through the diﬀerential access of diﬀerent classes to diﬀerent kinds of
complementary capital, and his relative share of ﬁnal product. (ibid., p. 65)
Another competitive element introduced by Gordon is competition amongst diﬀerent
groups of workers. Fostering competition within the working class, he argues, is one of the
strategies open to capitalists to prevent workers from getting organised and threatening
the capitalist dominance (ibid., p. 63). Capitalists thus, in other words, follow the old
and well-established rule divide et impera. An important means to this end, the author
argues, are capitalist institutions which promote an individualistic ideology.
Gordon then goes on to further specify his theoretical framework by formulating some
hypotheses about the development of advanced American capitalism (ibid., p. 66). He
analyses US economic history from 1870 to 1970 and points out that during this period
the homogeneity of labor [. . . ] began to dissolve (ibid., p. 72) and at least several
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objectively-deﬁned classes (Gordon, 1972, p. 72) emerged. This trend, Gordon argues,
was skillfully orchestrated by the ruling capitalist class in full accordance with the above
cited rule divide et impera. Employment diﬀerentiation, Gordon further points out,
was increasingly made along the lines of statistical discrimination (ibid., p. 78), or to
be more speciﬁc, according to race, sex and age (ibid., p. 78).
Gordon ﬁnally arrives at the conclusion that
it seems likely that members of the capitalist class have sought increasingly to
encourage and permit the development of several objectively-deﬁned classes
in the American labor market, each in objective competition with the oth-
ers, in order to heighten the stratiﬁcation of the labor force. It seems equally
likely that employers have found it in their collective interest to encourage and
permit the evolution of the more advantaged of those classes into subjectively-
deﬁned classes  through the development of class consciousness  particularly
insofar as members of these subjectively-deﬁned classes identify their ene-
mies as those within the less advantaged classes of workers. Finally, it seems
likely that capitalists have tried especially to prevent the emergence of the
lower strata as subjectively-deﬁned classes  to prevent the development of
class consciousness among lower-class workers  in order both to forestall
revolutionary impulses among the most thoroughly exploited and to preserve
some classes of workers who will continue to ﬁll the most secondary, unstable,
and undesirable jobs. (ibid., pp. 79-80)
In my view, Gordon adds to the analyses of Ankarloo and Peet by using a more diﬀer-
entiated model, allowing for more than one working class. This, however, considerably
complicates the analysis by introducing potential conﬂicts of interest within the working
class(es) on top of those between workers and capitalists.
2.2.3 Who are the poor?
The importance to further diﬀerentiate the non-possessing classes has also been recog-
nised by Erik Olin Wright. In his book Interrogating Inequality Wright (1994) argues
that the poor population can be divided in those whose
poverty [is] generated inside exploitative relations, and [those whose] poverty
[is] generated by non-exploitative oppression. The former correspond[s] to
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what in contemporary policy discourse is called the working poor; the latter
correspond[s] to the underclass. (Wright, 1994, p. 46)
Wright does not discuss in detail the situation of the working poor. He refers to two
important inﬂuence factors, however, which strongly resound Gordon's argument:
(1) many ﬁrms have low levels of productivity and in order to compete they
can only oﬀer low wages; and (2) many workers have low levels of skills or
limited possibility of geographical mobility and thus are constrained to accept
such poor-paying jobs. (ibid., p. 46)
The poverty of the working poor thus depends on their skill level as well as on the
productivity of the ﬁrms oﬀering low-skilled jobs. Having said this, Wright - also in
silent accordance with Gordon - stresses the importance of the relative power of workers
and capitalists for the inter-class distribution of income. More speciﬁcally, Wright argues
that
the existence of a sizeable population of working poor in an otherwise auent
society can be viewed, to a signiﬁcant extent, as one of the many consequences
of a weak, fragmented, and relatively conservative labor movement. (ibid.,
p. 46)
Overall, Wrights analysis of the working poor can be argued to broadly correspond to
Gordon's approach sketched out above. He adds to Gordon's analysis, however, through
his discussion of the underclass. Wright argues that
[t]he point is that some people do not in fact own productively usable labor-
power. The situation is similar to that of a capitalist owning outmoded
machines. While the capitalist physically controls these pieces of machinery,
they cease to be capital - a productive resource  if they cannot be deployed
within a capitalist production process proﬁtably. In the case of labor-power,
a person can physically control his or her own laboring capacity, but that ca-
pacity can cease to have economic value in capitalism if it cannot be deployed
productively. This is the essential condition of the underclass. (ibid., p. 48)
Quickly summarised, the members of the underclass are poor because they neither own
any means of production nor labour power that is in demand on the labour market.
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The underclass can be understood as being positioned outside of capitalist society. Its
members have no part to fulﬁll in the capitalist production process. They are thus largely
expendable from the point of view of the rationality of capitalism (Wright, 1994, p. 49).
As such, I would want to point out, they ought to be analytically diﬀerentiated from
the relative surplus population which is integrated in the capitalist production process
through their potential usefulness. I thus want to suggest that Wright's categorisation
of the poor might be amended to include three distinct groups: the working poor, the
relative surplus population and the underclass.
A similar categorisation of the poor population is provided by Wachtel in his 1971
article Looking At Poverty From a Radical Perspective (Wachtel, 1971). Wachtel distin-
guishes four diﬀerent groups of poor people (ibid., pp. 4-5):
 The working poor
 Poor people who are attached to the labour force but not in permanent full time
employment
 Poor people who are in some way handicapped and thus suﬀer disadvantages on
the labour market
 Poor people who are not attached to the labour market at all (e.g. pensioners,
prisoners, people who live of public beneﬁts)
Of these four groups, Wachtel argues, the poverty of all but the fourth group can to a
great extent be explained by their position on the labour market. And even the fourth
group's poverty, Wachtel adds, often depends on their previous employment record. The
amount of old age pension a person receives, for example, depends on their employment
situation during working age (ibid., pp. 3-5). Wachtel thus concludes that whether people
are poor or not is mainly determined by their labor force status (ibid., p. 5). Taking
occupation as an imperfect proxy for labor force status (ibid., p. 5), Wachtel then goes
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on to discuss a number of inﬂuences on wages. He argues that the wage an individual
worker receives can be explained by calling upon four diﬀerent types of variables (Wachtel,
1971, p. 5):
1. Individual characteristics over which the individual exercises no control
- age, race, sex, family class status, and region of socialization.
2. Individual characteristics over which the individual exercises degree of
control - education, skill level, health, region of employment, and personal
motivation.
3. Characteristics of the industry in which the individual is employed -
proﬁt rates, technology, product market concentration, relation of the indus-
try to the government, and unionization.
4. Characteristics of the local labor market - structure of the labor demand,
unemployment rate, and rate of growth.
In a next step, Wachtel observes that individuals have very little control over these
variables. Even the individual characteristics listed in the second category - education,
skill level, health, region of employment, and personal motivation - despite being classiﬁed
as lying within the individual's control, are so only to a limited extent (ibid., p. 5). To
support this argument Wachtel refers to studies showing that education to a great extent
depends on the socioeconomic status of the family one is born in (ibid., p. 5). Health too,
he argues, is partially endogeneous to the system (ibid., p. 5). Summing up, Wachtel
arrives at a very gloomy conclusion:
In sum, the individual has very little control over his or her labor force status.
If you are black, female, have parents with low socioeconomic status, and
dependent upon labor income, there is a high probability that you will have
relatively low levels of human capital which will slot you into low-paying
jobs, in low wage industries, in low wage labor markets. With this initial
placement, the individual is placed in a high risk category, destined to end
up poor sometime during her working and nonworking years. She may earn
her poverty by working fulltime. Or she may suﬀer either sporadic or long
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periods of unemployment. Or she may become disabled, thereby reducing her
earning power even further. Or when she retires, social security payments
will place her in poverty even if she escaped this fate throughout her working
years. With little savings, wealth, or a private pension income, the retiree
will be poor. (Wachtel, 1971, p. 6)
Wachtel can thus be said to promote a rather deterministic understanding of poverty,
leaving little room for people to improve their own situation. The causes of poverty, in
this scenario, are almost entirely located outside the individual's control in markets for
labor and capital and class backgrounds (ibid., p. 7).
2.2.4 The role of the state
Having thus ruled out the individual herself as a potential initiator of progressive change,
Wachtel goes on to discuss the role of the state in the production and alleviation of
poverty. He forbears from going into the details of the radical theory of the state and
summarises its key argument as follows: in radical analysis the state is understood to
consist of a powerful group of actors whose primary aim is to perpetuate their own
position of power and protect their interests. This group of powerful actors, Wachtel
adds, is far more likely to come from the capitalist class than from the working class
(ibid., p. 8). From these basic assumptions Wachtel derives three hypotheses concerning
the state's role in the production and alleviation of poverty:
First, government as a totality will reinforce the disequalizing tendencies of
the market through its support of basic capitalist institutions even though
liberals for the past 40 years have been attempting to do precisely the op-
posite. Second, programs to assist the poor will perhaps have some impact
in the short run, but in the long run will either atrophy, become anemic in
their impact, or become distorted in their purpose. Third, only those public
programs that are compatible with the basic institutions of monopoly capi-
talism will see the light of day in the ﬁrst instance and will survive to suﬀer
the fate outlined above in the second hypothesis. (ibid., p. 9)
Furthermore, Wachtel points out that a comprehensive analysis of the role of the state
needs to take into consideration not only decided anti-poverty policies but the totality of
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all government policies, as these may well include poverty-producing measures, too. To
put it in Wachtel's own words:
Even if poverty programs, broadly construed, beneﬁted the poor, the analysis
of the impact of state intervention should not end there. These welfare eﬀects
must be tallied along with the illfare eﬀects of other government programs
to determine whether the net eﬀect of state intervention is to enhance the
welfare of illfare of the people. It is inappropriate to simply analyze the
progressive redistributional aspects of transfer payments without analyzing
the regressive redistributional aspects of other government programs as well.
(Wachtel, 1971, p. 9)
Wachtel ﬁnally concludes that poverty is an endogenous feature of capitalist societies
which beneﬁts the possessing classes. As the state, in Wachtel's understanding, is part
of the problem and public policy is strongly anchored in the capitalist ethic, one cannot
hope to alleviate poverty via public policy measures (ibid., p. 16).
Similarly pessimistic views concerning the poverty-alleviating potential of the state
are expressed by other authors writing in the Marxist tradition (see for example Gordon
(1972) and Sackrey (1973)). Furthermore, even if public policy could temporarily allevi-
ate poverty, revolutionary Marxists would most likely not approve of it. As capitalism
is regarded as an inherently biased, exploitative system which will be overthrown in due
time, measures of social policy aimed at cushioning the cruelty of capitalism are met with
scepticism. These policies, it is reasoned, only serve to delay the anti-capitalist revolution
and consequently to prolong the capitalist exploitation of the working class (Bohmann,
1998, p. 140). Social policy, thus, from a Marxist perspective, is often regarded with
mixed feelings. The only real way out of a society divided along the lines of wealth and
poverty would be to question capitalism's very basic ownership structure and its social
form of production of wealth itself (Ankarloo, 2005, p. 100).
Further publications touching on the topic of poverty from a Marxist perspective are
Levi (1974), Sarvasy & Van Allen (1984), Goldsmith, Lapidus & Figart (1989). These
authors focus on other questions and do not go into much detail as to a theoretical expla-
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nation of poverty, however, and thus shall only be mentioned here for further reference.
Summing up, Marxists argue that (a) poverty is a structural feature of capitalism
rather than an accidental by-product, and that (b) this can be seen most clearly in the
exploitative nature of the wage-relation and the (ever growing) relative surplus popu-
lation (Marx, 1976 [1867], p. 781). As further important inﬂuence factors are identiﬁed
(c) a person's labour force status and (d) social stratiﬁcation within the working class.
Both the downwards pressure on wages and increasing unemployment, it might be added,
are expected to be particularly strong in times of economic crisis. Finally, as the state
is conceptualised as primarily providing a forum for powerful groups to safeguard their
vested interests, public policy, in a Marxist framework, is not expected to further the
alleviation of poverty.
In conclusion, it has been shown that Marxist theory certainly provides us with in-
teresting insights into a number of poverty producing tendencies inherent in modern
capitalism. These important contributions notwithstanding, one signiﬁcant weakness of
the Marxist approach has surfaced in this review: Marxist theorists tend to pay rather
little attention to considerations of individual or group agency. In order to arrive at a
truly comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of poverty, this aspect of the analysis
may need to be strengthened.
2.3 Other heterodox economic traditions
Browsing through well-known heterodox journals such as the Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics and the Review of Social Economy, one interesting parallel to mainstream eco-
nomic poverty research becomes evident: a considerable percentage of those articles
dealing with poverty are purely empirical with little or no mention of theory. It is thus
diﬃcult to assign them to any speciﬁc theoretical tradition. Having said this, however, I
hasten to add that there are also a number of very interesting theoretical contributions to
heterodox economic poverty research. In what follows I will ﬁrst provide a brief overview
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of some - mainly empirical - publications dealing with the inﬂuence of macroeconomic
factors on poverty, i.e. unemployment and increasing earnings inequality. The second
part of this section focuses on theoretical contributions. These will be shown to be so
original that little to no links to the literature discussed above can be established.
2.3.1 Analyses of macroeconomic inﬂuences
While topics such as growth, unemployment, labour market changes and increasing in-
equality are discussed in the heterodox literature, they are not as dominant as they are
in the mainstream literature. Nonetheless, a number of highly interesting papers dealing
with these issues can be found.
A very interesting paper dealing with unemployment from a Post-Keynesian perspec-
tive, for example, has been contributed by Jackson (1991-92). In The Employment Dis-
tribution and the Creation of Financial Dependence he argues for a closer inspection of
the diﬀerential eﬀects of unemployment. An exclusive focus on the aggregate eﬀects of
unemployment, Jackson holds, overlooks important information regarding the beneﬁcia-
ries and losers of deteriorating economic conditions (Jackson, 1991-92, p. 267). To put it
in Jackson's own words:
In a recession, the employed continue to work at the same job for the same
pay and experience little hardship; the unemployed, by contrast, often face a
complete loss of wage income and become a null-income group (Weintraub,
1985). Incomes are not reduced in equal proportion, and the brunt of the re-
duction is borne by a minority of the working population. This state of aﬀairs
is only too apparent from casual observation, yet it is frequently obscured in
macroeconomic discussion. (ibid., p. 267)
The unemployed minority of the population, Jackson then goes on to argue, loosing all
earned income, often fall into ﬁnancial dependence on the state (ibid., p. 279). Whilst
harming the unemployed themselves, this state of aﬀairs, the author points out, as-
sists the realization and stability of proﬁts by eliciting a higher general level of transfer
payments and expenditure from nonincome sources (ibid., p. 268). Wage payments go
54
down, but eﬀective demand is stabilised at a high level by government subsidies. Thus,
entrepreneurs tend to realise a relatively higher rate of proﬁt. Jackson concludes:
From a Post Keynesian perspective, full-time employment and a high inci-
dence of ﬁnancial dependence on the state are beneﬁcial to employers: they
stabilize aggregate income, ease the realization of proﬁts, and weaken the
bargaining position of workers. [. . . ] Financial dependence is a prime exam-
ple of a socially induced state, and its prevalence is a reminder of the social
and institutional nature of macroeconomics. (Jackson, 1991-92, p. 279)
Summing up, Jackson shows that unemployment is not as unambiguously an evil as it
is often conceived to be. Rather, it could be argued to have strongly beneﬁciary eﬀects
for employers, proﬁt recipients, and the job secure (ibid., p. 279). The question of
employment distribution thus is an important locus of economic power struggles. And
poverty resulting from unemployment may be conceptualised as being at least partly
produced by those people whose interest it serves.
Another much discussed issue arising from the literature is the functioning of the
labour market. Whilst in mainstream economic theory unemployment and low wages
are primarily understood to be the result of defects of individual people - e.g. little
education, low productivity - several heterodox authors question this interpretation.
Howell (2002), for example, evaluates the empirical evidence available in support of
what he calls the Uniﬁed Theory (Howell, 2002, p. 194), that is, the hypothesis that the
increasing income inequality experienced in most advanced nations since the 1980s has
been the result of skill-biased technological change. That is, it is the result of a simple
process of supply-and-demand, with demand shifting to the detriment of the low-skilled
workers (ibid., pp. 193-194). Howell ﬁnds that the empirical evidence supporting this
hypothesis is wanting and thus puts forward an alternative interpretation of the facts.
His approach centres around the negative economic eﬀects of low aggregate demand,
processes of economic restructuring away from agriculture and manufacturing (ibid.,
p. 235), the deregulation of labour markets as well as changes in the sphere of production
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(i.e. increased international mobility). This agglomerate of economic developments, the
author argues, has particularly harmed the low-skilled (Howell, 2002, p. 236).
Cormier and Craypo (2000), concurring with Howell on his rejection of the simple
supply-and-demand story, present yet another explanation of the phenomenon of increas-
ing wage inequality. Their approach is based on labour market segmentation analysis.
The core problem which working-poor households are facing, Cormier and Craypo argue,
are power diﬀerentials on the labour market (Cormier and Craypo, 2000, pp. 691-692).
Diﬀerences in power among individuals and households reﬂect inequalities in
their ability to control the labour market with respect to: (i) employment and
job standards, e.g., to obtain and protect good jobs; (ii) various barriers to
mobility from bad to good employment situations; and (iii) institutionalised
discrimination. Workers possessing little or no such power are relegated to
disadvantaged segments of the labour market in terms of relative resources
and capabilities. Their labour is systematically undervalued as a result, as
are the jobs they hold. (ibid., p. 692)
As, contrary to conventional analysis, Cormier and Craypo locate the cause of increasing
inequality in the structural characteristics of the labour market, the solution they propose
counts on the empowering eﬀects of unionisation, collective bargaining and labour market
regulation combined with a policy of sustained full employment (ibid., p. 707).
Similar arguments to the one presented by Cormier and Craypo can be found in the
extensive literature dealing with female or African-American poverty (see for example
Peterson, 1987; Pressman, 2003; Shulman, 1990). It is often argued that the higher
poverty rates among women and ethnic minority groups are at least in part due to these
groups being adversely aﬀected by power diﬀerentials on the labour market and thus
unequal access to well-paying jobs.
Summing up, it can be shown that the stylized facts of unemployment and increasing
wage inequality are discussed in mainstream as well as in heterodox economic poverty
research but, little surprisingly, the explanations found and policy conclusions drawn
diﬀer considerably.
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2.3.2 Distinctly heterodox strands of analysis
I will now turn the attention towards another set of contributions oﬀering theoretical
analyses of the persistence of poverty in advanced capitalist economies. The papers to
be discussed below can be said to be so distinctively heterodox that little links to what
is discussed in the mainstream literature can be found.
An early example of heterodox theorising on poverty can be found in Hobson's 1891
book Problems of Poverty (1899). In this book Hobson provides us with a detailed theo-
retical discussion of poverty in the late 19th century. After refuting the common fallacy
which takes the shape of an assertion, that poverty is unavoidable because England is not
rich enough to provide a comfortable livelihood for every one (Hobson, 1931, p. 4), he
sets out to analyse the true causes of poverty which he locates in the industrial system.
The major causes of poverty, according to Hobson, are all related to the labour market:
unemployment, irregular employment and low wages (ibid., pp. 14-17). The greatest part
of Hobson's book is thus devoted to the detailed discussion of diverse factors inﬂuencing
the supply of and demand for labour. He identiﬁes four key inﬂuences:
 The increasing mechanisation of production reduces the demand for unskilled labour,
thus resulting in job loss for the most vulnerable part of the wage-earning class,
the low-skilled workers. (ibid., chapter 2)
 The increasing migration of the most talented parts of the rural population into the
big cities increases the supply of labour and thus the competition for low-skilled
employment. This often harms the employment prospects of the less talented parts
of the urban population. (ibid., chapter 3)
 In his discussion of the sweating workshops Hobson discusses at length the detri-
mental inﬂuence of foreign migration on the working conditions of the British work-
ing class. Hobson regards the system of sweating workshops to be the single most
important cause of poverty. The working conditions in these workshops, he argues,
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would be far better if there were less competition from foreign immigrants who
are able and willing to work extremely hard for very little money. (Hobson, 1931,
chapters 4 and 5)
 A further poverty-producing factor, according to Hobson, can be found in the
import of goods. Imported goods reduce demand for domestically produced goods
and thus the domestic demand for labour. (ibid., p. 91)
All of these developments inﬂate the industrial reserve army and thus weaken the bar-
gaining position of the working class as a whole. Consequently, Hobson locates possible
remedies for the problem of poverty in measures that strengthen the working class, such
as unionisation, factory legislation and restrictions of the supply of unskilled labour
(ibid., p. 171).
On the whole, it can be said that, being deeply embedded in historical analysis, Hob-
son's argument strongly resounds later analyses of the poverty problem. There is one
important diﬀerence, however, which should not go unmentioned: the tone in which
Hobson talks about the poor often is disdainful, sometimes even outright antisemitic. In
describing the eﬀects of urbanisation, for example, Hobson writes:
If it were true that only the worthless portion of our country population
passed into our cities to perish in the struggle for existence, which is so fatal
in city life, we should on the whole have reason to congratulate ourselves.
(ibid., p. 54)
Later on, in his discussion of sweating workshops, Hobson keeps coming back to the
detrimental inﬂuence of the foreign Jew (ibid., p. 60):
[. . . ] the foreign Jew is such a terrible competitor. He is the nearest approach
to the ideal economic man, the ﬁttest person to survive in trade compe-
tition. Admirable in domestic morality, and an orderly citizen, he is almost
void of social morality. No compunction or consideration for his fellow-worker
will keep him from underselling and overreaching them; he acquires a thor-
ough mastery of all the dishonourable tricks of trade which are diﬃcult to
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restrain by law; the superior calculating intellect, which is a national heritage,
is used unsparingly to enable him to take advantage of every weakness, folly,
and vice of the society in which he lives. (Hobson, 1931, p. 60)
Personally, I ﬁnd it very hard to disentangle Hobson's economic analysis and his con-
temptuous world views. Is it not very likely that a theorist's perception of his subject
of analysis - the poor - impacts upon his theorising? Thus, despite some insightful the-
oretical arguments contained in his writing, I would be hesitant to turn to Hobson as a
basis for an understanding of contemporary poverty.
A more recent piece of heterodox economic poverty research was contributed by Jan
Toporowski (1993). In his paper Housing as a Wage and Luxury Good: Absolute Poverty
and the Distribution of Income in Supply-Side Economics Toporowski, building upon
Kalecki, questions the trickle-down argument of supply-side economics, according to
which a redistribution of income shares to those with higher incomes is supposed to result
in suﬃcient income growth to make everyone better oﬀ (Toporowski, 1993, p. 330).
He argues that, rather than indirectly beneﬁting the poor through fostering economic
growth, redistribution from the bottom to the top of the income distribution may result
in increasing demand for luxury goods. In case those products build on scarce resources,
this may mean that production is redirected towards luxury production and the supply
of the cheaper alternatives shrinks (ibid., p. 330). He states the case with regard to
housing: as housing space is scarce, increasing demand for luxury housing spurs the
conversion of more and more housing space into high-price properties and thus may
leave more and more poor people unable to ﬁnd aﬀordable accommodation (ibid., p. 333).
Toporowski presents empirical evidence for this phenomenon by relating the extent of
income redistribution during the 1980s to the number of homeless people (ibid., pp. 336-
338). Despite acknowledging diﬃculties with the availability and quality of data, he makes
a convincing case, concluding that
It is widely believed that the welfare state in the UK has eliminated poverty.
Even among those who do not accept this, changes in the distribution of
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income are usually associated with changes in `relative', rather than absolute
deprivation (Townsend, 1979). This article argues that regressive relative
income changes have price and supply eﬀects which are likely to lead to an
increase in absolute poverty. The existence of a commodity that takes up a
large share of the expenditure of virtually all categories of income, which is
a basic necessity, and which is inelastic in supply, is a suﬃcient condition for
absolute poverty to arise when income is redistributed in a regressive way.
(Toporowski, 1993, p. 341)
This argument will be taken up and discussed in some more detail in chapter 4.
Apart from the contributions discussed above, a surprisingly high percentage of het-
erodox attempts at the theoretical explanation of poverty can be attributed to the in-
stitutionalist tradition. The Journal of Economic Issues in particular has published a
number of very promising sounding papers over the last 50 years. Titles such as The
Institutional Economics of Poverty: An Inquiry Into the Causes and Eﬀects of Poverty
(Hill, 1998) and The Political Economy of Poverty: Institutional and Technological Di-
mensions (Hamilton, 1967) may suggest that the problem of understanding the origins
of poverty has long been solved. Unfortunately, those papers more often than not do not
live up to their promises. Hill's The Institutional Economics of Poverty: An Inquiry Into
the Causes and Eﬀects of Poverty, for example, rather than providing a comprehensive
analysis of poverty contains a fairly simple argument that
the failure of the American people to invest adequately in the human capital
represented by impoverished children is both the most important cause and
the most tragic eﬀect of poverty in the United States. (Hill, 1998, p. 279)
Despite being an important explanatory variable for the intergenerational perpetuation
of poverty this certainly cannot explain why there are any poor children in the ﬁrst place.
In Ganley's (1998) Poverty and Charity: Early Analytical Conﬂicts between Institutional
Economics and Neoclassicism, on the other hand, it seems diﬃcult to ﬁnd any substantial
argument at all. Thus, unfortunately, it must be said that, in institutionalist poverty
research all that glitters is not gold.
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Having said this, however, I want to point the reader towards two very interesting
institutionalist contributions: David Hamilton's The Political Economy of Poverty: In-
stitutional and Technological Dimensions dating from 1967 and a more recent paper
by Charles M.A. Clark (2002) entitled Wealth and Poverty: On the Social Creation of
Scarcity.
Hamilton starts his investigation by deﬁning two fundamental questions which ought
to be answered by economic poverty research: How big is the pie? And how is the
existing pie distributed? (Hamilton, 1967, p. 311). He then sets out to answer them
from a Veblenian perspective. The answer to the question of what determines the size of
the economic pie to be distributed, he suggests, lies in the state of the industrial arts
(ibid., p. 312). Thus, what fuels economic progress, he repeats a Veblenian theme, is not
- as neoclassicals and Marxists believe - capital accumulation but technological progress.
The accumulation of knowledge and the development of ever new and better modes of
production are the decisive elements for general economic progress (ibid., pp. 313-314).
It must be recognised, Hamilton stresses,
that anything which is technologically feasible can be funded. In fact, a
thing's technological feasibility is prior to its funding. The latter is merely an
act which gives the technological process institutional sanction; (ibid., p. 313)
The limiting factor, I want to stress one last time, from this point of view is technological
feasibility. Diﬀerences in tool skills (ibid., p. 314) thus, are what distinguishes auent
societies from poor societies.
In Reciprocity, Productivity, and Poverty (Hamilton, 1970) a paper published 3 years
later and thematically following up on The Political Economy of Poverty: Institutional
and Technological Dimensions Hamilton argues that indeed no technological reason ex-
ists for poverty in the modern industrial economy (ibid., p. 35). Whilst a lack of tech-
nological progress might still be an explanatory variable in some developing countries,
it certainly has become obsolete as an explanation of poverty in advanced capitalism
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(Hamilton, 1970, p. 35).
The reason for the continuous existence of poverty in the capitalist nations of abun-
dance, Hamilton points out, again referring to Veblen, is the human propensity for in-
vidious distinctions. According to this line of reasoning all societies ascribe diﬀerent
degree[s] of meritoriousness (Hamilton, 1967, p. 316) to diﬀerent occupations. Some
occupations rank higher in public perception than others. And this process of social val-
uation is what determines the relative incomes of the diﬀerent occupational groups (ibid.,
pp. 316-317). As relative income, understood from this perspective, is the result of social
conventions and ascriptions, obviously no metaphysical justiﬁcation for a speciﬁc income
distribution can be found. Hamilton was thus highly critical of marginalist theory:
Since it is the community through the market mechanism which evaluates
the productivity of these contributions, recourse to the theory of marginal
productivity leads merely to more diﬃcult questions. Since garbage must
be collected and carrots must be dug, the theory does not explain why the
community places such a low valuation on garbage collection and carrot dig-
ging. In other words, why should ditch-digging, technologically essential in
an industrial economy, stigmatize the ditch-digger and hence socially justify
his poverty? (ibid., p. 316)
This lack of recognition for the economic contribution of garbage collectors, carrot dig-
gers and the like, lies at the heart of our sustaining problem of poverty (ibid., p. 319).
Consequently, again in Reciprocity, Productivity, and Poverty, Hamilton concludes that
Nothing short of a massive institutional change can eliminate poverty in the
industrial economy. But this means that ancient and honorable habits of
thought which reinforce and justify ancient and honorable institutions must
give way. (Hamilton, 1970, p. 41)
We must overcome those social conventions ascribing such low value to certain occupa-
tions if ever we want to eliminate poverty. Thus, eliminating poverty, from this perspec-
tive, to say the least, is a long-term goal which cannot be accomplished by simple reliance
on social policy. As long as the fundamental processes of valuation remain unchanged,
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social policy only ever scratches on the surface of the poverty problem (Hamilton, 1970,
pp. 41-42). Whilst providing us with a very interesting and thought-provoking analysis,
Hamilton thus does not give us much orientation with respect to speciﬁc steps that could
be taken in order to ﬁght poverty. On top of that, one could argue that there ought
to be more to the explanation of poverty than this valuation-story would suggest. The
invidious distinctions between diﬀerent occupations could thus be considered as only one,
though important, part of the puzzle.
Other parts are contributed by Clark (2002) in his paper Wealth and Poverty: On the
Social Creation of Scarcity. Clark deﬁnes the purpose of his paper as follows:
to ﬁrst look at this critical history of wealth creating poverty and second to
provide the outlines of a Veblenian explanation of this process. (Clark, 2002,
p. 415)
Thus, it can be said to pursue a very similar goal to the present thesis. Indeed, Clark's
paper brieﬂy covers some of the issues analysed in detail in this thesis. However, the
paper under consideration as a whole is only seven pages long, out of which three pages
are devoted to a history of thought survey on abundance. This leaves Clark with only
four pages to discuss one of the most important phenomena of our time - the creation
of wealth and poverty (ibid., p. 418). Accordingly, despite taking up important parts of
the problem, this is done on a rather superﬁcial level.
Clark lists three major poverty producing processes:
(1) the social creation of scarcity, (2) social exclusion, and (3) the assignment
and shifting of costs. (ibid., p. 418)
Scarcity, Clark argues, is not an intrinsic feature of advanced capitalism. Rather, it is
deliberately created with the aim of generating proﬁts. Scarcity and thus poverty is an
accepted by-product of this strive for wealth. According to Clark, in a Veblenian frame-
work scarcity can be regarded to be primarily created through industrial sabotage and
conspicuous consumption (ibid., p. 418). Clark gives a quick overview of the potentially
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poverty producing eﬀects of these processes but, as I pointed out before, does not go into
the theoretical details. I will not repeat Clark's analysis here as these processes will be
dealt with in far more detail in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
Next, Clark goes on to explain the importance of social exclusion for the creation of
poverty. The argument goes as follows: scarcity is dependent upon the possibility to
exclude parts of the population, e.g. through the institution of private property. For
example: it is only possible to generate value through the selling of a good if the owner
has the possibility to hinder others from using it without paying. Exclusionary social
networks are another example. They generate value for their members through providing
them with insider information which is not accessible to everyone (Clark, 2002, p. 420).
Last but not least, Clark discusses the shifting of costs (ibid., pp. 420-421). Arguing
from an institutionalist understanding of the market (see Dugger, 1989), the author
points out that market prices usually do not cover all costs of production (Clark, 2002,
p. 420). Some of these costs are shifted away to third parties in the form of externalities:
Thus the pollution created by generating electricity is paid for by those who
ingest it into their system. The full cost of the worker  a living wage that
pays for the necessary costs of care giving upon which all in society depend 
is often borne by the workers' families and by those outside of the work force.
(ibid., p. 421)
Clark even goes as far as arguing that the successful shifting away of costs is a precon-
dition for economic success (ibid., p. 421). And the costs, he concludes, most often are
shifted away from the auent and onto the poor (ibid., p. 421). Thus the poor suﬀer
from having to carry a relatively heavy burden of socialised costs (ibid., p. 421).
Clark concludes his short article by arguing that the eﬀect of economic growth in the
US since the 1980s has been to harm the poor through increasing scarcity (ibid., p. 421).
As poverty and wealth, in this understanding, are two sides of the same coin, Clark
congruously points out that
In a very real sense the last thing the poor need is more accumulation of
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wealth. (Clark, 2002, p. 421)
As already alluded to above, Clark's analysis, from my point of view, contains a number of
highly interesting ideas but does not succeed in establishing a comprehensive explanation
of the creation of wealth and poverty (ibid., p. 418). On the one hand, this is due to the
relative superﬁciality of his analysis. On the other hand, a number of important topics,
such as the role of the government, go unmentioned. Thus, there is plenty of more work
to be done in order to formulate a truly comprehensive theory of poverty production.
Summing up, in heterodox economic poverty research we can observe a divide between
empirical and theoretical work, with relatively few points of contact between the two
branches. Whilst empirical work often investigates into similar questions as the main-
stream - e.g. the role of economic growth and unemployment - theoretical work most
often can be said to be distinctively heterodox both in method and questions discussed.
To my great surprise I found relatively little theoretical work dealing explicitly with
poverty in the post-Keynesian literature (for notable exceptions see Toporowski, 1993
and Jackson, 1991-92 discussed above). The majority of heterodox theoretical contribu-
tions to the understanding of poverty seem to belong to the institutional tradition. The
institutionalist analyses, however, can be said to be of very varying quality, some of them
being very well argued, others seeming almost devoid of content. Nonetheless, a number
of very promising bits and pieces for a comprehensive theoretical exploration of poverty
can be found in both the post-Keynesian and the institutionalist tradition. These bits
and pieces most often can be found to be directly derived from the work of Kalecki (see
Toporowski, 1993) or Veblen (see Hamilton, 1967; Clark, 2002), thus reinforcing my de-
cision to focus the present analysis on these authors' theoretical legacy (complemented
by Joan Robinson's inspiring contributions).
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2.4 The importance of the welfare state
The broad range of literature on the welfare state is another part of academic discourse
which may be expected to provide some insights into the problem of poverty. On the fol-
lowing pages I will therefore provide a succinct summary of a few particularly interesting
contributions.
A prominent ﬁgure which is strongly associated with the topic of poverty is Sir William
Beveridge, chairman of the famous Beveridge committee and often referred to as the
father of the modern welfare state. In 1941 Beveridge was asked to head an inquiry
into the existing schemes of social insurance and allied services (Beveridge, 1942, p. 7)
and to give recommendations for post-war reform. The declared aim of the Beveridge
Report was to devise a scheme with which it would be possible to abolish want, or in
other words, poverty (ibid., p. 7). It is important to note in this context, that the work
of the Beveridge committee was of a primarily policy-oriented nature. Beveridge did
not embark upon original research into the causes of poverty. Instead, he relied upon
the empirical work of early British poverty researchers, most importantly the work of
Seebohm Rowntree (Hills, 1999, p. 35). From Rowntree's work Beveridge deduced two
main causes of poverty which should be tackled by his new scheme: the interruption or
loss of earning power (Beveridge, 1942, p. 7) and family size (ibid., p. 7). He then went
on to propose a Plan for Social Security (ibid., p. 7) which builds upon four pillars
(Harris, 1999, p. 24):
 Child allowances to mitigate the eﬀects of large family size. (ibid., p. 24)
 A comprehensive national health service for the prevention and cure of disease and
`restoration of capacity for work available to all members of the community' (Ibid.:
p. 158) (Hill, 1990, p. 30).
 Policy measures to prevent mass unemployment (deﬁned as unemployment levels
of 8 1/2 per cent and above). (ibid., p. 30)
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 A comprehensive social insurance system to provide a safety net against loss of
income through irregular employment, unemployment, sickness, and retirement.
(Harris, 1999, p. 24)
Beveridge's interpretation of Rowntree upon which this proposition is based, however,
is contested. Veit-Wilson (1992) and Hills (1999) provide us with elaborate critiques of
Beveridge's use of diﬀerent poverty lines proposed by Rowntree. In his two major stud-
ies of poverty in York Rowntree made use of various diﬀerent poverty lines (Hills, 1999,
pp. 36-37). In 1899 he deﬁned a primary poverty line covering only the bare necessities for
physical eﬃciency in order to convince people who would accept deﬁnitions of poverty in
terms only of the irreducible scientiﬁc minimum of physiological, but not social, needs
(Veit-Wilson, 1992, p. 284). In his 1936 study Rowntree put forward a more generous deﬁ-
nition of poverty - the Human Needs of Labour (Hills, 1999, p. 37) - which represented
the minimum necessary not just for physical eﬃciency but for `a healthy life ' (ibid.,
p. 37). Veit-Wilson argues that Beveridge deliberately used Rowntree's primary poverty
line - a measure of poverty which even Rowntree himself had already rejected at the time
- whilst adopting a rhetoric which led people to believe that he had adopted a standard
comparable to the Human Needs of Labour poverty line (Veit-Wilson, 1992, pp. 296-297).
Thus, despite Beveridge's claims to the contrary, the beneﬁt levels determined on the
basis of his suggestions
represented not a living income but a state contribution towards one which
recipients would have had to supplement in other ways if they wished to live
social lives. (ibid., p. 284)
Yet, oﬃcial rhetoric always held on to the interpretation that beneﬁt levels are suﬃcient
to provide for subsistence (ibid., pp. 296-297). Veit-Wilson then goes on to argue that
[t]his has led to the commonplace but fallacious assumption that the social
security scales represent a realistic poverty line on which claimants ought to
be able to manage to lead a social life if they are competent. (ibid., p. 271)
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He thus concludes that the continuing conceptual confusion originating in the Beveridge
report resulted in much human suﬀering which could have been avoided otherwise (Veit-
Wilson, 1992, p. 271).
A related argument can be found in Hills (1999). The author argues that it is only
through applying Rowntree's 1899 primary poverty line to the data collected in 1936
that Beveridge could come to the conclusion that loss of earning power and family size
were at the root of the poverty problem (Hills, 1999, p. 37). Against Rowntree's higher
standard, Hills points out, low wages still accounted for a third of poverty (ibid., p. 37).
In a nutshell, it appears that Beveridge's accomplishments were considerably more
important on the level of policy than on the level of theory. This notwithstanding,
the contemporary discussion surrounding his use of diﬀerent poverty lines indicates the
extraordinarily close interrelation of theory and practice in the ﬁeld of poverty research.
As regards theoretical analyses of the welfare state, the best-known contribution has
been published by the Danish sociologist Gosta Esping-Andersen. In his well-acclaimed
book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Esping-Andersen (1990) proposes a ty-
pology of three fundamentally diﬀerent types of welfare states: the liberal welfare state,
the corporatist welfare state and the social democratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen,
1990, pp. 26-27). This typology can be said to have laid the foundation for large parts of
contemporary discussion surrounding diﬀerent aspects of the welfare state. Thus, it does
not come as a surprise that it is sometimes called upon in connection with the problem
of poverty. In their 2005 article Welfare Regimes and Poverty Dynamics: The Duration
and Recurrence of Poverty Spells in Europe Fouarge and Layte , for example, empirically
analyse
how well the diﬀerent welfare states of Europe perform in terms of preventing
recurrent and persistent income poverty and what household and individual
characteristics inﬂuence poverty duration. (Fouarge and Layte, 2005, p. 407)
Building on data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) covering
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the years 1993 to 1997, the authors attempt a comparative analysis of poverty dynam-
ics in diﬀerent EU member states (Fouarge and Layte, 2005, p. 409). They start their
analysis from an extended version of Esping-Andersen's typology, which diﬀerentiates
between liberal welfare states, corporatist welfare states, social democratic welfare states
and Southern European welfare states (ibid., p. 409). The authors hypothesise that the
diﬀerent types of welfare states, through diﬀerences in institutions and regulations, dif-
ferently impact upon the distribution of poverty over time (ibid., p. 409) and the length
of poverty spells. More precisely, Fouarge and Layte expect the following results:
Using this framework we expect that social democratic regimes would lead to
fewer poverty entries and more exits than corporatist regimes, as, although
levels of payment in the latter may be relatively high, entitlements tend to
be restricted to `core' groups with a history of employment. The higher
levels of active labour market policy in social democratic regimes should also
have a negative impact on the probability of experiencing poverty and the
spell duration. However, corporatist and social democratic regimes should
both have more eﬀective anti-poverty policies than either liberal or Southern
European type regimes, which tend to have means tested, low-level universal
beneﬁt systems in the case of liberal and piecemeal or non-existent beneﬁt
systems in the case of Southern European regimes. This pattern would be
supported by the general absence of active labour market policies in these
types of regimes. (ibid., pp. 409-410)
They hasten to point out, however, that other variables, such as the levels of incentives,
may distort the results (ibid., p. 410). This caveat notwithstanding, the authors ﬁnd
empirical support for their initial hypotheses. Fouarge and Layte thus arrive at the
following conclusions:
In particular, countries in the social democratic tradition do a better job of
preventing both short- and long-term poverty. Countries in the liberal tradi-
tion and Southern European countries display much higher rates of poverty
and longer durations of poverty spells, while countries in the corporatist tra-
dition take an intermediate position. Despite their dissimilar patterns of
poverty duration, European welfare states display rather similar probabili-
ties of exit from poverty, once we control for duration, though these similar
rates may be the result of very diﬀerent processes with social democratic and
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corporatist countries having high exit rates that decrease quickly whereas
liberal and Southern European countries have moderately high rates that re-
main more constant over time. This could suggest lower levels of incentives
in the former. (Fouarge and Layte, 2005, p. 423)
Furthermore, the authors point out, the results of their study conﬁrm the theoretical
adequacy of the welfare regime approach (ibid., p. 423).
This assessment, however, is by no means uncontested. In their paper A Re-examination
of Welfare States and Inequality in Rich Nations: How In-kind Transfers and Indirect
Taxes Change the Story Garﬁnkel, Rainwater and Smeeding (Garﬁnkel, Rainwater and
Smeeding, 2006), for example, criticise comparative studies for their exclusive reliance
on data concerning cash or near-cash transfers (ibid., p. 897) and direct taxes. As
soon as in-kind beneﬁts and indirect taxation are taken into account, the authors ar-
gue, cross-national diﬀerences in welfare expenditure shrink considerably, putting into
question the applicability of the welfare regimes approach (ibid., pp. 912-913). A very
similar argument has also been put forward repeatedly since the late 1990s by OECD's
Willem Adema and his colleagues (see for example Adema and Ladaique (2005)). As
these studies do not directly address the question of poverty, however, I will not discuss
them in any more detail.
A more recent contribution to the discussion of the nexus between the welfare state
and poverty has been made by Bea Cantillon (2011) who sought to evaluate the success
or failure of the European Union's Lisbon agenda in combating poverty. The author
seeks to explain
the stylized empirical fact that, despite higher average incomes, increased
employment rates and high levels of social spending, most European welfare
states have failed to make further progress in the ﬁght against (relative)
income poverty, particularly among the working-age population. (Cantillon,
2011, p. 445)
Cantillon identiﬁes three trends which help to explain this disappointing development:
70
First, rising employment has beneﬁted workless households only marginally.
Consequently, the number of job-rich households has increased while the num-
ber of jobless households has remained largely unchanged. Second, poverty
among the unemployed and workless households has increased in almost all
Member States. Third, new work- related spending  which tends to be less
pro-poor  has increased, while the generosity of traditional `passive' income
support has declined. (Cantillon, 2011, p. 445)
The author then concludes that it would be advisable for the European Union to abandon,
at least partially, the predominant strategy of the social investment state and return to
an adapted version of the old redistributive agenda (ibid., p. 445) in order to achieve
their goal to alleviate poverty.
A comparatively radical criticism of the welfare state has been voiced by the promi-
nent guild socialist G.D.H. Cole. In his pamphlet Is this socialism? Cole (2011 [1954])
criticised the Labour government of his time for sacriﬁcing its socialist ideals and set-
tling for welfare policies instead. He conceded that considerable progress has been made
in the ﬁght against poverty. Yet, this progress, Cole warned, was dependent upon full
employment and thus potentially unstable (Cole, 2011 [1954], p. 13). On an even more
fundamental level, Cole criticised the British welfare state for obstructing the develop-
ment of a truly socialist, classless society. He asked:
In other words, is the Welfare State, in the form in which it has been
developed so far, a step on the road to Socialism, or a step in [sic!] quite
diﬀerent direction - that is a step, not towards a classless society, but rather
towards a new stratiﬁcation that is likely to persist and to become more
marked? (ibid., p. 16)
His answer left no room for doubt. The British welfare state of the 1950s, Cole pointed
out, certainly was less elitist and more inclusive than the highly stratiﬁed aristocratic
society it succeeded, but it was by no means a society which provided equal life chances for
all its members (ibid., p. 15). Quite the opposite seemed to be true for some particularly
vulnerable groups:
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What we are getting in practice appears to be a society in which the ﬁeld of
recruitment for the superior positions is being considerably widened, so as to
give those who can get as far as the higher ranges of grammar or technical
education an improved chance of rising further even if their parents cannot
aﬀord to help them. But at the same time we are putting an increasingly
diﬃcult barrier between those who get so far and those who do not, and this
is still in the main a class barrier, though it has been moved further down
the social scale. (Cole, 2011 [1954], p. 15)
Cole's writing thus invites the counterintuitive interpretation that the institutions of the
modern welfare state, while strengthening the middle classes, may in fact to a certain
extent provide an obstacle to the abolition of poverty rather than further its cause.
On the whole, I want to argue that the available literature on the welfare state, while
discussing the problem of poverty, appears to have a very diﬀerent focus to the one
embraced in this thesis. Enquiries into the nexus between poverty and the welfare state,
rather than trying to understand the economic causes of poverty, tend to take poverty as
a given and evaluate diﬀerent policies to alleviate it. It is beyond doubt that this kind
of analysis addresses important questions, but it has very little common ground with the
problematique guiding the present enquiry which aims at understanding how poverty is
created in the ﬁrst place.
Concluding remarks
This literature review, I want to suggest, supports the following argument:
The ﬁrst impression that emerges when studying mainstream economic poverty re-
search is that it consists mainly of a) highly technical discussions of measurement issues
and b) purely empirical studies. Considering only the theoretical accounts, most re-
peat a behaviouristic theme attributing poverty to one or another characteristic of the
poor themselves. The very few publications which take a broader view cover a set of
very interesting questions. These, however, to my knowledge, have not yet been elab-
orated in any systematic manner, so as to provide us with an alternative account of
the origins of poverty. Thus, it might be concluded for the time being, that the causal
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analysis of poverty in the mainstream literature can largely be summarised in two hy-
potheses: Firstly, poverty arises because there is not enough economic growth. Secondly,
the poverty of individual people can mostly be attributed to individual characteristics
and failures, such as unfortunate life decisions and impatience. This approach, I want to
argue, is problematic for two reasons:
1. It reduces the complexity of the poverty problem to a simplistic culture-of-poverty
thesis, which in non-economic poverty research has already been discarded decades
ago.
2. Apart from being overly simplistic, the behaviouristic theories of poverty under
scrutiny here turned out to be based on circular reasoning.
Marxist poverty research provides a very diﬀerent picture. Contrary to mainstream
accounts, much emphasis is laid on the analysis of structural causes originating in the
mode of production. Marxist scholars identify some very interesting poverty producing
tendencies which they argue to be inherent in the capitalist system. They also draw
a more variegated picture of the poor population, recognising the existence of diﬀerent
groups of poor people and thus the need for a multi-class analysis. Yet, the feeling
arises that some Marxists underestimate the role of individual or group agency in the
explanation of social dynamics. This could be argued to be an aspect which would need
further attention in order to arrive at a truly comprehensive understanding of poverty.
Turning to contributions from other heterodox traditions, i.e. post-Keynesian and
institutionalist, a two-fold picture emerges: On the one hand we ﬁnd a variety of mainly
empirical contributions dealing with the relevance of macroeconomic inﬂuences for an
understanding of poverty. These publications address similar questions as parts of the
mainstream literature, yet arrive at very diﬀerent interpretations. On the other hand,
some highly original theoretical accounts can be found. These accounts, however, tend
to focus on a subset of speciﬁc aspects of the problem of poverty. No comprehensive
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theoretical explanation of poverty emerges from the literature. Nonetheless, a number
of very promising bits and pieces for a comprehensive theoretical exploration of poverty
can be found in both the post-Keynesian and the institutionalist tradition. This thesis
aims to be a step forward towards collecting, assembling and complementing the diﬀerent
pieces of this puzzle.
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3 Establishing compatibility
This chapter lays the foundations for the rest of this thesis, which ultimately aims at
establishing a synthesis between Veblenian, Kaleckian and Robinsonian thought, in that
it establishes the fundamental epistemological and methodological compatibility of the
three approaches.
The importance of methodological questions for economic theorising, whilst often being
ignored, seems to be well established within at least the heterodox part of the economics
profession. The epistemological foundations of the diﬀerent economic theories tend to ﬁnd
less consideration. I would argue, however, that the answers to epistemological questions
such as `What can we know?' are of equal importance for an evaluation of the mutual
compatibility of diﬀerent theories as their methodological foundations. Therefore, this
chapter considers both methodological and epistemological diﬀerences and similarities in
the works of Veblen, Kalecki and Robinson.
The chapter starts oﬀ with a discussion of the epistemological and methodological
positions underlying Veblen's work. This is followed by an account of Robinson's views
on these matters. Last but not least, the philosophical foundations of Kalecki's work
will be expounded. The chapter will close with a short summary of the main points of
argument and a concluding section.
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3.1 Thorstein Veblen
This subchapter is devoted to an in-depth analysis of the philosophical foundations of
Veblen's thought. I will open the ﬁeld with a brief exposition of the epistemological
undercurrent. Next follows a more detailed discussion of the main issue of this chapter,
namely the scientiﬁc methodology employed by Veblen. Finally, as Veblen is often said to
be highly inﬂuenced by the pragmatist philosophers of his time, the last section considers
the literature available on this question in order to arrive at an evaluation of the inﬂuence
of pragmatism on Veblen's thought.
3.1.1 Epistemology
Veblen's epistemological position provides us with a very interesting subject of study.
Contemporary institutionalists do not seem to agree on this matter. The only deﬁnitive
point of agreement is that Veblen decidedly rejected the idea of an absolute truth existing
independently of the knowing subject. With regard to the further interpretation of this
rejection two diﬀerent views can be found in the literature: Some authors argue that the
rejection of absolutism leads Veblen to adopt a relativist theory of knowledge and thus
to believe that no reality exists independently of its observer (see for example Reuter,
1996, pp. 75-76). Miller, on the other hand, rejects this interpretation, arguing that:
But, to state that an absolutist theory of reality is rejected, is not to imply
that a relativist one is accepted. The statement that there is no eternal,
absolute, ultimate reality does not suggest that there is no reality; that there
exist only many perspectives, each with an equal claim to validity. There is
a reality that stems, not from outside, but from within, the system. In truth,
that tree that falls in the forest really does fall, whether or not anyone hears
it. Pragmatism rejects equally the absolutist or rational, and the empirical
or relativist, theory of value. (Miller, 1991, p. 1000)
Or, as Dyer put it
Veblen argues that while brute facts do exist, we construct their meanings
guided by the laws of the activity of our faculties of knowledge. Induction,
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he believes, depends upon deﬁnite mental predispositions through which we
organize our knowledge of facts. (Dyer, 1986, p. 32)
According to these authors, Veblen is going middle ground between absolutism and rel-
ativism.
Interestingly enough, those authors who describe Veblen as relativist are from the
German-speaking part of Europe, whereas those who posit the intermediary position are
American. Thus, the diﬀerence in interpretation may be due to a phenomenon observed
by Hans Joas who argued that pragmatism1 has often been misunderstood in continental
Europe because it is such a speciﬁcally American way of thinking. Continental Europeans
often have diﬃculties in accessing the philosophical arguments of pragmatists. Thus,
pragmatism could be regarded as a prime example for the cultural embeddedness of
scientiﬁc reasoning (Joas, 1992, pp. 11-13). If we accept this interpretation, the logical
consequence would be to assume that Miller's and Dyer's dialectical interpretations are
likely to do better justice to what Veblen intended to convey. Veblen thus can be regarded
as adopting neither a purely relativist nor a purely absolutist stance; rather, he opted
for an intermediary position.
3.1.2 Methodology
The ﬁrst impression to be got upon closer enquiry into Veblen's methodological contribu-
tion is the immense controversiality of opinions surrounding it. Even more than on other
aspects of Veblen's thought the diversity of diﬀerent, even contradictory evaluations and
interpretations is astounding.
Concerning a general evaluation of Veblen's methodology, for example, opinions range
from totally dismissive to positive and hopeful:
In relation to the development of scientiﬁc method in economics, Veblen's
contribution cannot be highly rated. (Coats, 1954, p. 537)
1The philosophical movement which - as we will see below - many authors see as providing the philo-
sophical foundations of Veblenian institutionalism.
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Veblen never managed to translate his methodological outline into a usable
or appealing theory of institutional change. (Rutherford, 1998, p. 464)
Although there is now revived interest among economists in the idea of evolu-
tion, the requirements that Veblen laid out are demanding. Institutionalists,
anthropologists and other social scientists, if they wish to follow Veblen's
lead, will have to take history and comparative studies seriously, will have
to incorporate an adequate explanation of novelty, and will have to give up
universal criteria for a good economy. (Mayhew, 1998, pp. 459-460)
Turning to method, it is sometimes suggested that Veblen's contributions
carry no methodological implications for substantive economics. But I think
we can now see that this is incorrect. Of course, in advance of a particular
investigation it is rarely, if ever, feasible to determine which precise methods
will prove to be the most useful in any given context. But it is often possible
to throw light on the sorts of methodological orientations or approaches that
will be required. (Lawson, 2003, p. 215)
But controversiality does not end here. Indeed, it can also be observed in discussions
of the details of Veblen's method. Summarising Veblen's method, Griﬃn, for example,
characterises it as material, experimental, and quantitative (Griﬃn, 1998, p. 748).
Reuter, on the other hand, describes it as evolutionary, holistic and genetic (Reuter,
1996, p. 105). Despite not wanting to dismiss Griﬃn's interpretation, I want to argue
that Reuter's understanding is certainly closer to the current institutionalist canon of
thought. Nonetheless, I believe that Reuter's analysis sometimes falls short of providing
us with a complete picture of the implications of Veblen's methodological thought. In
what follows, I will thus propose a similar, yet slightly more comprehensive analysis of
Veblenian methodology. Veblen's scientiﬁc method, I want to argue, can be described
as subjectivist, open, historical, interdisciplinary and holistic. The decision to use more
general terminology has also been inﬂuenced by the objective to facilitate the comparison
of Veblenian, Kaleckian and Robinsonian methodology. I will now examine each of the
above mentioned features in more detail.
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Subjectivist
Veblen's methodology can be characterised as subjectivist in so far as he regards changes
in the people's perceptions and habits of thought as the cause of economic change. He
holds that the material facts of life, that is the resources available to mankind, do not
change. It is only the people's perceptions of what can be done with the resources
available to them that change (Veblen, 1898, pp. 387-391). Thus, Veblen can conﬁdently
conclude that
The change is always in the last resort a change in habits of thought. (ibid.,
p. 391)
The theoretical focus in the analysis of economic change, thus, according to Veblen must
lie on an analysis of changes in the habits of thought of the people. The starting point
of theoretical analysis is not the material world per se, but people's interpretations of
material phenomena (ibid., pp. 387-388). This is why Veblen's approach can be labelled
as subjectivist. It is important to note, though, that subjectivism as it is employed here
is not to be confused with epistemological relativism. Veblen does not refer to individual
subjective realities; rather, he refers to the collectively constructed reality of the social
group (ibid., p. 391).
Open
The primary methodological claim of Veblen'sWhy is economics not an evolutionary sci-
ence? is that, as the title suggests, economics should adopt an evolutionary methodology.
Evolutionary is deﬁned as being non-teleological, that is as not following a predetermined
path or converging towards some ideal state, as for example neoclassical equilibrium anal-
ysis suggests (ibid., p. 378). Development is understood as a blind, undetermined process
building upon all that has come before (Wisman and Rozansky, 1991, p. 713). Whilst
teleological theory building is future-oriented, looking to achieve some predetermined
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ideal state, non-teleological enquiry is always backwards-looking, aiming at explaining
what has happened and what is happening (Veblen, 1909, pp. 627-628). In short, non-
teleological reasoning concerns itself with the explanation of processes of cumulative
change (Veblen, 1898, p. 387). The preﬁx cumulative means that
each new situation is a variation of what has gone before it and embodies as
causal factors all that has been eﬀected by what went before. (Veblen, 1909,
p. 628)
But, as I have stressed above, this does not mean that development processes are prede-
termined by earlier events. Argyrous and Sethi (1996) argue that Veblen posits openness
as a basic principle at both the micro and the macro economic level:
Whilst positing the fundamental indeterminacy of human behaviour, they argue, Ve-
blen still concedes teleological inﬂuences at the micro level in so far as the individual
should be conceived of as a purposeful entity (Argyrous and Sethi, 1996, p. 477). This
does not mean, however, that the purposes which these individuals pursue are predeter-
mined or even known.
The desires and objectives of individual agents are not given and universal,
but can take various forms. (ibid., p. 477)
At the macro level as well, the whole is more than its individual parts and thus a funda-
mentally undetermined process of cumulative causation (ibid., p. 477).
Argyrous and Sethi thus conclude that
It is only by freeing up the process at both the micro and macro levels from
teleological constraints, and allowing each systematically to aﬀect the other,
that we can have truly evolutionary theory. (ibid., pp. 477-478)
Historical
The Veblenian method can be described as historical, that is as having an important
time dimension, for three reasons:
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Firstly, as economic theory, according to Veblen, should concern itself with the expla-
nation of processes of cumulative causation, the method employed necessarily needs to
be processual, able to capture dynamic change (Veblen, 1899, p. 123). Methods aimed at
the analysis of static situations are inadmissible (Veblen, 1908). Dealing with processes
of change and cumulative causation, it is obvious that questions of timing and sequence
are important. Thus, Veblen's evolutionary theory has to take account of what hap-
pens when and in which order (Veblen, 1899, pp. 123-124). That is, it has to contain an
important time dimension.
Secondly, following on from what has just been said, evolutionary theory building
should be understood as backwards-looking. Forecasts are inadmissible as the future is
regarded as fundamentally uncertain. Thus, economic theory has to contend itself with
explaining what has happened in the past and with trying to understand current devel-
opments. The subject matter of economics thus is primarily historical, with evolutionary
economics largely being a study in economic history (Veblen, 1909, pp. 627-628).
Thirdly, again closely related to what has already been said, economic theorising,
according to Veblen, is a historical enterprise in that its results are always historically
contingent. Economists working in the Veblenian tradition can never hope to uncover
`natural laws' (Veblen, 1898, p. 392). Rather, they need to be aware that the results
they obtain are always emerging from a speciﬁc historical situation and thus that, as the
economy develops, economic theory has to change as well (Veblen, 1900, p. 241).
But modern scientiﬁc inquiry in any case comes to rest only provisionally;
because its prime postulate is that of consecutive change, and consecutive
change can, of course, not come to rest except provisionally. By its own
nature the inquiry cannot reach a ﬁnal term in any direction. (Veblen, 1994
[1908], p. 33)
Summing up, Veblenian methodology can be characterised as historical because the
analysis of cumulative change has an important time dimension, because it is mostly
backwards-looking, explaining past processes, and ﬁnally, because its results are under-
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stood to be historically contingent, that is valid only in the speciﬁc historical situation
under study.
Interdisciplinary
The economic sphere, Veblen holds, is so closely intertwined with other spheres that it
can only ever be understood in its interrelation with those spheres. The subject ﬁeld of
economics thus is hard to delineate. On top of that, an understanding of economic phe-
nomena necessitates knowledge from neighbouring disciplines. Thus, economic research,
in order to accommodate the immense complexity and interrelatedness of its subject mat-
ter, always to a certain extent has to be interdisciplinary (Veblen, 1898, pp. 392-393).
Holistic
Veblenian analysis can be said to be holistic insofar as it is neither methodologically
individualist nor collectivist. Veblen is very concerned about drawing a comprehensive
picture, taking into account dialectical processes of development.
The growth and mutations of the institutional fabric are an outcome of the
conduct of the individual members of the group, since it is out of the expe-
rience of the individuals, through the habituation of individuals, that insti-
tutions arise; and it is in this same experience that these institutions act to
direct and deﬁne the aims and end of conduct. It is, of course, on individuals
that the system of institutions imposes those conventional standards, ideals,
and canons of conduct that make up the community's scheme of life. Scientiﬁc
inquiry in this ﬁeld, therefore, must deal with individual conduct and must
formulate its theoretical results in terms of individual conduct. But such an
inquiry can serve the purposes of a genetic theory only if and in so far as this
individual conduct is attended to in those respects in which it counts toward
habituation, and so toward change (or stability) of the institutional fabric,
on the one hand, and in those respects in which it is prompted and guided by
the received institutional conceptions and ideals on the other hand. (Veblen,
1909, pp. 629-630)
Thus, I want to argue that Veblen can safely be said to be a truly holistic theorist.
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3.1.3 Pragmatism
Veblen's (general) philosophical approach is widely attributed to the pragmatist tradition
(see for example Mirowski, 1987; Reuter, 1996; Griﬃn, 1998; Hodgson, 1998; Twomey,
1998; Barbalet, 2008). Indeed, Veblen used to be a student of Peirce, the widely acclaimed
founding father of pragmatism, during his time at John Hopkins University (Griﬃn,
1998, p. 734). According to Griﬃn, Veblen received three months of general tutorials
(ibid., p. 734) from Peirce. Apart from this, relatively little is known of the extent of
Veblen's knowledge of and contact with pragmatism. Veblen himself never mentioned
Peirce in writing (ibid., p. 734). When referring to pragmatism in general, Reuter argues,
Veblen at ﬁrst was highly critical and dismissed it as being incompatible with his own
understanding of science (Reuter, 1996, pp. 81-82). He was particularly critical of the
pragmatists' stress on expediency, himself highlighting the importance of disinterested
inquiry (Veblen, 1906, p. 599). Contrasting pragmatism and science, Veblen claims
Pragmatism creates nothing but maxims of expedient conduct. Science cre-
ates nothing but theories. It knows nothing of policy or utility, of better
or worse. None of all that is comprised in what is today accounted sci-
entiﬁc knowledge. Wisdom and proﬁciency of the pragmatic sort does not
contribute to the advance of a knowledge of fact. It has only an inciden-
tal bearing on scientiﬁc research, and its bearing is chieﬂy that of inhibition
and misdirection. Wherever canons of expediency are intruded into or are
attempted to be incorporated in the inquiry, the consequence is an unhappy
one for science, however happy it may be for some other purpose extraneous
to science. The mental attitude of worldly wisdom is at cross-purposes with
the disinterested scientiﬁc spirit, and the pursuit of it induces an intellectual
bias that is incompatible with scientiﬁc insight. (ibid., p. 600)
Reuter, referring to Daugert, suggests that Veblen's dismissive evaluation of the com-
patibility of pragmatism with his own approach is based on his incomplete knowledge
of pragmatism rather than on pragmatist writing per se (Reuter, 1996, p. 82). In The
Higher Learning in America, published twelve years after his original critique, Veblen
seems to be more positive with regard to pragmatist philosophy, arguing that pragmatist
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theories have evolved and indeed made their peace with (Veblen, 1957 [1918], p. 4)
his own stress of the character of science as disinterested enquiry. In the later stages of
his career, Veblen can thus be said to have embraced pragmatism as compatible with
his own approach. Indeed, notwithstanding Veblen's critical remarks, contemporary
institutionalists agree that Veblen was highly inﬂuenced by the writings of the ﬁrst gen-
eration pragmatists. Whilst most authors argue that the primary pragmatist inﬂuences
were Peirce and James (Griﬃn, 1998; Twomey, 1998; Hodgson, 1998; Barbalet, 2008),
Mirowski suggests that Dewey and James were indeed more important inﬂuences than
Peirce himself. However, all agree on the strong pragmatist inﬂuence underlying Veblen's
thought.
3.2 Joan Robinson
Joan Robinson was very explicit about the philosophical background of her work. While
not necessarily aligning herself with any speciﬁc philosophical tradition, on numerous
occasions she discussed epistemological and methodological questions. On the following
pages I will ﬁrst discuss Robinson's epistemological statements and then follow on with
an overview of her methodological position. Finally, the compatibility of Robinson's
approach with critical realism - which is often referred to as the philosophical basis of
post-Keynesian economics - will very brieﬂy be considered.
3.2.1 Epistemology
As far as the epistemological foundations of her work are concerned, Robinson's writings,
I want to suggest, are ambiguous. On the one hand, a strongly relativist stance can
clearly be detected. On the other hand, Robinson's belief in the falsiﬁability of economic
theories suggests a realist perspective. In what follows I will brieﬂy review both aspects
of Robinson's work.
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Robinson's leaning towards relativism is made explicit in Economic Philosophy (Robin-
son, 1962). In this book she argues that
One reason why modern life is so uncomfortable is that we have grown self-
conscious about things that used to be taken for granted. Formerly people
believed what they believed because they thought it was true, or because it
was what all right-thinking people thought. But since Freud exposed to us
our propensity to rationalization and Marx showed how our ideas spring from
ideologies we have begun to ask: Why do I believe what I believe? The fact
that we ask such questions implies that we think that there is an answer to
be found but, even if we could answer them at one layer, another remains
behind: Why do I believe what I believe about what it is that makes me
believe it? So we remain in an impenetrable fog. Truth is no longer true.
Evil is no longer wicked. `It all depends on what you mean.' (ibid., p. 7)
This demonstrates a very relativist understanding of knowledge. As our cognition, Robin-
son argues, is always coloured by our experiences and prejudices, there is no way of
obtaining objective knowledge. Even though reality may exist independently of our cog-
nition, we are incapable of apprehending it. The only way of perceiving reality as it
really is, Robinson suggests, is through the repeated testing of hypotheses (ibid., p. 27).
The objectivity of science arises, not because the individual is impartial, but
because many individuals are continually testing each other's theories. (ibid.,
p. 27)
Thus, Robinson seems to argue, that out of the multiplicity of subjective observations
and interpretations arises objectivity.
This is closely related to the second aspect of Robinson's epistemological thinking,
namely her belief in falsiﬁcation. Robinson repeatedly seems to suggest that the method-
ological problem of economics arises out of its incapability to formulate testable hypothe-
ses (ibid., p. 26). Economists, she claims, should aim at the formulation of testable hy-
potheses rather than relying on metaphysical propositions (ibid., p. 9). This implies,
however, that there is a way for economists to perceive reality. This, I would like to
argue, contradicts her earlier assertion of the unknowability of `the truth'. How could we
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falsify hypotheses without being able to decide between what is true and what is not?
One possible way of reconciling these two fundamentally contradictory propositions is
provided by, as has been suggested above, Robinson's belief that objectivity arises out of
the process of many researchers testing each others hypotheses. This stance reminds me
of the pragmatist understanding of socially constructed truth. On the epistemological
level, thus, Robinson may be interpreted as adopting a similar stance to Veblen, despite
her somewhat irritating stress on falsiﬁability.
3.2.2 Methodology
Methodological reasoning featured high in Robinson's work . Very early on in her ca-
reer she started to enquire into the methodological basis of economics. Her ﬁrst major
methodological publication was a pamphlet entitled Economics is A Serious Subject (Har-
court, 1990, p. 63). In Joan Robinson's Early Views on Method Geoﬀ Harcourt (1990)
argues that Robinson fundamentally changed her methodological position shortly after
publication of the pamphlet, following a quite diﬀerent approach in the introduction to
The Economics of Imperfect Competition only a year after publication of the pamphlet
(ibid., pp. 63-64). The following analysis will thus focus on later methodological state-
ments. Important later publications dealing with matters of methodology are Economic
Philosophy (Robinson, 1962), Time in Economic Theory (Robinson, 1980d), History
Versus Equilibrium (Robinson, 1980 [1974]) and Thinking About Thinking (Robinson,
1980c). Reading through these publications four major methodological principles can be
detected: Robinson's proposed methodology can be described as historical, holistic, inter-
disciplinary and open. These are not categories used by Robinson herself but I will argue
that they are nonetheless very useful for describing and comparing her methodological
position.
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Historical
The methodological principle most highlighted by Robinson is the importance of his-
torical analysis. A number of publications, most notably Time in Economic Theory
(Robinson, 1980d) and History Versus Equilibrium (Robinson, 1980 [1974]) are explic-
itly devoted to the establishment of the importance of the time dimension in economic
theory. Robinson introduces the diﬀerentiation between logical time and historical time,
arguing that economic theory should always concern itself with historical time (Robinson,
1980d). She is highly critical of neoclassical static equilibrium analysis for failing to take
account of the cumulative, dynamic aspects of economic change (Robinson, 1980 [1974],
pp. 57-58).
We might suppose that we can take a number of still photographs of economies
each in stationary equilibrium; let us suppose that the `measurement' problem
can be solved by calculating all values in terms of labour time, and that it
happens that the economies can be arranged in a series in which a larger value
of capital per man employed is associated with a higher net output per man
of a homogenous consumption good, as on Professor Samuelson's `surrogate
production function'. This is an allowable thought experiment. But it is not
allowable to ﬂip the stills through a projector to obtain a moving picture of
a process of accumulation. (ibid., p. 57)
Economic change, Robinson repeatedly stresses, originates in the past and reaches into
an unknowable future. It is an open, unpredictable process which is far from follow-
ing any predetermined pattern, e.g. automatically adjusting to equilibrium (Robinson,
1980d, p. 219). Like Veblen, Robinson was primarily interested in explaining dynamic
processes of economic change. She was not interested in simply describing and compar-
ing stationary states but wanted to explain how real economies develop (Robinson, 1980
[1974], p. 57). And she never tired of stressing that in order to be able to do so economic
theory has to give due account to history (ibid., p. 49). Economic theory, Robinson was
convinced, has to take to the turbulent waters of truly dynamic analysis (Robinson,
1980 [1977][b], p. 70) in order to be relevant.
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Apart from stressing the dynamic aspect of economic theorising, Robinson's analy-
sis was also historical in so far as she rejected the possibility of ﬁnding general laws
(Robinson, 1980d, p. 228). Economic theory-building, Robinson argues, cannot hope to
uncover ahistorically valid general laws; rather, it has to contend itself with enquiring
how things happen (ibid., p. 228). Economic theories always are historically contingent
and can never provide a knock-down answer (Robinson, 1962, p. 26). Thus, like Veblen,
Robinson conceptualises economic theory building as an ongoing process which can only
ever come to rest provisionally.
This stress on the historical contingency of economic ideas points us towards another
important methodological principle underlying Robinson's work: the close interrelation
of theory with empirical data. Despite being a purely theoretical economist herself,
Robinson used to closely collaborate with highly skilled empirical economists such as
Kalecki. Thus she ensured the empirical relevance of her theoretical work (Harcourt,
2002, p. 95). In her methodological writings, Robinson's endeavour for the empirical
validity of economic theory surfaces in her discussion of the role of assumptions. It is
of utmost importance, Robinson holds, that economists be as explicit as possible about
the assumptions on which their theories are built. This requirement is often neglected in
economic analysis (Robinson, 1980c, p. 111). It fulﬁls two important functions, though:
ﬁrstly, it facilitates the evaluation of competing theories with respect to the realism
- and thus appropriateness - of their assumptions. That is, theoretical assumptions,
according to Robinson, should represent the real world. Secondly, making explicit the
assumptions underlying the diﬀerent theoretical approaches facilitates communication
between theorists (ibid., p. 111). Ideally, Robinson argues,
Each party should set out clearly the assumptions on which his argument is
based; by mutual criticism they can arrive at agreement about what conse-
quences follow from what assumptions and then they can join in an amicable
discussion about what evidence must be found to show which set of assump-
tions (if either) is relevant to the problem in hand. (ibid., p. 111)
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Robinson notes, however, that this ideal case is far removed from actual economic dis-
course:
For this method to be successful, both parties must follow it. An attempt
by one party to proceed in this way is frustrated if the other continues to
reiterate his conclusions or insists that his own set of assumptions is the
only one that can legitimately be made. Unfortunately, the greater part of
economic controversies arise from confronting dogmas. The style of argument
is that of theology, not of science. This has grown with the growth of a
large and ﬂourishing profession, in which jobs depend on supporting opinions
acceptable to those in authority. (Robinson, 1980c, p. 111)
Her plea for the disclosure of assumptions so far remains largely unheard from the greatest
part of the profession.
Holistic
Robinson adopted a methodology that was neither strictly individualist nor strictly col-
lectivist. Rather, I would say, she takes up an intermediary position looking at the
interrelations between individual and collective behaviour. Indeed, she was very inter-
ested in the role of diﬀerent institutions in shaping individual behaviour (Harcourt, 1990,
p. 63):
it is obviously impossible to discuss the behaviour of individuals in a vacuum
without saying anything about the legal, political and economic setting in
which they are to operate. (Robinson, 1980b, p. 92)
A further related issue which is discussed in Robinson's writings are the close interrela-
tions between micro- and macro-theory:
Micro questions  concerning the relative prices of commodities and the be-
havior of individuals, ﬁrms, and households  cannot be discussed in the air
without any reference to the structure of the economy in which they exist,
and to the processes of cyclical and secular change. Equally, macro theories of
accumulation and eﬀective demand are generalizations about micro behavior:
the relation of income to expenditure for consumption, of investment to the
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pursuit of proﬁt, of the management of placements, in which ﬁnancial wealth
is held, to rates of interest, and of wages to the level of prices result from the
reactions of individuals and social groups to the situations in which they ﬁnd
themselves. (Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], p. 4)
To be fair, it must be acknowledged that Robinson's methodological approach was not
as holistic as Veblen's, but, I would like to argue, it contains some holistic elements as
well. Diﬀerences are to be found in degree, rather than in principle.
Interdisciplinary
Despite hardly making it explicit, Robinson, I would argue, was acutely aware of the need
to analyse economic behaviour and institutions in their interrelation with other spheres
of social life. This gets particularly obvious in her discussion of the political sphere which,
as we will see in chapter 7, is based on Kalecki's theory of the political business cycle.
In their book Joan Robinson Harcourt and Kerr (Harcourt and Kerr, 2009) also support
this view, pointing out that
Over her lifetime, but particularly in her later years, Joan Robinson aban-
doned the traditional model of economics. First, she extended the boundaries
of the subject. She does so not only by going outside orthodox economics but
also goes into anthropology, sociology, history and politics for her material.
(ibid., p. 202)
Open
In her writings on the role of time in economic theorising, Robinson tirelessly points to
the fundamental indeterminacy of the future. Or, to put it in other words, in Robinson's
eyes the future is open (Robinson, 1980d, p. 219).
`Today' is inﬂuenced, but not completely bound, by the past. Any action or
decision taken today is either the result of blind habit and convention or it is
directed towards its future consequences, which cannot yet be fully known.
(ibid., p. 219)
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Robinson certainly has some understanding of path dependency or cumulative causa-
tion, thus allowing the past to inﬂuence the present and the past and the present to
inﬂuence the future, but this does only inﬂuence, not predetermine present and future
developments. In the last instance the outcome of processes of cumulative change re-
mains unknowable (Robinson, 1980d, p. 219). Accordingly, in Economics - An Awkward
Corner Robinson aptly argues that
It is impossible to understand the economic system in which we are living if
we try to interpret it as a rational scheme. It has to be understood as an
awkward phase in a continuing process of historical development. (Robinson,
1968, p. 11)
3.2.3 Critical realism
Younger generations of post-Keynesian economists seem to have reached a broad con-
sensus that critical realism can be considered the philosophical basis of post-Keynesian
economics. As Joan Robinson certainly is one of the major inﬂuences on modern post-
Keynesian economics, this claim necessitates the question of whether the philosophical
principles of critical realism are compatible with her philosophical position. I will thus
brieﬂy enquire into this question.
Jeﬀerson and King deﬁne six criteria which can be used to identify particular research
paradigms as critical realist (Jeﬀerson and King, 2011, pp. 960-961). Critical realist the-
orising, they hold, is characterised by:
i. There is a presumption that objects of enquiry exist at least partially inde-
pendently of their investigation and are separable from the enquirer. Thus, it
is inconsistent with strong forms of social constructionism (Della Porta and
Keating, 2008, p. 24).
ii. Relations of cause and eﬀect are involved; mere `mutual dependence' is not
suﬃcient. Causality is attributed to the structures, powers, mechanisms or
tendencies that underlie speciﬁc events and which produce or facilitate their
occurrence.
iii. Priority is given to explaining observed events or data; prediction may or
may not be possible, but it is never primary or suﬃcient.
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iv. Socio-economic systems are understood to be open.
v. Economic theories apply to particular social, geographic and historical
contexts, and need to change when the context changes. This is the principle
of historical speciﬁcity.
vi. Social institutions are not exogenous to human agency. (Jeﬀerson and
King, 2011, pp. 960-961)
While Jeﬀerson and King posit the assumption of a reality existing independently of the
observer as an important characteristic of critical realism, Dow stresses that this does
not imply that we are actually able to apprehend it:
critical realism does not claim to identify true causal processes. While that
is the aim, it is emphasized that knowledge actually produced is both fallible
and transformable; there can be no assurance of having identiﬁed the truth.
In the same way as the Babylonian approach, critical realism seeks to avoid
the duality of certain knowledge/no knowledge, aiming to establish the best
means of building up knowledge that is useful for practical purposes (i.e.
knowledge of cause) given the inherent diﬃculties of doing so with respect to
social systems. (Dow, 1999, p. 23)
The assertion of an independently existing reality thus should not be regarded as implying
an absolutist agenda.
Can Robinson's methodological approach, summarised above, be described as critical
realist as it is characterised by Jeﬀerson and King? The answer, I would argue, is a
deﬁnitive `yes'. Every single one of the above criteria can also be found in Robinson's
methodological writings. Joan Robinson's philosophical approach thus can conﬁdently
be regarded as being compatible with the modern critical realist project.
3.3 Michaª Kalecki
Analysing Kalecki's methodological approach is a very demanding undertaking as Kalecki
has published very little on the topic himself. Only two very short papers deal with
methodological questions: Econometric Model and Historical Materialism (Kalecki, 1997
[1964][a]) and Why Economics Is Not an Exact Science (Kalecki, 1997 [1964][b]). In ad-
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dition to that Jeﬀerson and King report that there is some mentioning of methodological
issues in a few other papers. Even so, they argue, they amount to less than 1% of
his published work (Jeﬀerson and King, 2011, p. 961). Direct evidence on Kalecki's
methodological understanding, thus, is relatively sparse. Nonetheless, in what follows I
will provide a brief discussion of Kalecki's methodology, drawing on the two methodolog-
ical papers mentioned above and the available secondary literature.
Whilst explicitly methodological statements are scarce in Kalecki, discussion of the
epistemological foundations of his work seems to be non-existent. Therefore, as the
analysis of Kalecki's epistemological position appears to bear a great risk of turning out
to be pure speculation, I decided to limit my discussion to methodological concerns.
3.3.1 Methodology
As Kalecki did not publish much on methodology, secondary literature on the topic is
rather sparse too. Toporowski (1991) has contributed a highly interesting paper on the
topic in which he directly scrutinises Kalecki's empirical and theoretical oeuvre in an
attempt to expound the methodological basis of his research. Toporowski starts from the
observation that Kalecki did not comply with the academic convention of situating one's
work in the theoretical discourse of the time (Toporowski, 1991, p. 91). Indeed, Kalecki
so rarely and cursorily referred to theoretical work by other authors, Toporowski points
out, that this
gave rise to jocular speculation among his colleagues as to whether he had
read any theory at all (ibid., p. 91).
Rather than joining in in these speculations, Toporowski suggests that Kalecki's self-
contained way of working suggests an intuitive deductive way of drawing conclusions
from his ideas (ibid., p. 90). He then goes on to point out a further peculiarity of
Kalecki's approach, however, which appears to stand in contradiction to this suggestion:
spread throughout Kalecki's theoretical work are assumptions which have clearly not
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been derived through logical deductive reasoning but are grounded in empirical obser-
vation (Toporowski, 1991, pp. 92-93). Thus, Toporowski holds, looking at the totality
of Kalecki's empirical and theoretical contributions an empirical deductive way of rea-
soning emerges as the methodological basis of his work. Toporowski convincingly argues
that Kalecki's theoretical papers can be interpreted as generalisations drawn from his
rich empirical experience. This empirical deductive method also explains the very rare
references to other theoretical work (ibid., pp. 94-95).
Adding to Toporowski's general methodological observations I want to put forward
my own interpretation of Kalecki's two explicitly methodological publications. The most
intriguing feature of the two papers, I want to argue, is that in both of them Kalecki
seems to introduce some kind of dualism between `pure economics' and economics broadly
speaking. Pure economics, he argues, just like theoretical physics, is a
quantitative discipline[s] which, on the basis of general premisses derived from
the knowledge of the real phenomena, develop a deductive system which is
then confronted with the external world. (Kalecki, 1997 [1964][b], p. 308)
Pure economics as it is described here, Kalecki argues, is a purely deductive discipline
(ibid., p. 310) and an exact science (ibid., p. 310). He does concede, however, that there
is more to processes of economic development than can be explained by pure economics
(Kalecki, 1997 [1964][a], p. 303).
The fundamental problem of economics is that, unlike the physicists, economists do
not have the possibility of performing controlled experiments. The data they have to
work with is always biased by external disturbances (Kalecki, 1997 [1964][b], p. 310). On
top of that, Kalecki argues, these external factors play a very important part (ibid.,
p. 310) in explaining economic development. Thus, he concludes that in economics no
hypothesis can ever be fully conﬁrmed. We can never know `the truth' (ibid., p. 310).
Whilst in Why Economics Is Not an Exact Science Kalecki does not go into the details
of delineating the explanatory scope of pure economics, I want to argue that this is exactly
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what he does in Econometric Model and Historical Materialism. In this short paper
Kalecki describes econometric modelling and historical materialism as two alternative
approaches to the development of society (Kalecki, 1997 [1964][a], p. 301). He deﬁnes
the econometric model as
based on functional relations between the econometric variables in the period
considered as well as between these variables and the same variables in the
past periods. The relations are assumed to be given and not subject to
change. In this way a deﬁnite dynamic process is established which, however,
corresponds to the actual developments only in the case where the basic
assumption of the invariability of functional relationships referred to above is
fulﬁlled. (ibid., p. 301)
Historical materialism, on the other hand,
considers the process of the development of a society as that of productive
forces and productive relations (the base) which shape all the other social
phenomena such as government, culture, science, and technology etc. (the
superstructure). There is a feedback eﬀect involved here, the superstructure
inﬂuencing the base as well. (ibid., p. 301)
Kalecki then goes on to argue that these two approaches, whilst being very diﬀerent,
are not necessarily irreconcilable (ibid., p. 301). The econometric model is appropriate
for the analysis of static situations in which no changes in natural resources, productive
relations, and the superstructure aﬀect the development of productive forces (ibid.,
p. 301). Kalecki hastens to add, though, that
In a more general case these functional relationships alter under the impact of
events in three other spheres of the system and the economic development is
then a much more complicated process than that presented by an econometric
model as it reﬂects the evolution of the society in all the aspects. (ibid.,
p. 301)
Also, as the applicability of the econometric model presupposes known and unchanging
productive relations, it is not admissible to be used to make predictions. After all, we
cannot know how the productive relations will develop in the future (ibid., p. 302).
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Combining the arguments from the two papers, I want to argue, presents us with the
following methodological position: Econometric modelling can be fruitfully applied to
economic research as long as its application remains restricted to the sphere of `pure
economics', that is the explanation of static situations with known productive relations.
Indeed, it is a valuable research tool, Kalecki argues, provided its limitations are kept
in mind (Kalecki, 1997 [1964][a], p. 302). On the other hand, this sphere of pure eco-
nomics is embedded in and inﬂuenced by other factors which cannot be quantiﬁed and
included in an econometric model (ibid., p. 303). Thus, following Kalecki's approach, I
would argue, means that econometric modelling always needs to be complemented by
other research methods. This approach can be observed throughout Kalecki's manifold
theoretical writings.
In conclusion, I want to align myself with Joan Robinson who argued that
Though Kalecki liked to express his ideas in neat formulae, he was always
conscious of the limitations of that style of exposition, and set his arguments
against the background of history, politics and institutional change. (Robin-
son, 1980 [1977][a], p. 196)
3.3.2 Critical realism
Apart from Toporowski's above mentioned paper, most of the secondary literature on
Kalecki's methodology has been written as part of the ongoing discussion about whether
critical realism can be regarded as the appropriate philosophical foundation for post-
Keynesian economics. Thus the focus is on establishing whether Kalecki's methodological
approach is compatible with critical realism. On this issue diﬀerent authors arrive at
diﬀerent conclusions.
In what follows, I will summarise three papers dealing with the question of com-
patibility in chronological order of their publication.
In 1999 Walters and Young, in a paper enquiring into the general appropriateness
of critical realism for post-Keynesianism, argue that Kalecki's approach is incompatible
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with critical realism (Walters and Young, 1999, p. 114). They give two reasons for this
assessment:
Firstly, they argue that Kalecki's analysis sticks with surface phenomena rather than
trying to explain hidden mechanisms or powers (ibid., p. 114). As the importance of
underlying structures and causal mechanisms is one of the key tenets of critical realism,
this would necessarily result in Kalecki's approach being at odds with critical realism
(ibid., p. 114).
Secondly, the authors reason that Kalecki's frequent use of statistics and econometrics
marks his approach as incompatible with critical realism as well (ibid., p. 114). The use of
econometrics, it is often argued, in order to be valid presupposes a closed system in which
all the important variables are known. This stands in direct opposition to the stress on
openness in critical realism. Thus, the authors conclude that Kalecki's methodological
approach is incompatible with critical realism (ibid., p. 114).
In his 2000 paper A Realist Appraisal of Post-Keynesian Pricing Theory Downward
arrives at a very diﬀerent conclusion. Contradicting Walters and Young, Downward
holds that Kalecki's pricing theory is indeed aimed at uncovering the causal mechanisms
underlying pricing decisions, and is thus fully consistent with a post-Keynesian com-
mitment to an open-system ontology (Downward, 2000, p. 214). Downward points us
towards Kalecki's discussion of the role of trade unions, sales promotion and industrial
concentration in the determination of the degree of monopoly for an illustration of this
argument (ibid., p. 215). Nonetheless, Downward concedes that Kalecki could be said
partially to invoke the intrinsic condition of closure in attempting to establish
the causal mechanisms involved in setting prices [. . . ]. (ibid., p. 214)
Intrinsic closure, according to Dow can be deﬁned as [ruling] out any change in the
variables within the systems or in their interrelations (Dow, 2003, p. 13).
Kalecki, in order to be able to explain or even predict pricing behaviour, presupposes
a certain stability or regularity of the inﬂuences acting upon prices. Consequently, a
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certain reliance upon so-called event regularities - which stand in clear opposition to
an open-system methodology - can be detected. However, Downward argues, Kalecki's
careful avoidance of determinism keeps him from relying too heavily on supposed event
regularities (Downward, 2000, p. 214). On top of that, Downward reasons, the extrinsic
condition of closure is clearly not invoked (ibid., p. 214) in Kalecki's work. That is,
Kalecki does not presuppose full knowledge of external variables (Dow, 2003, p. 13).
In conclusion, Downward argues that Kalecki's pricing theory can be regarded as a
manifestation[s] of a critical-realist approach (Downward, 2000, p. 222).
Downward's stance on this matter can be further illuminated by the fact that he is
part of a group of post-Keynesians arguing for the admissibility of econometric model-
ling within a critical realist framework. These authors argue that whilst strict event
regularities cannot be supposed to occur, so-called demi-regs, that is, regularities that
are not only highly restricted but also somewhat partial and unstable (Lawson, 2003,
p. 79) may indeed be observed. These demi-regs may be used as a basis for econometric
modelling. This is even conceded by Lawson who in general seems to be very critical of
the use of formalistic methods:
Parenthetically, I might emphasize at this point that if Post Keynesians do
join with critical realism in accepting its ex posteriori assessment that the
world is open and structured, it does not follow (as some have supposed) that
Post Keynesians ought thereby not to engage at all in formalistic methods
such as econometrics. The possibility of successes with the latter requires
local closures. But closures themselves have been shown to presuppose, and
indeed to be a special conﬁguration of, an open and structured system, that
is, a special case of the sort of system that does widely obtain (see, e.g.,
Lawson, 1997). Critical realism thus cannot and does not rule out a priori
their limited occurrence. (Lawson, 1999, p. 7)
Nonetheless, the admissibility of econometric modelling is still highly controversial within
the critical realist community. A more recent contribution to this ongoing discussion has
been provided by Jeﬀerson and King in their 2011 article Michaª Kalecki and Critical
Realism.
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In this article Jeﬀerson and King have formulated six criteria for evaluating whether
a theoretical approach is compatible with the critical realist framework (Jeﬀerson and
King, 2011, p. 961). These criteria have already been quoted above in my enquiry into
the compatibility of Robinson's approach with critical realism, but I shall brieﬂy sum-
marise them again for the reader's convenience: the acknowledgement of the existence of
an independent reality, enquiry into underlying causal mechanisms, focus on the expla-
nation of observed phenomena, openness, historical contingency and the endogeneity of
institutions (ibid., p. 961). Having outlined these criteria, Jeﬀerson and King go on to
analyse Kalecki's adherence to each of them in detail.
The authors do not spend much time on criterion one, taking
[. . . ] it as read that Kalecki assumed the economy to exist independently of
his observation of it. (ibid., p. 962)
Criteria two and three are dealt with together because, as the authors point out, they
cannot be separated in Kalecki's work. Kalecki's theoretical work is an attempt at the
explanation of observed events, e.g. price determination, in terms of underlying causal
factors, e.g. all that inﬂuences the degree of monopoly (ibid., p. 962).
Jeﬀerson and King seem to agree with Walters and Young and Downward in so far
as they view openness as the most problematic criterion with regard to Kalecki's work.
The authors observe that Kalecki's extensive use of econometrics may be problematic
in implying a closed-systems approach, but ultimately arrive at the same conclusion as
Downward:
[. . . ] Kalecki clearly recognised that economies are open systems with some
degree of event regularity aﬀorded by partial or local closures due to speciﬁc
organisational or institutional contexts [. . . ]. (ibid., p. 965)
The assumption of local closures, as Downward (2000) argues and has been conceded by
Lawson (1999) as well, can be regarded as compatible with critical realism.
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Criteria ﬁve and six, namely historical speciﬁcity and the endogeneity of institutions,
are unproblematic with regard to Kalecki's work. Kalecki can be said to have been
acutely aware of the historical contingency of theory building and of the importance of
including institutions in economic theory (Jeﬀerson and King, 2011, pp. 968-970).
Accordingly, Jeﬀerson and King come to the conclusion that
taken as a whole, Kalecki's work does reﬂect open-system thinking, and in-
corporates the principles of historical speciﬁcity and the endogeneity of social
institutions. (ibid., p. 970)
Thus, they conclude that Kalecki's theoretical work can be viewed as being compatible
with critical realism (ibid., p. 970).
In a nutshell, two out of the three papers discussed above come to the conclusion that
Kalecki can be posthumously included in the ranks of critical realist economists. The
most problematic aspect of Kalecki's work in this respect is his reliance on econometric
modelling, but as has been argued by Downward and Jeﬀerson and King and as I hope
to have shown in chapter 3.3.1, Kalecki can be said to have employed mathematical
modelling in a manner that is compatible with an open-system approach.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I put forward the proposition that Veblen, Robinson and Kalecki share, if
very broadly, certain core epistemological and methodological principles. These principles
are: historicity, openness, holism and interdisciplinarity. Of the three authors Kalecki
certainly occupies a special position with his frequent use of econometrics. This has
provoked some authors to argue that Kalecki's use of econometrics presupposes a closed-
system perspective which would make it fundamentally incompatible with Veblen's and
Robinson's approaches. However, other authors show that Kalecki's use of econometrics
only relies on demi-regs and thus can be said to respect the basic premises of open-
system thinking. In a nutshell, then, the three authors under scrutiny can be said to
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have built their theories on largely compatible philosophical foundations. Judging from
the philosophical basis, thus, there is no reason to oppose a theoretical synthesis of
Veblen's, Robinson's and Kalecki's work.
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4 Poverty producing process n° 1:
Conspicuous consumption
Conspicuous consumption may be a surprising element to be included in an analysis of
poverty production. Is it not a proof of having more than one needs for subsistence,
rather than too little? Certainly, widespread conspicuous consumption is a feature of
wealthy societies. This, however, is only one side of the coin. Wealth and poverty are
closely interrelated. Whilst demonstrating the wealth of some, conspicuous consump-
tion through various means contributes to the creation or aggravation of the poverty of
others. A close investigation of these adverse socio-economic consequences of conspic-
uous consumption constitutes the heart of this chapter. The start will be made by a
detailed discussion of Veblen's analysis of conspicuous consumption. This is followed by
an examination of Joan Robinson's contributions to the topic. Next comes a section
detailing Kalecki's approach to consumption. This then leads into an analysis of the
special case of conspicuous consumption on supply-restrained markets. The main part
of the chapter will be concluded by a section dealing with the question of the long-term
ﬁnancial sustainability of conspicuous consumption patterns. Finally, in the last section,
the argument is summarised and preliminary conclusions are drawn.
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4.1 Thorstein Veblen
Before going into the details of the analysis, let me start with a short conceptual deriva-
tion. Conspicuous consumption, in the English-speaking world, has come to be regarded
as part of common vocabulary. It's origins, however, lie in the work of Thorstein Veblen.
In the Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen starts his analysis from the assumption that
our self-esteem is built up in interaction with and thus crucially depends upon others. It
does so in two ways: ﬁrstly, in order to feel good about themselves, people need to feel
valued by others (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 30). Secondly, people deﬁne their self-worth in
comparison with others. We do not just want to be good, we want to be better than
others (Veblen, 1998 [1899]; Forges Davanzati, 2006, pp. 55-56).
However widely, or equally, or fairly, it may be distributed, no general
increase of the community's wealth can make any approach to satiating this
need, the ground of which is the desire of every one to excel every one else
in the accumulation of goods. If, as is sometimes assumed, the incentive to
accumulation were the want of subsistence or of physical comfort, then the
aggregate economic wants of a community might conceivably be satisﬁed at
some point in the advance of industrial eﬃciency; but since the struggle is
substantially a race for reputability on the basis of an invidious comparison,
no approach to a deﬁnitive attainment is possible. (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 32)
Our self-esteem, thus, to a considerable extent is based on relative status.
In former times status was assigned exclusively in relation to diﬀerent occupations
(ibid., p. 8). Predatory occupations, like warfare and hunting, came to be more highly
valued than industrial employment. These occupations were based on aggression, exploi-
tation and strength (ibid., p. 10). As time progressed and social roles became more diﬀer-
entiated, other employments such as sports, politics, clerical work and eventually business
management came to be included in the group of highly valued predatory professions. As
diﬀerent as they may seem at ﬁrst glance, the diﬀerent predatory occupations, accord-
ing to Veblen, have one thing in common: none of them is directed towards productive
work. Rather than living oﬀ their own productive power these members of society live oﬀ
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the exploitation of others (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 14). The high social status connected
to predatory occupations is also reﬂected in higher rates of pay. Accordingly, ﬁnancial
power has come to be established as the ultimate measure of status (ibid., p. 84).
In order for wealth to vest its owner with status it needs to be demonstrated to the
fellow men (ibid., p. 36). This is achieved through conspicuous waste. Veblen deﬁnes
conspicuous waste as any action or purchase incurred on the ground of an invidious
pecuniary comparison (ibid., p. 99). Conspicuous waste can be further divided into
conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption (ibid., p. 84).
Conspicuous leisure is the `ostentatious display' of free time with the aim to demon-
strate that one has the ﬁnancial capacity to refrain from productive work.
Time is consumed non-productively (1) from a sense of the unworthiness of
productive work, and (2) as an evidence of pecuniary ability to aﬀord a life
of idleness. (ibid., p. 43)
The ﬁrst part of this quotation shows how closely this behaviour is linked to the social
division of labour and related attributions of value. The choice of activities that count as
conspicuous leisure is not just an accidental by-product of the need to display ﬁnancial
wealth, it is deeply rooted in social norms concerning the worthiness or unworthiness of
diﬀerent occupations. Abstaining from productive work per se, though, is not enough.
The whole point of conspicuous waste is to demonstrate our status to the other members
of the community we live in. Accordingly, we must be able to show proof of the time
spent unproductively. This is often achieved through engagement in quasi-artistic and
quasi-academic activities (e.g. playing a musical instrument, learning a dead language).
Another popular conspicuous occupation is sports (ibid., pp. 44-45). The archetypical
model of the well-educated housewife is a special instance of conspicuous leisure too,
as in this case the man basically delegates conspicuous leisure (and often conspicuous
consumption as well) to his wife1. These activities show results which can be used to
1This was already discussed by Veblen in his essay The Economic Theory of Women's Dress which was
published ﬁve years prior to The Theory of the Leisure Class in 1894.
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communicate status while at the same time carefully avoiding any notion of productive
usefulness. This strategy does not work equally well in all circumstances, though (Veblen,
1998 [1899], p. 86).
Veblen holds that the eﬀectiveness of conspicuous leisure as a means for the display
of wealth is contingent upon the size of a community. In small communities, as for
example in rural areas, where people are in close contact with each other, conspicuous
leisure is eﬀective. This tends to change, however, once communities grow in size and get
increasingly anonymous: the bigger a community gets, the looser the contact among its
members, the less eﬀective becomes the `ostentatious display' of leisure (ibid., pp. 86-87).
In the modern community there is also a more frequent attendance at large
gatherings of people to whom one's everyday life is unknown; in such places as
churches, theatres, ballrooms, hotels, parks, shops, and the like. In order to
impress these transient observers, and to retain one's self-complacency under
their observation, the signature of one's pecuniary strength should be written
in characters which he who runs may read. (ibid., p. 86)
In these cases, more direct, more readily visible demonstrations of wealth are needed.
This is were conspicuous consumption comes into play.
In late 19th century already Veblen observed a continuing trend towards urbanisa-
tion and bigger and more anonymous communities. His conclusion as to the status of
conspicuous leisure as an eﬀective means of status acquisition thus comes as no surprise:
It is evident, therefore, that the present trend of the development is in the
direction of heightening the utility of conspicuous consumption as compared
with leisure. (ibid., p. 86)
It should be stressed, however, that this is a relative shift rather than an absolute dis-
appearance of conspicuous leisure. Both strategies continue to coexist. Still, despite not
being the only means of status demonstration, conspicuous consumption can rightly be
considered as the most important one in advanced industrial economies (ibid., p. 87).2
2Life has changed considerably since the time of Veblen's writing and thus have the possibilities for
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As with conspicuous leisure, the deﬁning element of conspicuous consumption is its
wastefulness (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 85).
Throughout the entire evolution of conspicuous expenditure, whether of goods
or of services or human life, runs the obvious implication that in order to
eﬀectually mend the consumer's good fame it must be an expenditure of
superﬂuities. In order to be reputable it must be wasteful. No merit would
accrue from the consumption of the bare necessaries of life [...] (ibid., pp. 96-
97)
To argue that conspicuous consumption is the consumption of superﬂuous goods certainly
implies some valuation. What are to be deﬁned as necessary and superﬂuous goods is, at
least to a certain extent, a matter of taste. But Veblen does not want this diﬀerentiation
to become arbitrary. He stresses that it does not depend upon personal judgement but can
be determined objectively. Veblen recognises that the consumers may ﬁnd conspicuous
consumption goods necessary, even indispensable (ibid., pp. 99-100). These subjective
valuations or habits, however, are irrelevant for his classiﬁcation of consumption goods
as conspicuous or serviceable:
The question is, therefore, not whether, under the existing circumstances
of individual habit and social custom, a given expenditure conduces to the
particular consumer's gratiﬁcation or peace of mind; but whether, aside from
acquired tastes and from the canons of usage and conventional decency, its
result is a net gain in comfort or in the fulness of life. Customary expenditure
must be classed under the head of waste in so far as the custom on which it
rests is traceable to the habit of making an invidious pecuniary comparison
 in so far as it is conceived that it could not have become customary and
prescriptive without the backing of this principle of pecuniary reputability or
relative economic success. (ibid., pp. 99-100)
conspicuous consumption. In the era of Facebook and the like human relations become increasingly
transient and superﬁcial. Thus, not only has conspicuous consumption overtaken conspicuous leisure
in terms of eﬀectiveness, traditional methods of conspicuous consumption have been superseded by
new, even more eﬀective means. Modern technology provides us with a wealth of possibilities for the
eﬀective display of wealth. A formidable new strategy for example is the option oﬀered by more and
more online shops (e.g. Amazon) at the end of an order, to publish your latest shopping on facebook.
All you need to do is click on a button. In this way, one does not even need to meet people in order
to show oﬀ one's pecuniary wealth. All that is needed is to befriend them on facebook.
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Despite appearing rather straight forward at ﬁrst, this deﬁnition leaves a number of
questions unanswered:
Firstly, is Veblen's `fulness of life' an absolute or a relative concept? Does a full life
mean physical safety and protection from the forces of nature or should it be understood
in relation to the current standard of living? Given that Veblen highlights the importance
of adopting a relative understanding of poverty it would seem odd to use an absolute
deﬁnition of a full life. Using a relative deﬁnition, however, seems to be at odds with
Veblen's strive for independence from personal judgement.
Secondly, even if an understanding of what constitutes a full life could be agreed
upon, be it absolute or relative, who would there be to execute it? Veblen's deﬁnition
seems to imply an outsider's perspective, someone with enough distance to the dominant
consumption patterns of the community to be able to diﬀerentiate between real, life-
fulﬁlling wants and status-driven wants. He observes himself that the people who are
part of the community may not be able to draw this distinction.
Thirdly, independent of the details of what ought to be considered as a legitimate want,
how generous would Veblen be as regards the means for their satisfaction? Not feeling
hungry, for example, can certainly be considered a basic want but there are numerous
ways to achieve this end - one can eat bread and potatoes, or T-bone steak and caviar.
Where would Veblen draw the line between conspicuous and serviceable consumption?
He approaches this problem through conceding that goods can have both conspicuous
and non-conspicuous elements (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 100).
It is obviously not necessary that a given object of expenditure should be ex-
clusively wasteful in order to come in under the category of conspicuous waste.
An article may be useful and wasteful both, and its utility to the consumer
may be made up of use and waste in the most varying proportions. Consum-
able goods, and even productive goods, generally show the two elements in
combination, as constituents of their utility; although, in a general way, the
element of waste tends to predominate in articles of consumption, while the
contrary is true of articles designed for productive use. (ibid., p. 100)
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The distinction between conspicuous and serviceable consumption thus is not always a
clear-cut one. Housing is a good example for a good that is partly conspicuous and
partly serviceable. Having a roof above one's head that provides shelter from the forces
of nature is evidently necessary and can safely be classiﬁed as serviceable. The bigger
the dwelling gets, however, and the more amenities it contains (e.g. a swimming pool,
a tennis court, . . . ) the more conspicuous it gets. But however decadent it may get, it
always retains a kernel of serviceability. Expensive designer clothing and luxurious meals
are similar examples.
Particularly this last question shows very clearly that Veblen's deﬁnition of conspic-
uous consumption does not lend itself easily to a classiﬁcation of goods. The deﬁnition
quoted above contains another important piece of information, however: conspicuous
consumption is traceable to the habit of making an invidious pecuniary comparison
(Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 100). Conspicuous consumption can thus be understood as con-
sumption incurred on competitive grounds and is opposed to consumption that is based
on a non-competitive urge to satisfy a speciﬁc human need (ibid., pp. 99-100). The main
diﬀerence may thus be taken to be a diﬀerent rationale rather than a feature of the
product per se.
In order to be apt for invidious comparison, it does not suﬃce for consumption to
be wasteful, it must be commonly held to be desirable as well. The expression of so-
cial status through conspicuous consumption follows a tacitly accepted set of rules. A
certain socially agreed upon desirability is an absolute precondition for eﬀective status-
demonstration. A lot of power thus resides with whoever is in the position to decide
upon what is desirable and what is not. The power to decide upon desirability, accord-
ing to Veblen, ultimately resides with the leisure class (ibid., p. 84)3. The leisure class,
in Veblen's view, stands at the top of the social hierarchy and hands down the norm
of reputability (ibid., p. 84) to the lower strata of society. It thus exerts a dominant
3The term leisure class refers us back to the other strategy of status demonstration discussed above,
namely conspicuous leisure.
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inﬂuence on the consumption patterns of the rest of society.
This is eﬀectuated through what Veblen calls `status emulation'. Every group in a
society tries to emulate the consumption patterns of the group just above them in the
social hierarchy (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 84). In this manner, consumption patterns are
transmitted from the leisure class down to the poorest strata of a society, with only slight
adjustments due to diﬀerences in purchasing power (ibid., p. 84).
This leads us to the assertion that basically all groups in a society engage in conspicuous
consumption. Even the poorest groups in a society, if at all possible, try to maintain a
minimum level of conspicuous consumption (ibid., p. 85). To put it in Veblen's words:
No class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, foregoes all customary
conspicuous consumption. The last items of this category of consumption are
not given up except under stress of the direst necessity. Very much of squalor
and discomfort will be endured before the last trinket or the last pretence of
pecuniary decency is put away. (ibid., p. 85)
The reason for this, according to Veblen, lies in our psychological dependence on recog-
nition from others. We do not just consume for consumption's sake, rather we follow a
desire to live up to the conventional standard of decency (ibid., p. 102). Or, to put it
in more contemporary terms, consumption is one of the major means for social inclusion
in modern capitalist society. We need to consume in order to be respected members of
society. Unfortunately for those at the lower income end of the scale the standard that
must be met for inclusion is not ﬁxed (ibid., p. 102).
The standard is ﬂexible; and especially as it is indeﬁnitely extensible, if only
time is allowed for habituation to any increase in pecuniary ability and for
acquiring facility in the new and larger scale of expenditure that follows such
an increase. (ibid., p. 102)
The process of habituation combined with technological innovation leads to ever higher
levels of conspicuous consumption (ibid., p. 102). This tendency is further fuelled by the
aforementioned desire of higher income groups to defend their status vis à vis the people
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just below them in the social hierarchy. This is prone to result in a never-ending spiral
of emulation and demarcation, climbing ever higher levels of conspicuous consumption.
Status acquisition through conspicuous waste thus has a very important dynamic element.
And this is where the major risk lies. This process will never stop. It may even, in the
most extreme case, result in people gravely neglecting their physical needs in order to
be able to satisfy the spiritual need (Veblen, 1998 [1899], p. 85) of pecuniary decency
(ibid., p. 85) through conspicuous waste.
With the exception of the instinct of self-preservation, the propensity for emu-
lation is probably the strongest and most alert and persistent of the economic
motives proper. In an industrial community this propensity for emulation ex-
presses itself in pecuniary emulation; and this, so far as regards the Western
civilised communities of the present, is virtually equivalent to saying that it
expresses itself in some form of conspicuous waste. The need of conspicu-
ous waste, therefore, stands ready to absorb any increase in the community's
industrial eﬃciency or output of goods, after the most elementary physical
wants have been provided for. (ibid., p. 110)
Despite observing that conspicuous waste has not yet reached this extreme stage, Veblen
is highly critical of the negative economic eﬀects of status-competition. This is why he
never tires of stressing the socially disruptive nature of conspicuous consumption.
4.2 Joan Robinson
The negative socio-economic consequences of unregulated (conspicuous) consumption
were the focus of Joan Robinson's writings on consumption. Due to her macroeconomic
research focus Robinson never developed a systematic analysis of consumption patterns.
Nonetheless, she provides us with an elaborate critique of untrammelled consumption.
An Introduction to Modern Economics, an economics textbook she published with John
Eatwell (Robinson and Eatwell, 1974), provides us with a good idea of Robinson's general
theoretical approach to the topic. In this book the authors give a short summary of their
views on diﬀerent theories of consumption. They are generally highly critical of economic
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analyses of consumption, arguing that far more research on the subject has been carried
out from a sociological perspective by marketing and sales departments and advertising
agencies (Robinson and Eatwell, 1974, pp. 202-203). The neoclassical explanation of
consumption, the theory of demand, is dismissed as being tautological and criticised
for its exclusive focus on individual preferences (ibid., pp. 201-202). Furthermore, the
authors stress the importance accruing to social inﬂuences, such as family background
and propaganda, in inﬂuencing consumption decisions (ibid., p. 202). It does not come
as a surprise, then, that they seem to hold a positive opinion of Veblen's work. Robinson
and Eatwell refer to him as having been the only one to introduce reality into the debate
with his sarcastic description of `conspicuous consumption' in The Theory of the Leisure
Class (ibid., p. 202). A very similar understanding can be found already in Robinson's
The Accumulation of Capital which was published about 15 years earlier:
But in reality consumption is very much a social aﬀair, and everyone's habits
are very much inﬂuenced by what everyone else is doing, so that when a
whole community is growing richer together consumption tends to rise with
wealth. This tendency, which probably exists to some extent in all societies,
is reinforced under the capitalist rules of the game by the sales pressure of
competitive entrepreneurs. Saving is something of a moral eﬀort, even at
a high standard of life, and good resolutions to behave in a thrifty manner
are hard to keep when they are constantly assaulted by advertising and the
temptation of new commodities. Moreover there is a kind of competition
in consumption, induced by the desire to impress the Joneses, which makes
each family strive to keep up at least an appearance of being as well oﬀ as
those that they mix with, so that outlay by one induces outlay by others,
just as technical improvements by one entrepreneur induce improvements by
his competitors. (Even in a social group where display is considered vulgar,
it may be very expensive to be inconspicuous in a gentlemanly manner.)
(Robinson, 1986 [1956], p. 251)
Thus, despite her not having published much on consumption herself, we can draw some
conclusions on Robinson's position by stating that she was knowledgeable of and sym-
pathetic to the Veblenian approach.
Consequently, fully in line with Veblen, in her own writing, Robinson was most con-
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cerned with the negative social consequences of unregulated consumption. In Beyond Full
Employment she poses the question which, I would argue is an important undercurrent
of Veblen's thought, namely: What do we want to use our resources for? (Robinson,
1980 [1961], p. 109). She goes on to stress that, despite what other authors - not the least
of which Keynes - say, this is in fact a key economic question. Who spends the money
and what they spend their money on does make a diﬀerence (ibid., p. 110).
In What are the questions? she comes back to the above question from a slightly
diﬀerent angle, asking What is growth for? (Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], p. 29). Taking a
closer look at the neoclassical stance that the aim of growth is to produce for consumption
she proceeds with the following question: But consumption by whom, of what? (ibid.,
p. 30). Providing the answer to this question, according to Robinson, should not be left
to individual preferences and the freedom of choice alone. She lists three arguments to
support this claim:
First, she cites the great disparities in purchasing power which characterise modern
capitalist societies. The high purchasing power of the wealthier classes bears the risk
of diverting productive capacities away from necessary goods and into the production of
luxury goods (ibid., p. 30).
The goods that it is proﬁtable to supply are those that will be bought at the
medium and higher levels in the hierarchy of incomes; low incomes do not
provide a good market. As general consumption increases, there is less and
less motive for catering to the needs of the poorest. (Robinson and Eatwell,
1974, p. 204)
Thus, the higher general living standards are, according to Robinson, the greater the risk
of the market meeting the trivial wants of a few before the urgent needs of the many
(Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], p. 30). It goes without saying that such a development would
be considered to be highly problematic from a social provisioning perspective.
Second, she points towards the possible negative externalities generated by consump-
tion. Untrammelled consumption, in some cases, leads to socially unacceptable results
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(Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], p. 30). The example Robinson gives - the increasing motorisa-
tion of the population - is well known today from the discussions surrounding the notion
of sustainability. She comes back to this issue three years later in The Disintegration of
Economics (Robinson, 1980b):
The existence of scarce means (materials, energy, cultivable land) has recently
come very much to the fore in public discussion, while consumers' tastes run
to large cars, overheated rooms, and an excessive consumption of meat. (ibid.,
p. 92)
The endangerment of natural resources, though, is not the only case in point. Further
examples will be discussed in chapter 4.4.
Third, Robinson argues that a lack of regulation eﬀectively means allowing the great
corporations to decide about the allocation of resources. Unregulated consumption would
not necessarily enhance consumer sovereignty, but rather result in greater sovereignty of
entrepreneurs (Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], p. 30). This argument originates in the assertion
that it is supply that creates demand and not the other way round. It can be found in
a very concise formulation in An Introduction to Modern Economics already:
Consumers choose (for whatever motives) from among the commodities of-
fered. They have a power of veto  they need not buy what they do not like 
but none of initiative. The pattern of demand for particular commodities in
a society is strongly inﬂuenced by the supply of what is available. (Robinson
and Eatwell, 1974, pp. 203-204)
Thus, consumer sovereignty in a free market economy only exists in very narrow conﬁnes.
Nevertheless, in order to realise their proﬁts, the individual producers are dependent upon
the consumers as buyers of their products. The consumers thus must be prevented as far
as possible from making use of their `power of veto'.
The greatest challenge in this respect for the entrepreneurs is the great productiveness
of modern industry (ibid., p. 204). In order to keep the system running and proﬁts
ﬂowing, consumers must be induced to continually buy the produce of industry. Yet,
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It would be technically possible to satisfy the demand for manufactures now
known, at an acceptable standard, for the whole population of the industrial
countries in a few years, but then how would the system continue to function?
The problem has so far been solved by the creation of wants. (Robinson and
Eatwell, 1974, p. 204)
Consequently, ever new wants need to be created, new products invented (ibid., p. 204).
Luckily for the entrepreneurs, as we have seen above, a major motive for consumption
is the `spiritual need' for recognition and status. And particularly in the range of con-
spicuous consumption goods, with no clearly deﬁned material want to fulﬁl, much room
is left for the creation of new products designed to fulﬁl newly created wants. All the
entrepreneurs need to do is to make sure that their product is perceived as `eligible'
in the canon of conspicuous consumption. Accordingly, entrepreneurs put much eﬀort
into ensuring the continuance of conspicuous consumption habits. This is described with
reference to mass media and the press:
Moreover, to ensure an expanding market for consumption goods in general,
the press and the mass media (for which advertisement is the main source of
revenue) are involved in keeping up the general atmosphere of enthusiasm for
new purchases and of prestige attached to possessions. (ibid., p. 204)
Another aspect of this problematique is the trade-oﬀ between what is proﬁtable and
what is desirable from a social provisioning point of view. Many of the most vital
goods do not lend themselves to quick proﬁt making, whereas what does often is not
particularly desirable from a social provisioning perspective. The not so proﬁtable but
vitally important goods and services need either be provided for by the state or risk
not being provided for at all. Unfortunately, the public provision of goods and services
has come under a bad reputation. This, according to Robinson, is due simply to an
ideological bias towards laissez-faire (Robinson, 1962, p. 125):
The diﬀerence between proﬁt margins and indirect taxes, in terms of their
economic functioning, is not at all clear-cut; one is no more and no less a
`burden' than the other. The diﬀerence between them is that the outlay
114
of proﬁt margins on dividends, amenities or proﬁtable investment, under
nominal control of the shareholders, is in the hands of the board of directors,
while the outlay of rates and taxes is in the hands of city corporations and
government departments, under nominal control of the electorate. The idea
that one is necessarily more `economic' than the other has no foundation
except in ideological prejudice. (Robinson, 1962, p. 125)
In numerous publications such as Economic Philosophy (ibid.) and Obstacles to Full
Employment (Robinson, 1980 [1946]) Joan Robinson thus argues in favour of an unbiased
evaluation of diﬀerent social provisioning strategies, holding that regulation may often
produce better results than free market allocation.
The deeper insight underlying all this is the acknowledgement of diﬀerences between
individual and social rationality. What is individually rational behaviour is not necessar-
ily in the best interest of society as a whole as well. In Economic Philosophy Robinson
leaves no doubt as to what she thinks ought to to be done:
If the question is once put: Would a greater contribution to human welfare
be made by an investment in capacity to produce knick-knacks that have to
be advertised in order to be sold or an investment in improving the health
service? It seems to me that the answer would be only too obvious; (Robinson,
1962, pp. 129-130)
In a nutshell, Joan Robinson can be said to have taken up the argument where Veblen
left it. Whilst Veblen put much eﬀort into an intricate description of the details of con-
sumption patterns in capitalist economies, pointing out but not focusing on the negative
eﬀects of conspicuous consumption, Robinson set out to further elaborate on the latter.
4.3 Michaª Kalecki
Similar to Joan Robinson, Michaª Kalecki did not develop a systematic approach to con-
sumption on the micro-level. He never tired of stressing the importance of aggregate
demand but did not go into the details of who consumes what, let alone why. Unlike
Robinson, he did not explicitly refer to an existing micro-theory of consumption either. It
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is thus diﬃcult to position his work with respect to the problematique of conspicuous con-
sumption. Nevertheless, in what follows, I will point out two instances in which Kalecki
discusses consumption and try to relate his analysis back to Veblen's and Robinson's
work.
Kalecki's best known proposition concerning consumption is his assumption that the
consumption propensity of workers is higher than the consumption propensity of capi-
talists. Or, even more to the point:
[T]he poor have a higher propensity to consume than the rich. (Kalecki,
1990 [1944], p. 372)
Kalecki does not derive this presumption from an assumed diﬀerence in consumption
behaviour; rather, he derives it from the fact that workers earn less than capitalists. As
Kalecki postulates workers' wages not to be high above some sort of subsistence wage,
he expects them to spend all their income on consumption. Simply because they do
not earn enough to save (Sawyer, 1985, p. 13). Capitalists, on the other hand, earn
more than they would need for the satisfaction of their material needs. Throughout
his writings Kalecki presumes capitalists to save (see for example Kalecki, 1990 [1939];
Kalecki, 1991 [1943]; Kalecki, 1965 [1954]). Even allowing for a considerable level of
purely conspicuous consumption, it seems, they are assumed to have money left over for
saving and investment. On top of that, Kalecki argues that in the case of capitalists each
individual's consumption is less elastic than his saving (Kalecki, 1990 [1939], p. 266).
Thus, an increase in income is far less likely to encourage additional consumption from
capitalists than it is from workers.
With this argument Kalecki wants to show that the distribution of income matters
for the smooth functioning of the economy. He argued that the level of aggregate de-
mand plays a crucial role for economic growth (Kalecki, 1965 [1954]). Thus, showing that
workers are more likely to raise aggregate demand if paid more is part of his argument in
favour of a more equal income distribution. The interesting twist in this argument is that
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Kalecki does not argue from a moralistic perspective but from a pragmatic matter-of-fact
perspective. We should not have a more equal distribution of income because it would
be the `right' thing to do, we should have it because we would all proﬁt from it.
This argumentation, however, does not tell us anything about speciﬁc consumption
patterns; it does not specify a threshold either. Kalecki did not go into the practicalities
of his assumption. He was more concerned with the general tendency than with the
details. But what can be deduced from this analysis is that Kalecki obviously assumes
a limit to conspicuous consumption. Other than Veblen, he does not expect it to go on
inﬁnitely, eating up all available income.
Apart from his discussion of diﬀerent consumption propensities, Kalecki approaches
consumption and production through the lens of Marx's reproduction schema. Marx
divides the economy into two departments:
 Department I producing investment goods
 Department II producing consumption goods
The production of raw materials and semi-ﬁnished goods needed for production in either
department is part of department I (Kalecki, 1991 [1968], p. 459). Kalecki started from
this schema but introduced two important modiﬁcations. First, he counts raw materials
and intermediate goods as being produced in the respective department in which they
are needed. Thus, he assumes vertical integration (ibid., p. 459). Second, whilst sticking
to the original two sector model in some cases4, he expands the model in others. In his
well known analysis of the determinants of proﬁt, for example, he further diﬀerentiates
between capitalists' and workers' consumption, thus presenting the following three sector
model of the economy (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], p. 47)5:
 Department I produces investment goods
4See for example The Problem of Financing Economic Development (Kalecki, 1993 [1954]) and Central
Price Determination as an Essential Feature of a Socialist Economy (Kalecki, 1992 [1958]).
5In The Impact of Armaments on the Business Cycle after the Second World War (Kalecki, 1991 [1955])
he even expands the model to comprise 4 sectors, including a separate armaments sector.
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 Department II produces consumption goods for capitalists
 Department III produces consumption goods for workers
In order to better understand Kalecki's approach and the rationale behind it, it is nec-
essary to look at the context in which he proposes these modiﬁcations. This can best
be retraced in his Theory of Economic Dynamics (Kalecki, 1965 [1954]). The analysis is
started oﬀ with the following simple balance sheet:
Gross proﬁts Gross investment
Wages and salaries Capitalists' consumption
Workers' consumption
Gross national product Gross national product
(taken from ibid., p. 45)
Assuming, as Kalecki usually does, that workers spend their whole income on con-
sumption and do not save, we can cross out `wages and salaries' on one side and `workers'
consumption' on the other side of the balance sheet (ibid., p. 45). In the next step Kalecki
changes the exposition, presenting the following equation:
Gross proﬁts = Gross investment + capitalists' consumption
He then goes on to argue that it is investment and capitalists' consumption which deter-
mine proﬁts and not the other way round (ibid., pp. 45-46).
In order to help understanding, Kalecki decides to restate this analysis in somewhat
diﬀerent terms (ibid., pp. 46-47). This is the point at which he introduces the reproduction
schema presented above. From the context of his analysis it can be seen that Kalecki
simply converted each entry on the right side of the balance sheet into a department,
turning `capitalists' consumption' into `consumption goods for capitalists' and `workers's
consumption' into `consumption goods for workers'.
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This conversion, I want to argue, despite appearing to follow logically at ﬁrst, turns out
to be problematic on closer inspection. Whilst capitalists' and workers' consumption can
safely be said to be distinct categories, the same is not true for consumption goods for
workers and capitalists. A signiﬁcant overlap can be assumed to exist, particularly in the
range of basic necessities. No clear demarcation line can be drawn between consumption
goods for capitalists and workers.
In a diﬀerent context Kalecki appears to have been vaguely aware of this problem,
arguing that
The capitalists' consumption is partly directed to wage-goods, the increase in
the price of which may cause a rise of capitalists' expenditure on wage-goods
and a fall in the purchases of other goods subject to their consumption. Then
a corresponding shift in the output will take place. (Kalecki, 1990 [1937],
p. 321)
In this statement Kalecki seems to acknowledge the overlap between capitalists' and
workers' consumption. He does so only in a footnote, though, and does not consider the
deﬁnitional problems arising from it. Stating that capitalists consume wage goods means
that these cannot be deﬁned simply by the fact of being purchased out of wages.
This points us towards a possible logical fallacy in Kalecki's argument: despite being
very plausible in its original formulation, the argument looses some of its explanatory
power in the restated version, simply because of semantic diﬀerences between `consump-
tion' and `consumption goods'. Whilst being convincing when discussing consumption in
the abstract, deﬁnitional problems arise once the issue is restated in more concrete terms
diﬀerentiating between diﬀerent groups of consumption goods. I argue that, although
this does not impact on the validity of Kalecki's general argument, this diﬃculty should
be acknowledged and dealt with.
I want to suggest that Kalecki's argumentation would gain in logical consistency if his
analysis of the determination of proﬁts were separated from his interpretation of Marxian
reproduction schema. For other parts of his analysis, as for example in the above cited
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footnote, a Veblenian interpretation of consumption may prove to be fruitful. This
impression is reinforced through Kalecki's choice of terminology in Essays in the Theory
of Economic Fluctuations (Kalecki, 1990 [1939]) where he refers to capitalist consumption
goods as luxury goods (ibid., p. 275). This is not meant to pretend, however, that this
is what Kalecki had in mind.
Kalecki most certainly did not conceptualise consumption along Veblenian lines. I
believe to have shown, however, that consumption was largely underconceptualised in
Kalecki's analysis, leaving room for improvement and re-interpretation. Having said
this, the next section will show that Kalecki provides us with valuable insight into a par-
ticularly problematic area of conspicuous consumption, namely conspicuous consumption
on certain supply-restrained markets.
4.4 The special case of supply-restrained markets
In his 1993 article Housing as a Wage and Luxury Good: Absolute Poverty and the
Distribution of Income in Supply-Side Economics Toporowski argues that, implicit in
Kalecki's theory is a model of how capitalists' consumption of wage goods may under
speciﬁc circumstances result in an increase in absolute poverty.
The theoretical background of Toporowski's argument is as follows: Kalecki usually
works with the assumption of capacity underutilisation. As long as production capacities
are not fully used, a pronounced mismatch between supply and demand is likely to exist
only temporarily, because entrepreneurs can easily increase production without incurring
much additional cost. Long-run problems of scarcity are very unlikely to arise in such
markets as supply is elastic and can easily respond to changes in demand. Kalecki does
acknowledge, however, that some markets may be supply constrained. In industries pro-
ducing at full capacity level or when dependent on limited resources (e.g. housing space),
supply cannot adapt to demand as easily as on markets with idle production capacities.
Supply-restrained markets working to full capacity represent the competitive exemption
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to Kalecki's rule saying that in advanced capitalism the great majority of markets are
oligopolistic. While putting forward a mark-up pricing framework for oligopolistic mar-
kets, Kalecki conceptualises prices on competitive markets as being determined via the
interplay of supply and demand6.
In the special case of supply constrained markets which produce goods that are both
wage and luxury goods, Toporowski argues, an important phenomenon can occur: if capi-
talists, for whatever reason, increase their spending on such a market this is likely to raise
the prices and crowd out consumption by the (ﬁnancially weaker) workers (Toporowski,
1993, pp. 331-332). This, as Toporowski argues, can result in absolute poverty, if there
is a wage good that is a basic necessity, and whose supply is both inelastic in the short
run, and readily transferable into booming luxury markets (ibid., p. 337). Toporowski
empirically shows this to have happened on the UK housing market of the 1980s, as
more and more living space has been converted into luxury housing and the number of
aﬀordable dwellings decreased (ibid., p. 333). Consequently, housing prices went up and
the number of households registering as homeless more than doubled over the decade
from 1979 to 1989 (ibid., p. 337).
Obviously, the poverty-producing eﬀect is even more pronounced in the housing market
than it would be in markets for other, more easily substitutable goods (ibid., p. 333).
Still, it is not constrained to the housing market.
Interpreting the above in Veblenian terms, one could say that supply-restrained mar-
kets which distribute goods with both strong conspicuous and non-conspicuous features,
if left unregulated, are highly at risk of producing adverse socio-economic results. These
markets present us with an extreme case of the negative side-eﬀects of conspicuous con-
sumption. In eﬀect, the socio-economic problems impending from these markets are so
serious that they should not be left to chance.
Albeit written with a diﬀerent focus, Kalecki's papers on the war economy, published
6For the theoretical details of this analysis please refer to chapter 5.
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during World War II, supply us with some valuable ideas concerning ways to counter
these predicaments. I would argue that these can be transferred to modern market
economies as long as the following two conditions hold:
 There is scarcity, be it through a rise in demand or a fall in supply
 Supply is inelastic
The number of markets fulﬁlling these preconditions obviously is far smaller in modern
capitalist economies than it was when Kalecki was working on the problem during World
War II. However, the situation on some markets, as for example the housing market, may
be suﬃciently similar to warrant a closer examination of Kalecki's thoughts.
The two major economic problems of the time of Kalecki's writing were inﬂation and
a scarce supply of consumption goods (Kalecki, 1997 [1940], p. 3). Roughly speaking,
Kalecki's explanation of wartime UK economy was as follows: high investment in arma-
ments and related industries resulted in high levels of employment and thus relatively
high levels of purchasing power. At the same time, production capacities for consumer
goods were reduced in favour of military production. Equally, the shipping space avail-
able for imports of consumption goods was drastically reduced. Thus, the relatively
high purchasing power of the population was confronted with a low supply of goods to
purchase. This drove prices up, resulting in considerable inﬂation and, in some cases,
an absolute shortage of goods (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b], p. 20). The primary challenge for
economists at the time was to devise measures for eﬀectively combating this double-edged
problem of scarcity and inﬂation. In his writings Kalecki discusses six diﬀerent courses
of action available to public authorities:
 Laissez-faire (ibid.)
 Higher taxation (e.g. income taxation) (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][a])
 Compulsory saving (Kalecki, 1997 [1940])
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 Stabilisation of money wages (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b])
 Direct price control (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b]; Kalecki, 1997 [1944])
 Diﬀerent forms of rationing (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][a]; Kalecki, 1997 [1941][c]; Kalecki,
1997 [1941][d]; Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b]; Kalecki, 1997 [1942][a]; Kalecki, 1997 [1942][b];
Kalecki, 1997 [1944])
Each of these strategies tackles either inﬂation or scarcity, or both. I will now turn to a
short account of Kalecki's view of the advantages and drawbacks of each of them.
The strategy of laissez-faire would mean that public authorities do not intervene in the
market, expecting the price mechanism to readjust supply and demand. Thus, inﬂation
would be accepted as a necessary evil in order to curtail demand of scarce products.
Kalecki was highly critical of this option, arguing that the lower-income groups are hit,
and it is the reduction in their consumption which keeps in balance the demand for and
supply of consumption goods (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b], p. 21). It is obvious that this would
leave the issue of conspicuous consumption in supply-restrained markets unresolved. On
top of that, as I will set out in more detail in the next chapter, rising prices have a
tendency to spark oﬀ demand for higher wages and thus set into motion an inﬂationary
vicious circle (ibid., p. 20).
Higher taxation, in particular a rise in income taxation, according to Kalecki, has
much the same distributive eﬀect as rising prices. This time real wages are reduced not
through a rise in prices of consumption goods but through a rise in other consumption-
independent dues, the ﬁnal result staying the same: lower purchasing power and thus
lower demand (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][a], p. 7). Kalecki believes to detect a strategic element
in some people's preference for taxation as opposed to laissez-faire inﬂation, though:
The diﬀerences between these two ways which is in the back of the mind of
people who advance such proposals is probably based on a rather arbitrary
assumption that workers will not ask for higher wages when taxed while they
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usually do it when the cost of living rises, and thus the `vicious spiral' will
be prevented. (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][a], p. 7)
Compulsory saving was a measure suggested by Keynes in order to curtail consumption.
The rationale of the measure was to reduce the available income in order to limit the
purchasing power of the population. Kalecki was highly sceptical of this proposition
for two reasons: First, he was sceptical as to whether the measure would be able to
achieve its aim. His reservation stemmed from the fact that wealthy people, in order to
keep up their current standard of living may resort to reducing voluntary saving or even
dissaving rather than do what is expected of them, namely cut consumption and increase
saving. This would imply that only those people who cannot resort to extra resources
will actually cut consumption and thus seriously harm the eﬀectiveness of the proposal.
Secondly, related to the ﬁrst argument, this measure is likely to burden the lower income
groups more than anyone else (Kalecki, 1997 [1940], p. 3). Thus, like laissez-faire and
taxation, compulsory saving, according to Kalecki, is not suitable to solve the problem
at hand.
The fourth strategy on the list, the stabilisation of money wages, directly tackles the
problem of the wage-price-spiral. Prices are allowed to increase at ﬁrst, until they have
risen suﬃciently to equate supply and demand at the given wage level. As workers cannot
react with demands for higher wages, the vicious circle is stopped before it starts. Kalecki
hurries to add, though, that this does not mean that real wages remain constant after
the initial decline (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b], p. 20).
It is important to notice that real wages will not be stabilized at the lower
level they ﬁrst reach. Any further fall in the supply of consumption goods
will automatically cause a further decline in real wages. (ibid., p. 20)
It is due to this that Kalecki argues that the stabilisation of money wages solves the
problem of inﬂation at the expense of the lower-income working population who are
eﬀectively disempowered in the struggle for distributive shares. On top of that, this
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measure leaves the problem of scarcity unresolved (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b], p. 21).
Direct control of prices approaches the problem from the opposite direction. In this
case, it is the entrepreneurs who are forced to step out of the inﬂationary vicious circle
and thus are bereft of their chance to keep their proﬁts high. While eﬀectively combating
inﬂation this strategy still has an important drawback:
No decrees about prices can, however, increase the supply of goods. The
outcome of price-ﬁxing measures is either that prices continue to rise illegally
or that the discrepancy between demand and supply is reﬂected in a shortage
of goods and queues. Inﬂation still exists, but its shape is altered. In this
form it victimizes chieﬂy the people who have no time  or servants  to make
the best of the state of haphazard distribution: in other words, those who
work hard and have low incomes. (ibid., p. 21)
Thus, the exclusive reliance on price control merely shifts the problem of inﬂation to
another sphere rather than eﬀectively solving it. On top of that, it is still the poorest
part of the population who is most severely aﬀected.
In reaction to the deﬁciencies of all other strategies, Kalecki proposes rationing as [t]he
only radical, fair, and eﬃcient way of dealing with [inﬂation] (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][e],
p. 88).
Comprehensive rationing of goods in short supply avoids rising prices, deple-
tion of stocks, and also haphazard distribution. For demand is now adjusted
to supply by the direct curtailment of expenditure. And in contrast with the
position under laissez-faire inﬂation, wage stabilization, or price control with-
out rationing, the largest cut in consumption is extracted from those with the
highest standard of living. (Kalecki, 1997 [1941][b], p. 21)
Kalecki does concede, however, that rationing by itself may not be suﬃcient for solving
the problem of inﬂation (Kalecki, 1997 [1944], p. 33). At least in some cases rationing may
well lead to a reduced sensitiveness of costumers to price diﬀerences as between various
sources of supply (ibid., p. 33). Rationing thus may result in higher market imperfections
and higher prices (for the details of this analysis see the next chapter). As a consequence,
Kalecki stresses, rationing should be accompanied by price control in order to ensure its
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eﬀectiveness in comprehensively solving the twin-problem of distribution of goods and
inﬂation (Kalecki, 1997 [1944], p. 33).
It follows from the above argument that it is always useful and in most cases
necessary to supplement rationing by price control. This conclusion is of
some practical importance for the post-war transition period. As long as
some commodities are in scarce supply both rationing and price control must
be maintained. (ibid., p. 37)
To sum up the argument, it can be concluded from the above that a policy combining
rationing and price control may be the method of choice for dealing with the problems
laid out at the beginning of this subchapter. Whilst a comprehensive rationing scheme
would appear disproportionate, a speciﬁc rationing scheme, regulating the distribution of
basic necessities that are in scarce supply, on the other hand, may provide a good way to
tackle some of the current problems with conspicuous consumption on supply-restrained
markets.
4.5 Excursus: On the ﬁnancial sustainability of conspicuous
consumption patterns
In recent studies diﬀerent authors have analysed another interesting and potentially
poverty producing aspect of conspicuous consumption: its relationship to the level of
household saving or indebtedness respectively (Starr, 2009; Wisman, 2009; Barba and
Pivetti, 2009).
Both Barba and Pivetti (2009, p. 122) and Wisman (2009, p. 104) suggest that the
increasing indebtedness of US households is related to the high and increasing degree
of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth (Wisman, 2009, p. 104) to be
observed in the United States over the last decades. Veblen's theory of conspicuous
consumption provides us with two interesting hypotheses as to the reasons for this de-
velopment:
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First, the higher income accruing to the top earners provides them with even more
capital for conspicuous consumption. They are thus likely to raise consumption levels in
an ongoing struggle for superiority in status, consequently raising standards for everyone
in the social hierarchy. It thus becomes necessary to consume more in order to keep one's
respective position on the social ladder (Wisman, 2009, pp. 104-106).
Second, as Veblen observed, people are very conscious of their relative social status
and thus do everything they can to maintain their standard of living. Barba and Pivetti
(2009, p. 125) therefore argue that consumption spending is relatively inelastic with
regard to changes in real incomes, consumption expenditure being highly inﬂuenced by
the relation of
current income relative to past income; people whose incomes are low rela-
tive to their past incomes reduce saving and incur deﬁcits, if they have the
necessary assets or credit, to protect their living standards (cf. Duesenberry,
1949, pp. 7689). (Barba and Pivetti, 2009, p. 125)
Consequently, according to Wisman, if cutting consumption is not an acceptable option
people are left with three ways to react to growing inequality and/or rising consumption
standards: Firstly, if they have been saving so far, they can reduce their savings or even
dissave. Secondly, if they do not have savings they can go into debt. Thirdly, they
can increase working hours in order to obtain a higher income (Wisman, 2009, pp. 104-
106). Wisman argues that empirical evidence shows that US households have done all of
this over the last 30 years (ibid., p. 106). Due to its important economic consequences
both Barba and Pivetti and Wisman focus their analyses on the second strategy, namely
increasing household debt (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Wisman, 2009).
While an increase in household debt can be observed throughout all income groups
it is most pronounced amongst the lower income groups (Wisman, 2009, p. 106). Fur-
thermore, it is argued that a considerable part of this additional debt is incurred for
consumption rather than investment purposes. Barba and Pivetti show that the forms of
debt prevalent in lower income households are credit card debt, non-bank debt and, in-
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creasingly, mortgages. They cite empirical evidence suggesting that mortgages are most
often incurred in order to ﬁnance consumption. Thus, all the forms of credit prevalent
with lower income groups can be shown to be primarily oriented towards consumption
(Barba and Pivetti, 2009, pp. 114-116).
In conclusion, Barba and Pivetti argue that the growing indebtedness of US households
which could be observed over the last 25 years
should be seen principally as a response to stagnant real wages and retrench-
ments in the welfare state, i.e. as the counterpart of enduring changes in
income distribution. (ibid., p. 114)
Furthermore, they put forward the argument that
This analysis seems to suggest that through household indebtedness it is pos-
sible to bring about the best outcome from the point of view of the capitalist
system, i.e. that through household debt low wages can be brought to coex-
ist with high levels of aggregate demand, without it being necessary, for this
coexistence to be persistently ensured, to have recourse to state intervention
and bigger government. Household debt thus appears to be capable of pro-
viding the solution to the fundamental contradiction between the necessity of
high and rising levels of consumption, for the growth of the system's actual
output, and a framework of antagonistic conditions of distribution, which
keeps within limits the real income of the vast majority of society. Indeed,
not only the solution to this fundamental contradiction of capitalism, but the
best of all possible worlds seems to have been brought about for the richest
section of society. This is because with the substitution of loans for wages the
share of actual income accruing to capitalists et hoc genus omne is fed also by
interest that wage earners must pay on the loans they obtain; moreover, the
burden of servicing their debt pushes them, sooner or later, to work harder
and for longer hoursthat burden, in other words, eventually enhances the
workers' willingness to `go anywhere and do anything' on such terms as can
be got, thereby contributing to the persistence of low wages and labour costs.
(ibid., pp. 126-127)
Loan ﬁnanced consumption seems to provide a possibility for the wealthy classes to over-
ride Kalecki's prediction that high income inequalities will result in insuﬃcient eﬀective
demand, thus breaking the power of his argument for a more equal income distribution.
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Consequently, household debt has more and more come to be regarded as a demand man-
agement tool the same way public debt has in the wake of the Keynesian Revolution.
Barba and Pivetti warn against the risks of substituting demand management based
on private household debt for demand management through public debt, though. While
they do not regard rising public debt levels as problematic in the long run, they argue that
rising household debt levels are (Barba and Pivetti, 2009, pp. 129-130). If indebtedness
continues to grow, there comes a point at which people are so heavily indebted that they
are unable to service their debts (ibid., p. 128). Once this happens on a large scale this is
likely to result in liquidity problems for banks. In order to protect the economy, the state
will, as we have seen in the current ﬁnancial crisis, act as a lender of last resort, which
will in turn result in raising public debt (ibid., p. 130). Accordingly, the result in terms
of public indebtedness is the same as it would have been had the government followed a
classical Keynesian demand management strategy, with the diﬀerence that this strategy
results in far greater disruptions of the economy and that the people proﬁting from it
are other. While Keynesian demand management policies are likely to strengthen the
working class, the reliance on private debt and public crisis management clearly proﬁts
the entrepreneurial class. Not only can they keep real wages low without risking a
drop in demand, they also proﬁt from the interest payments the indebted lower income
households have to make (ibid., p. 127). The fact that governments jump in to stabilise
the economy once this inherently unstable situation gets out of control means that the
entrepreneurs do not have to bear the costs of their strategy either. The proﬁts thus
accrue to the entrepreneurs, whilst the losses are borne by society as a whole.
A very diﬀerent but related argument is put forward by Martha Starr in her 2009
CJE article Lifestyle Conformity and Life-cycle Saving - a Veblenian Perspective. The
aim of this paper is to provide an explanation for life-cycle saving patterns (Starr, 2009,
p. 25). The author draws on Veblen's work in order to counter dominant theorising in the
ﬁeld which assumes individually utility-maximising rational actors. She sets out stating
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that in a Veblenian framework people's decisions are understood to be based on habitual
behaviour and emulation rather than rational calculus (Starr, 2009, p. 27). She then goes
on to introduce ﬁndings from contemporary theories of cultural evolution claiming that
the emulation of behavioural patterns, rather than being a dysfunctional human trait, can
indeed be regarded as highly functional in complex situations where individuals ﬁnd it
hard to make informed decisions. In such situations, emulating the successful behaviour
of others may produce better results than trying to work out the optimal strategy oneself
(ibid., pp. 32-33). Applying these thoughts to the topic of the article Starr then goes on
to state that
[...] there are good reasons to believe that the alternative of imitating pre-
dominant consumption patterns will tend to produce good outcomes, in terms
of putting people on consumption trajectories that tend to be smooth and
reasonably low in downside risks. As discussed, following lifecycle norms
tends to cause saving in some sense `automatically', namely, via accumula-
tion of home equity and channelling of free cash ﬂow into ﬁnancial assets after
children have left the household. (ibid., p. 33)
This is a very interesting statement as it shows that, while starting from the same the-
oretical foundations as Barba and Pivetti and Wisman, Starr comes to very diﬀerent
conclusions. Whilst the former authors have drawn on the concept of conspicuous con-
sumption in order to explain the increasing indebtedness of households, Starr argues that
habitual consumption patterns more or less automatically ensure suﬃcient savings. She
does concede, however, that this explanation leaves plenty of room for non-optimal re-
sults as well: ﬁrstly, people may ﬁnd that despite emulating successful others they do not
achieve optimal results for themselves (there is no guarantee of success in this strategy);
and secondly, in times of rapid social and economic change emulating successful others
may prove to be dysfunctional if the situation has changed too much for past strategies
to be applicable (ibid., pp. 33-34). It is via this second reservation that the author in-
troduces the empirical fact that provided the starting point for the other analyses and
seems to be strangely at odds with her argumentation, namely the low savings rate of
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US households. Nevertheless she holds that
[w]hile the lifecycle-saving view [the dominant approach] struggles to explain
this, in the conformity view [her approach], it could readily occur if people
are emulating the lifecycle consumption patterns of cohorts somewhat older
than themselves, who received windfall gains from the start-up of the Social
Security system and were covered far more often by deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
plans and received retiree health insurance from their employers. (Starr, 2009,
p. 34)
Thus, the low savings rate, according to Starr's interpretation, results from people fol-
lowing out-dated consumption trajectories (ibid., p. 34). The main diﬀerence between
Starr's analysis and Barba and Pivetti and Wisman's then is, that the latter assume a
dysfunctional pattern of conspicuous consumption to be the key problem7, whilst Starr
is discussing delays in adaptation to fundamentally functional consumption patterns.
Taking into consideration Veblen's analysis of `institutional inertia' it seems highly
unlikely, however, that economic and social circumstances and consumption habits will
ever be fully in line:
Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circum-
stances, and are therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the
present. (Veblen, 1998 [1899], pp. 190-191)
Bearing in mind the reservations she makes, Starr's argument seems to be reduced to
the simple statement that consumption and savings patterns are not determined through
rational calculus but rather through imitation of habitual behaviour. In conclusion, I
am afraid to say, the present author has not been convinced that Starr has achieved her
self-imposed aim, namely:
Hopefully the analysis of this paper illustrates the potential gains to be had
from refreshing Veblenian thinking about culture, norms, habits and economic
7It is important to stress, though, that the authors do not blame conspicuous consumption but rather
accept it as a given human trait which - in combination with high earnings inequality - produces
undesirable social outcomes. Consequently, the solution they propose is not to cut consumption but
rather to counteract earnings inequality through Keynesian demand management policies.
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change with insights from contemporary theories of cultural evolution. (Starr,
2009, p. 45)
The argument put forward by Barba and Pivetti (2009) and Wisman (2009) concerning
the causal relation between conspicuous consumption and indebtedness seems to be far
more convincing.
Summing up, it can be said that on top of the negative economic consequences de-
scribed by Veblen, Robinson and Kalecki, conspicuous consumption has another impor-
tant drawback: being such a powerful motivational factor it enables the rich to rely on
demand management via private debt, with all the adverse economic consequences cited
above.
Concluding remarks
Conspicuous consumption, according to Veblen, is the most important means of status
demonstration in advanced industrial economies. The major diﬀerence between conspic-
uous and serviceable consumption is that the former is based on invidious comparison
whereas the latter is based on the urge to satisfy a basic human need. Veblen never tired
of stressing the socially disruptive eﬀects of conspicuous consumption.
Joan Robinson, taking up the analysis where Veblen left it, identiﬁed and discussed
three major problems of unregulated (conspicuous) consumption: First, the risk of di-
verting productive capacities away from basic necessities and towards luxury production.
Second, negative externalities arising out of consumption. Third, due to the fact that
supply creates demand, leaving consumption unregulated would eﬀectively mean that
large corporations, not the people, decide upon the allocation of resources.
Kalecki on the other hand, despite largely underconceptualising consumption in gen-
eral, provides us with valuable ideas on a special case of conspicuous consumption: con-
spicuous consumption on supply-restrained markets. Rationing and price control are
presented as a promising policy-mix to tackle the problems that are likely to arise in
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these special circumstances.
Finally, it was shown that contemporary authors draw on Veblen's theory of conspic-
uous consumption to explain the problem of rising household debt. They argue that the
strong urge to preserve one's relative social status in combination with growing income
inequalities lead households to go into debt in order to keep up a certain level of conspic-
uous consumption. While from the point of view of the entrepreneurs this may appear
to be an optimal strategy for proﬁt maximisation, it has important socially disruptive
consequences and, as we have seen in the current economic crisis, it is not sustainable in
the long run. The authors thus warn against the negative socio-economic consequences of
demand management based on the reliance upon conspicuous consumption and private
debt.
Overview of the main poverty producing eﬀects
Conspicuous consumption may be argued to contribute to the production of poverty in
at least four diﬀerent - although closely interrelated - ways:
Firstly, conspicuous consumption produces poverty because it raises the bar. Who is
considered to be poor, in a relative poverty framework depends not least on the standard
of living prevalent in a community. Townsend has argued that people should be consid-
ered to be poor if they are no longer able to fully participate in the regular life of their
community. What a person needs to have or be able to do in order to fully participate
in communal life, in turn, depends on the general standard of living prevalent in a soci-
ety. This is where conspicuous consumption comes into play. Conspicuous consumption
has been shown to broadly fulﬁl two social functions: on the one hand, it acts as an
important means for status diﬀerentiation. The more conspicuous consumption you can
aﬀord, the higher up in the social hierarchy you are. On the other hand, conspicuous
consumption may be interpreted as setting minimum standards of consumption which
need to be attained in order to be accepted as fully-ﬂedged members of a community.
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Accepting on the one hand the hypothesis that widespread conspicuous consumption to a
certain extent deﬁnes the minima which need to be attained and on the other hand, that
status struggle continuously exerts an upwards pressure on conspicuous consumption, it
becomes clear that conspicuous consumption can indeed be considered to exert an im-
portant inﬂuence on the development of a relative poverty line. Consequently, if incomes
do not keep pace with the imperative for increasing conspicuous consumption more and
more people will end up to be in relative poverty, even if their disposable income remains
unchanged.
Secondly, high levels of conspicuous consumption may provoke a diversion of produc-
tive capacities. Producers may ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to cater to the luxury consumption
of the auent than to the basic needs of the poor. In extreme cases, this economically
sound business model may result in some basic goods not being produced at all, with
detrimental eﬀects on the ability of some people to achieve a predeﬁned standard of liv-
ing. The actual practical signiﬁcance of such extreme cases of the diversion of productive
capacities in our modern economies, however, would require thorough empirical investi-
gation. Furthermore, the negative eﬀects of any diversions that may arise largely depend
upon the substitutability at equal prices of the product in question.
Thirdly, conspicuous consumption can contribute to poverty through the generation
of negative externalities. The best-known example of such negative external eﬀects can
probably be found in transportation: the more people decide to buy and use their own car
rather than using means of public transport, the less cost-eﬀective the provision of public
transport becomes. At a certain point, public transport may be suspended altogether,
thus requiring everyone to secure private transportation. Those who cannot aﬀord to do
so face serious stints in their mobility. This, in turn, can have considerable impact upon
employment prospects and shopping options, to name but a few of the consequences. As
for those who manage to secure private transportation, this is likely to be more expensive
than public transport. The additional costs incurred for transportation may suﬃce to
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push some people below the poverty line who until then would have been able to secure
a living above the poverty line.
Finally, it has been pointed out above that conspicuous consumption can have partic-
ularly detrimental eﬀects on some supply-restrained markets. This has been shown by
Toporowski (1993) with reference to the UK housing market. Conspicuous consumption
in this speciﬁc case can be shown to have two related eﬀects: on the one hand more
and more living space is converted into luxury accomodation (see the argument on the
diversion of production above). On the other hand, the decreasing number of aﬀordable
accomodation results in a rent increase. Thus, in the case of conspicuous consumption
on the housing market additional poverty may be produced if wages do not keep up with
increasing rents.
The above discussed instances of conspicuous consumption producing poverty, it needs
to be mentioned, all hang on a speciﬁc operationalisation of poverty. As has been pointed
out in chapter 1, poverty in the context of this dissertation is not only deﬁned in terms
of a relatively low income but also in terms of material deprivation. All of the poverty
producing eﬀects discussed above can be understood as acting on the material deprivation
aspect of poverty, rather than on nominal income.
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5 Poverty producing process n° 2:
Mark-up pricing
This chapter argues that mark-up pricing is a further important poverty producing pro-
cess which needs to be taken into account in an analysis of poverty in advanced capital-
ism. First, the original formulation and development of the mark-up pricing framework
in Kalecki's work will be discussed. Next follows Robinson's critique and evaluation of
the approach. Thirdly, Veblen's thoughts on the issue of price determination will be laid
out and compared to the mark-up pricing approach. Finally, I will point out how ﬁrms
engaging in mark-up pricing may produce poverty.
5.1 Michaª Kalecki
Kalecki showed considerable interest in price determination as an important part of the
analysis of economic dynamics. Throughout his career he was working on and constantly
revising his own attempt at an explanation of price determination. According to Kriesler
(1987) Kalecki's major eﬀorts in this respect were:
1. The Determinants of Distribution of the National Income (1991 [1938])
2. Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations (1990 [1939])
3. The Supply Curve of an Industry under Imperfect Competition (1991 [1940])
4. A Theory of Long-Run Distribution of the Product of Industry (1941)
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5. Studies in Economic Dynamics (1991 [1943])
6. Theory of Economic Dynamics (1965 [1954])
7. Class Struggle and Distribution of National Income (1991 [1971])
While detecting a considerable extent of continuity in 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7, Kriesler argued
that 3 and 4 represent a marginalist detour which Kalecki discarded afterwards. I will
thus focus my analysis on Kalecki 1938, Kalecki 1939, Kalecki 1943, Kalecki 1954 and
Kalecki 1971.
After exploring the basic assumptions of Kalecki's analysis, as well as discussing its
explanatory scope, I will delineate the theoretical development of Kalecki's analysis of
price determination.
5.1.1 Basic assumptions
Kalecki starts oﬀ his analysis with the observation that in modern capitalist economies
two diﬀerent regimes of price determination apply: price determination via supply and
demand on competitive raw material and basic foodstuﬀ markets on the one hand and
price determination via cost plus mark-up on oligopolistic markets for manufactured
goods on the other hand (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], p. 11). I will follow Kalecki's lead in
quickly discussing the situation on competitive markets while focusing the analysis on
the imperfectly competitive manufacturing sector.
The exemption: Competitive markets
Contrary to dominant belief at the time of his early writing, Kalecki regarded competitive
markets to be an exemption rather than the rule. Truly competitive structures, according
to him, can be found in only a few sectors of the economy, namely those producing raw
materials and unprocessed foodstuﬀ, that is i.e. agriculture and mining. These markets
share the following characteristics: A big number of small producers are competing with
137
each other and supply is inelastic in the short run. On these primary goods markets
prices are ﬁxed through the interplay of supply and demand (Sawyer, 1985, pp. 20-21).
Prices are highly responsive to changes in either supply or demand and thus tend to be
unstable (Robinson, 1980a, p. 149).
For the greatest part of modern capitalist economies, however, according to Kalecki, the
concept of `perfect competition', rather than being a realistic assumption, is a dangerous
myth:
Perfect competition, when its actual status of a handy model is forgotten,
becomes a dangerous myth. (Kalecki, 1991 [1971], p. 98)
Imperfectly competitive markets are the rule in advanced capitalism.
The rule: Oligopolistic markets
In his analysis of imperfect competition Kalecki's analytical focus lies on the manufactur-
ing sector. He does state, however, that construction, transportation and services follow
a very similar logic and can be captured with the same theoretical model. The following
discussion thus applies to the manufacturing, construction, transportation and services
sectors (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], p. 30). Typical for advanced capitalism are oligopolistic
industries with only a few dominant actors. These industries, according to Kalecki, usu-
ally operate below full employment of capital equipment (Osiaty«ski, 1991b, p. 492)
and are thus able to react ﬂexibly to changes in demand. Bottle-necks in supply and
the resulting price rises are usually not an issue in these industries (Kalecki, 1965 [1954],
p. 11). Apart from capacity underutilisation and elastic supply, Kalecki bases his analysis
on the following assumptions:
 Average and marginal costs are constant as long as the point of full capacity utili-
sation is not reached, and the diﬀerence between average and marginal costs is neg-
ligible. Average costs are thus a good approximation for marginal costs (Kalecki,
1991 [1943], pp. 119-120).
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 In Theory of Economic Dynamics Kalecki also adds that In view of the uncertain-
ties faced in the process of price ﬁxing it will not be assumed that the ﬁrm attempts
to maximize its proﬁts in any precise sort of manner (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], p. 12).
In Class Struggle and Distribution of National Income Kalecki introduces another qual-
iﬁcation which should not go unmentioned: as it presupposes diﬀerential pricing, the
theory of mark-up pricing in its ﬁnal formulation is not suitable to account for the pric-
ing behaviour of monopolists (Kalecki, 1991 [1971], p. 100).
Having established the basic assumptions underlying Kalecki's analysis, I will now
go on to discuss the development of his theory of the determination of the mark-up
throughout his career.
5.1.2 Development of Kalecki's pricing theory
Kalecki's pricing theory, Kriesler (1987) argued, developed in three stages. In what
follows I will sketch out and discuss in some detail the diﬀerences and continuities between
these diﬀerent stages of theory development.
Phase 1: 1938-1943
Kalecki's ﬁrst attempt at the formulation of a pricing theory was made in his 1938 pa-
per The Determinants of Distribution of National Income. As the title suggests, pricing
theory, in Kalecki's mind, was and always remained tightly connected to income distri-
bution, i.e. the determination of the relative shares of wages and proﬁts. Kalecki puts
forward the following pricing equation (Kalecki, 1991 [1938], p. 7):
p = ca + da + sa + wa + ra
Price is thus determined by the average capitalist income (ca), the average costs of
depreciation (da), average salaries (sa), average wages (wa) and average raw material
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costs (ra).
Marginal costs in this model are calculated as follows (Kalecki, 1991 [1938], p. 7):
m = dm + sm + wm + rm
Furthermore, following Lerner, he called the ratio of the diﬀerence between price and
marginal cost to price (ibid., p. 7) the `degree of monopoly' which is depicted by the
letter µ.
µ =
(p−m)
p
=
mark − up
price
As Kalecki assumes marginal costs and average costs to be equal as long as ﬁrms work
below capacity level, the only diﬀerence between marginal costs and price is capitalist
income ca. Capitalist income contains proﬁts and interest (ibid., p. 7). The degree of
monopoly thus in this formulation is nothing else than the share of the particular cap-
italist's income in the prices of his products. It provides us with some insight into the
price setting policy of the ﬁrm. How much proﬁt does it dare to charge? Kalecki at ﬁrst
does not tell us much on how these decisions are taken, though. As his aim is to explain
the relative shares of wages and proﬁts in national income, he goes on to aggregate the
analysis of individual ﬁrms in order to obtain data for the economy as a whole. He does
so by simply adding up the values from the individual equations (ibid., p. 8). Following
a number of conversions and the introduction of a few simplifying assumptions Kalecki
arrives at a new formula for the degree of monopoly (ibid., p. 9):
µ =
C +D + S
T
=
profits+ overheads
turnover
Or, expressed in Kalecki's words:
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The relative share of gross capitalist income and salaries in the aggregate
turnover is with great approximation equal to the average degree of monopoly.
(Kalecki, 1991 [1938], p. 9)
It should be noted that this aggregated degree of monopoly, analogous to Kalecki's equa-
tion for the degree of monopoly of an individual ﬁrm, does not contain any notion of
the interdependence of ﬁrms within an industry. Every ﬁrm determines its degree of
monopoly independently of its competitors. The ﬁrm's competitive position is by deﬁ-
nition reﬂected in the mark-up on costs (p−m). Kalecki does not tell us much about
what inﬂuences the mark-up, though.
What is the explanatory value of Kalecki's ﬁrst formulation of the degree of monopoly?
The theoretical gain lies in verbally linking the mark-up (p−m) to the structure of the
industry. In this ﬁrst paper, however, Kalecki establishes the link between pricing and
competition but does not explain it in detail yet. He provides us with some general hints
on what inﬂuences the degree of monopoly, though:
 The creation of cartels increases µ (ibid., p. 19).
 [T]he fall in price of raw materials in the slump creates among the entrepreneurs a
reluctance to `pass it on to the buyer', and this too, of course, increases the degree
of monopoly (ibid., p. 19).
 [W]age-cutting is likely to increase to a certain extent the degree of monopoly,
because a tendency may exist not to pass it on to the buyer (ibid., p. 19).
 The change of basic data may, of course, also inﬂuence the degree of monopoly.
For instance, a change in the rate of interest or technical progress aﬀects the size
of the enterprise which is essential for the degree of monopoly. (The variation of
the scale can be treated as a special case of variation of the type of equipment.)
(ibid., p. 13).
This ﬁrst paper was republished in a slightly amended version as the ﬁrst chapter of
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Kalecki's Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations (Kalecki, 1990 [1939]). Apart
from diﬀerences in connotation1 the theoretical analysis remains essentially the same as
in its ﬁrst formulation. Kalecki presents the following formula for the weighted average
of the degrees of monopoly, µ (ibid., pp. 240-241):
µ =
E +O
T
Concerning the inﬂuences on the degree of monopoly, Kalecki adds a new paragraph
which was not included in The Determinants of Distribution of National Income:
This tendency for the degree of monopoly to increase in the long run may,
however, be oﬀset by the diminishing imperfection of the market caused by
the fall of transport costs in relation to prices, the standardization of goods,
the organization of commodity exchanges, etc. In the Spätkapitalismus [phase
of advanced capitalism], however, the ﬁrst tendency has the upper hand, and
the degree of monopoly tends to increase. (ibid., p. 247)
In short, contrary to dominant dogma, Kalecki believes advanced capitalist economies to
develop further and further away from the ideal of perfect competition. The increasing
degree of monopoly means a higher mark-up on costs and thus a change in the distribution
of income in favour of capitalist income (ibid., p. 245).
After a short detour using marginalist methods2 Kalecki ties in this analysis with the
ﬁrst chapter of his book Studies in Economic Dynamics which was published in 1943.
The most notable diﬀerence to his earlier publications is that in Studies in Economic
Dynamics there is no more mention of individual ﬁrms. Kalecki starts the analysis with
the following deﬁnition of an industry:
By an `industry' is meant here manufacturing and selling of a certain group
of products which fulﬁls the following conditions: (i) The price ﬁxing for a
product by a ﬁrm is inﬂuenced mainly by the prices of other products in
1Capitalist income c is now called entrepreneurial income e; depreciation d, salaries s and interest are
taken together as overheads o.
2see Kalecki (1991 [1940]) and Kalecki (1941).
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the group and the expected price reactions of ﬁrms manufacturing them, and
only to a much lesser degree by prices and price reactions outside the group.
(ii) The proportional changes of the unit prime costs (unit costs of materials
and wages) of the various products of an `industry' are not very divergent.
(Kalecki, 1991 [1943], p. 119)
This deﬁnition was and still is subjected to severe criticism in the Post-Keynesian com-
munity. Osiaty«ski, for example, wrote
What is the essence of the diﬃculty in deﬁning an `industry' under oligopoly
competition? The product of each ﬁrm included in an `industry' must diﬀer
from products of other ﬁrms so that each ﬁrm can determine the price for its
own product, i.e. so that each product has its own price. Yet the product
diﬀerentiation must not be too big, because every oligopoly ﬁrm (unless it
ceases to be an oligopoly and becomes a monopoly) must take into account
prices ﬁxed for similar products by its oligopoly competitors. The prime-cost
curves of individual ﬁrms in an `industry' must not diﬀer too much between
themselves, yet they must be mutually independent. Those contradictions
can be solved only by an arbitrary deﬁnition of the scope of an `industry'.
(Osiaty«ski 1986 quoted in Osiaty«ski, 1991b, p. 497)
Little surprisingly, then, Kalecki was accused of being too indeterminate in his attempt at
deﬁnition. Kriesler, in his major study of Kalecki's microanalysis, restated this criticism.
Kalecki himself seems to have been well aware of the problems attached to his deﬁnition:
It is obvious that this deﬁnition is not clear-cut. The broader the group the
better condition (i) is fulﬁlled and the worse, in general, condition (ii). The
group must thus be formed so as to achieve a compromise between these two
requirements, and therefore the scope of the industry is within certain limits
arbitrary. (Kalecki, 1991 [1943], p. 119)
This did not stop him from using it, though. He continuously relied on the concept of an
industry in his subsequent analysis. Kalecki thus seems to have taken a rather pragmatic
stance towards deﬁnitions in the social sciences: whilst deﬁnitions are an important
element of social science research, they cannot and must not always be perfectly clear-
cut. Robinson joined in on this view, arguing that
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The concept of an industry, though amorphous and impossible to demarcate
sharply at the edges, is of importance for the theory of competition. (Robin-
son, 1980 [1953], p. 223)
Osiaty«ski's response to these defensive attempts is unambiguous: the critics remain
unpersuaded (Osiaty«ski, 1991b, p. 498).
This may partly be due to Kalecki's own methodological standards. He did not con-
tempt himself with a verbal analysis of economic developments but tried to express them
in terms of mathematical formulae. These were then applied to an empirical analysis of
existing economies3. It seems only logical that in this case an imprecise deﬁnition causes
more of a stir than in other, less formalistic contexts. The fact that, as we will see below,
in Kalecki's last two publications on pricing and distribution he changes major parts of
the analysis, yet left his conception of industry unchanged, does not seem to indicate
that Kalecki was particularly concerned about the usefulness of his deﬁnition though.
Be this as it may, a thorough analysis of Kalecki's pricing theory cannot let this major
point of critique go unmentioned.
Apart from the analytical starting point - single ﬁrm or industry - the analysis in
Studies in Economic Dynamics in many respects sticks quite closely to its predeces-
sors. Kalecki starts from the same assumptions - capacity underutilisation and constant
marginal costs - and develops a formula for µ (Kalecki, 1991 [1943], pp. 119-121).
µ =
∑
Qk (pk − ak)∑
Qkpk
The denominator
∑
Qk (pk − ak) is equal to aggregate proﬁts and overheads of the
industry, whereas the numerator
∑
Qkpk represents the aggregate value of sales ( =
turnover) of the industry (ibid., p. 121). Despite being presented in yet another diﬀerent
version it is obvious that this equation is identical with Kalecki's earlier formulations
of the degree of monopoly. Yet, in its third edition, Kalecki decided to abolish the
3Primarily the US and the UK.
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label `degree of monopoly', calling µ the percentage gross margin (Kalecki, 1991 [1943],
p. 121). At some points in the analysis, however, he uses the term degree of oligopoly
(ibid., p. 126), reminding us of the original appellation.
What inﬂuences the degree of monopoly? In Studies in Economic Dynamics Kalecki
goes into more detail as to what inﬂuences the degree of monopoly, an issue which he
did not discuss in much detail in his earlier works. He argues that changes in the degree
of monopoly µ
[...] are determined chieﬂy by changes in the state of market imperfection and
oligopoly, by changes in the rates of prime selling costs, and by `bottle-neck
factors'. True, µ is inﬂuenced also by relative changes in the average prime
costs as between ﬁrms, but this inﬂuence is not likely to be very important.
(ibid., p. 135)
Changes in the state of market imperfection Kalecki cites transport costs as an im-
portant inﬂuence on the condition of market imperfection. If transport costs rise rel-
ative to prime production costs, or alternatively, prime production costs decline while
transport costs remain stable, this results in an increase in market imperfection (ibid.,
pp. 120-121). Relatively higher transport costs are a phenomenon that is often encoun-
tered during slumps (as prime production costs tend to decline in economic downturns)
and thus, the degree of monopoly could be expected to rise in times of economic crisis
(ibid., p. 126). There are other factors which inﬂuence the degree of monopoly in the
opposite direction, however: Kalecki refers to Harrod who posited that consumers tend
to be more careful in comparing prices charged by various sellers in the slump than in
the boom (ibid., p. 126). Consequently, information asymmetries decline and the market
gets more competitive. Finally, when ﬁrms get under ﬁnancial pressure during a slump,
tacit price agreements are more likely to arise (ibid., pp. 126-127).
Imagine a deep slump in which the average prime costs in an `industry' have
fallen considerably. If the percentage margins were unchanged, there would
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be an even stronger fall of what is left for overheads and proﬁts of a single
producer because output is reduced as well. The resulting deterioration in
his ﬁnancial position induces him to increase his percentage gross margin in
the hope that other producers will act likewise. If they do not he is lost, but
so would he be if he reduced his prices proportionally to average prime costs.
If such is the prevailing attitude, a `tacit agreement' is established and µ is
higher than it otherwise would be. (Kalecki, 1991 [1943], pp. 126-127)
These tacit agreements, according to Kalecki, are likely to become ineﬀective once the
slump is over. Firstly, because the ﬁnancial pressure which caused them in the ﬁrst
place will be removed, and secondly, because the ﬁrms will be very careful not to risk
their good competitive position in a prospering market (ibid., p. 127). Keeping prices
artiﬁcially high could provoke newcomers to enter the proﬁtable market or allow the
reopening of establishments closed down in the slump (ibid., p. 127).
Changes in the rates of prime selling costs
It may be assumed that the entrepreneur apportions a certain part of his
selling costs to `investment or overhead selling costs' (a considerable part of
advertising is probably treated in this way) and the rest to `prime selling
costs'. The ﬁrst may be included in overheads and proﬁts, while the second
plays in price formation a role similar to prime production costs. (ibid.,
p. 124)
The higher prime selling costs are, the lower is the degree of monopoly, presuming that
everything else remains stable (ibid., pp. 124-125).
Bottle-neck factors The mentioning of bottle-neck factors as an inﬂuence which has
the potential to raise the degree of monopoly is particularly interesting as it runs to a
certain extent counter to one of the basic assumptions of the argument: capacity under-
utilisation. In the discussion of the diﬀerent pricing regimes in the raw materials and the
manufactures sectors, the (in)elasticity of supply emerged as one of the key diﬀerences
between the two types of markets. On the raw materials sector, which is characterised by
inelastic supply in the short run, prices are ﬁxed by the interplay of supply and demand.
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The markets for manufactured goods, on the other hand, are characterised by elastic
supply. This, according to Kalecki, is a precondition for the applicability of mark-up
pricing theory. An industry in which sales increase so much as to get close to the full
utilisation of existing productive capacities, thus, represents an interesting `grey area'.
Once full capacity utilisation is reached, Kalecki assumes competition to increase and
supply and demand to take over as determining factors. But until just before that point,
Kalecki seems to argue, these developments are reﬂected in a higher mark-up (Kalecki,
1991 [1943], p. 124). It could be argued that through this theoretical twist Kalecki is
softening his assumption of capacity underutilisation. He hastens to add, though, that
such bottle-necks usually only become signiﬁcant in  `abnormal' times, during wars or
post-war periods (ibid., pp. 127-128). Thus, his assumption of capacity underutilisation
usually holds.
Having discussed the diﬀerent inﬂuences on the degree of monopoly, Kalecki gives his
estimation as to the probable long-run development of the degree of monopoly:
The imperfection of the market will tend to diminish as a result of the fall
of transport costs in relation to prime production costs, standardization of
goods, spreading of commodity exchanges, etc.; the higher standard of living
may tend to cause less careful buying (the `Harrodian factor'), but this will
probably be fully oﬀset by a higher degree of knowledge and more free time for
buying; ﬁnally, at a certain late stage of capitalist development the expansion
of advertising may in many cases create an `artiﬁcial' market imperfection.
The progressive concentration of industry is likely to enhance the degree of
oligopoly. The rates of prime selling cost are also likely to rise in the long
run, particularly at a certain late stage of capitalist development. As to the
inﬂuence of bottle-neck factors, it seems that, at least in the twentieth century,
they are eﬀective in `normal' times only close to the top of the boom, and even
then are not very signiﬁcant for manufacturing industry as a whole. Thus
bottle-neck factors are probably not important in the long-run analysis of
recent economic developments. This does not, however, exclude a possibility
of signiﬁcant long-run changes in µ caused by these factors. On balance it
is impossible to say a priori how µ changes in the long run. But it follows
clearly from the above that (if we leave aside bottle-neck factors) it is more
likely to rise in the later than in the earlier stage of capitalist development.
(ibid., pp. 128-129)
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Summing up, one could say that, despite being very cautious with forecasts Kalecki
expects market imperfections, and thus the degree of monopoly, to rise rather than fall.
In face of this detailed discussion of the degree of monopoly one is tempted to over-
look one peculiar detail of the analysis: Throughout the paper Kalecki does not give a
conclusive account of his pricing theory. We know from his earlier writings that Kalecki
conceptualises price as being determined by primary production costs plus mark-up and
are thus led to believe that an enquiry into the determination of the mark-up is all that
is left to do when analysing pricing decisions of entrepreneurs. But already at the begin-
ning of the paper Kalecki gives us a hint that the underlying conceptualisation of price
formation must have changed:
The ﬁrms ﬁx the prices of their products, taking into consideration the mobil-
ity of customers (market imperfection) and the inﬂuence of their own prices
on those of their rivals (oligopoly). (Kalecki, 1991 [1943], p. 120)
The ﬁrms' interdependence with the pricing decisions of their competitors, which is
described in the second part of the above quote, is nowhere included in the pricing
equations of his earlier works on the issue. It is not taken up in Studies in Economic
Dynamics either. This task was left for him to accomplish in the next version of his
theory, published nine years later in his book Theory of Economic Dynamics (Kalecki,
1965 [1954]).
Phase 2: 1954
In Theory of Economic Dynamics Kalecki starts his analysis from a new pricing equation
(ibid., p. 12):
p = mu+ np
The price of a commodity is thus determined by its average prime costs u, the weighted
average price of all ﬁrms in the industry p and two positive coeﬃcients m and n which
148
reﬂect the degree of monopoly (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], pp. 12-13). Kalecki does not discuss
this equation in detail or give any hints as to how these coeﬃcients could be determined
empirically, though. In the empirical part of his own analysis he relies on the ratio of
proceeds to prime costs as an indicator of the degree of monopoly (ibid., pp. 20-21).
Whilst it must be acknowledged that this approach is likely to be due to restricted data
availability, it is interesting to note that this ratio does not correspond to any of the
formulae for µ given in his previous publications. In Theory of Economic Dynamics the
degree of monopoly is substituted by the coeﬃcients m and n which seem to be taken as
externally determined.
What inﬂuences the degree of monopoly? Contrary to the mathematical part of the
exposition, Kalecki discusses diﬀerent inﬂuences on the degree of monopoly in some detail
in the verbal analysis of the issue. He identiﬁes four major inﬂuences on the degree of
monopoly:
Tendencies of concentration in industry Kalecki makes out a trend to the formation of
giant enterprises in advanced capitalist economies. These enterprises which often handle
a considerable share of an industry's output, through their sheer size are very inﬂuential
on the average price of the industry and thus, as we have seen above, on the pricing
decisions of their competitors (ibid., p. 17). Knowing that other ﬁrms will react to its
pricing policy,
the ﬁrm can ﬁx its price at a level higher than would otherwise be the case.
The same game is played by other big ﬁrms and thus the degree of monopoly
increases substantially. (ibid., p. 17)
This tendency can further develop into tacit agreements or even into cartel agreements
(ibid., p. 17). As has already been stated above, these tendencies are particularly strong
during times of economic depression.
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Sales promotion The rising inﬂuence of sales promotion (advertising etc.) results in
the substitution of non-price competition for price competition and thus a higher degree
of monopoly (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], p. 17).
Overhead costs As overhead costs are part of the mark-up, rising overhead costs would
lead to decreasing proﬁt margins provided that the degree of monopoly is stable (ibid.,
p. 17).
If the level of overheads should rise considerably in relation to prime costs,
there will necessarily follow a `squeeze of proﬁts' unless the ratio of proceeds
to prime costs is permitted to rise. As a result, there may arise a tacit agree-
ment among the ﬁrms of an industry to `protect' proﬁts, and consequently to
increase prices in relation to unit prime costs. For instance, the increase in
capital costs per unit of output as a result of the introduction of techniques
which increase capital intensity may tend to raise the degree of monopoly in
this way. (ibid., p. 17)
Trade unions Strong trade unions, according to Kalecki, may for a number of reasons
provide a check to the expansion of the degree of monopoly:
A high ratio of proﬁts to wages strengthens the bargaining position of trade
unions in their demands for wage increases since higher wages are then com-
patible with `reasonable proﬁts' at existing price levels. If after such increases
are granted prices should be raised, this would call forth new demands for
wage increases. It follows that a high ratio of proﬁts to wages cannot be
maintained without creating a tendency towards rising costs. This adverse
eﬀect upon the competitive position of a ﬁrm or an industry encourages the
adoption of a policy of lower proﬁt margins. Thus, the degree of monopoly
will be kept down to some extent by the activity of trade unions, and this
the more the stronger the trade unions are. (ibid., p. 18)
Trade union power is thus the only factor which negatively inﬂuences the degree of
monopoly.
Summing up, two observations can be made: First, the list of inﬂuences on the degree of
monopoly diﬀers considerably from the one presented in Studies in Economic Dynamics.
I would argue, however, that the new list represents an extension and clariﬁcation of the
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old list, rather than a refutation of the same. Second, whilst being very indeterminate as
to the inﬂuence on and the development of the degree of monopoly in the mathematical
part of his analysis, Kalecki paints a very rich picture of the issue in the verbal exposition.
Phase 3: 1971
In the last version of his pricing theory, the posthumously published Class Struggle and
Distribution of National Income (Kalecki, 1991 [1971]), Kalecki again changed the exposi-
tion of his ideas and explicitly included some aspects which were included only implicitly
in earlier versions. Despite changes in the details of the analysis, the main idea remained
the same:
Each ﬁrm in an industry arrives at the price of its product p by 'marking up'
its direct cost u, consisting of average costs of wages plus raw materials, in
order to cover overheads and achieve proﬁts. (ibid., p. 99)
After this general observation, Kalecki goes on to introduce the following equation for
the mark-up (ibid., p. 99):
p− u
u
= f
(
p
p
)
According to this equation, the mark-up p−uu is a function of the relation of the weighted
average price of the industry to the ﬁrm's price:
[...] the lower p is in relation to p, the higher the mark-up will be ﬁxed. (ibid.,
p. 99)
Equating f
(
p
p
)
with the mark-up represents a very strong recognition of the interdepen-
dence of ﬁrms. It may even be objected that this is too one-sided a focus on inter-ﬁrm
relations. Yet, it could be argued that via the function f other factors inﬂuencing the
extent of price competition indirectly enter into this equation as well. In this formulation
function f remains a black box, however, and Kalecki does not tell us much about how
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it could be determined. The only inﬂuence on the mark-up which Kalecki discusses in
this paper is trade union power (Kalecki, 1991 [1971], p. 100). The argument is very
similar, if, as I would argue, somewhat more pessimistic than the analysis in Theory
of Economic Dynamics. Having discussed the possible redistributive consequences of
increasing bargaining power of trade unions, Kalecki concludes:
The rise in wages is to a great extent `shifted to consumers'. And `normal'
wage increases will usually leave functions f unaﬀected while mark-ups may
otherwise tend to get higher because of the rise in productivity of labour.
(ibid., p. 101)
In a nutshell, it can be said that while Kalecki concedes the possibility of trade unions
restraining the mark-up, he nonetheless seems to be very cautious in his evaluation of the
eﬀectiveness of such a strategy. Rather than restraining the mark-up, demands for price
increases may just set into motion an inﬂationary wage-price spiral: As wages are part of
primary costs which enter the price calculations of ﬁrms, wage rises are likely to be oﬀset
by a corresponding rise in prices. Accordingly, real wages - and thus the living standard
of the workers - would remain unchanged. There is one reason why wage bargaining may
still have the desired eﬀect, however: Firms may try to stop the detrimental wage-price
spiral for fear of their declining competitive position relative to other industries (ibid.,
p. 100). Robinson later on introduces a second scenario for successful wage bargaining:
Ongoing technological progress often results in rising productivity and thus higher proﬁts
in the more innovative sectors of the economy. The workers in those sectors will want
their share in the gains and demand a wage rise. The entrepreneurs in these highly
proﬁtable parts of the economy may indeed be happy to accord a pay rise, knowing that
their competitors will be pressured to pay the same wage rates. Weaker competitors
who cannot cover the higher wage costs through productivity gains subsequently have to
raise prices and thus get into an even worse competitive position. In this case granting
higher wages, for some entrepreneurs, may be a small price to pay for a higher degree of
monopoly (Robinson, 1979, p. 44). Nevertheless, Kalecki concludes that
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It should be noted that it is possible to devise forms of class struggle other
than wage bargaining, which would aﬀect the distribution of national income
in a more direct way. (Kalecki, 1991 [1971], p. 102)
The alternative strategies he proposes, e.g. price control or subsidising the prices of
consumption goods for workers, aim at keeping down the cost of living (ibid., p. 102) and
thus avoiding the inﬂationary wage-price spiral which is likely to result from a distributive
struggle exclusively conducted at the level of wage bargaining.
Another interesting feature of Class Struggle and Distribution of National Income is
that Kalecki introduces yet another slightly diﬀerent term for the mark-up, namely p−uu
(ibid., p. 99). In his earlier versions the degree of monopoly µ used to be deﬁned as follows:
µ = p−akp . Kalecki does in no way explain the change of denominator. In addition to that
he avoids to talk about the `degree of monopoly', a term which, according to Osiaty«ski,
evoked so many misinterpretations and accusations of tautology (Osiaty«ski, 1991a,
p. 529). Instead, he only refers to inﬂuences on the mark-up. It is thus diﬃcult to
establish with absolute certainty whether his new formula represents just a strategic
reformulation or hints at more profound conceptual changes.
Having retraced the development of Kalecki's pricing theory throughout his career, in
conclusion I fully agree with Kriesler's appraisal:
[Although] Kalecki was unable to defend his conclusions with a rigorous for-
malization of his microdistribution theory [...] and despite the changes to
the theory, particularly the `degree of monopoly', the essential aspects of the
analysis of price determination were adhered to by Kalecki in all his writings.
(Kriesler, 1987, pp. 100-101)
I would argue that, leaving aside the attempts at formalisation, one can deduce from
Kalecki a very good descriptive understanding of price formation and its relation to
income distribution and consequently poverty production.
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5.2 Joan Robinson
When discussing Joan Robinson's analysis of price formation, ﬁrst of all it must be
mentioned that for great parts of her analysis she relied on Kalecki's work in the ﬁeld.
On many occasions she referred to him, taking his theory as the point of departure for
her own analysis. Robinson did not just uncritically accept Kalecki's theory, however.
She criticised and amended it, pointing out where she thought more research would be
needed. On the other hand, she also defended Kalecki's theory against some of its critics,
trying to jump in with clariﬁcations of misunderstandings which arose due to Kalecki's
terse style of exposition. In what follows, I will ﬁrst present Robinson's attempts at
conceptual clariﬁcation of Kalecki's contested key concepts `industry' and `degree of
monopoly'. Next, her critique of Kalecki's pricing theory as well as her appraisal of the
theoretical status of pricing theory will be discussed.
5.2.1 Industry
As has already been mentioned in the last section, Joan Robinson defended Kalecki's use
of the concept of `industry', despite it being amorphous and impossible to demarcate
sharply at the edges (Robinson, 1980 [1953], p. 223). Consequently, contrary to Kalecki,
she does not try to come up with a quantiﬁable deﬁnition. Hers is a deﬁnition which
comes very close to what Thurman Arnold recommended in his 1937 book The Folklore
of Capitalism:
Deﬁnition is ordinarily supposed to produce clarity in thinking. It is not
generally recognized that the more we deﬁne our terms the less descriptive
they become and the more diﬃculty we have in using them. The reason for
this paradox is that we never attempt to deﬁne words which obtain a proper
emotional response from our listeners. Logical deﬁnition enters when we are
using words which we are sure ought to mean something, but none of us
can put our ﬁnger on just what that meaning is. (Arnold, 1937, p. 180) [. . . ]
How may the observer of social institutions avoid such traps? The answer
is that in writing about social institutions, he should never deﬁne anything.
He should try to choose words and illustrations which will arouse the proper
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mental associations with his readers. If he doesn't succeed with these, he
should try others. If he ever is led into an attempt at deﬁnition, he is lost.
(Arnold, 1937, pp. 182-183)
Rather than logically explaining what `industry' ought to mean, Robinson describes what
is generally understood by the term:
In ordinary language when we speak of the cotton industry, the iron-founding
industry, the boot-and-shoe industry (leather) we are thinking of a group of
ﬁrms engaged in a certain type of production, governed by the kinds of object
produced and the materials of which they are made. [...]
There are often certain basic processes required for the production of the most
diverse commodities (tennis balls, motor tyres and mattresses) and economies
in the utilization of by-products under one roof. The know-how and trade
connections established for one range of products make it easier to add dif-
ferent commodities of the same technical nature to a ﬁrm's output than it
is to add mutually substitutable commodities made of diﬀerent materials, or
made or marketed by radically diﬀerent methods. Moreover, the members of
an industry have common interests and a common language, and feel a kind
of patriotism which links them together, even when they are in competition
with each other. It is much easier to organize control over one industry serv-
ing many markets than over one market served by the products of several
industries. (Robinson, 1980 [1953], pp. 222-223)
This description is not much help in operationalising the concept for empirical analy-
sis, but it most certainly will arouse the proper mental associations (Arnold, 1937,
pp. 182-183). Perhaps, after all, the way forward for a fruitful deﬁnition of industry is
empirical, rather than logical. Rather than imposing a deﬁnition top-down we could ask
the entrepreneurs which ﬁrms they think constitute the industry they are part of. Joan
Robinson's approach, I would suggest, may lead us in that direction.
Another interesting aspect of Robinson's analysis of `industry' is her stress of
the distinction between output of an industry - that is, a group of ﬁrms en-
gaged in the production of commodities alike in their methods of manufacture,
and the supply to a market - that is, the demand for a group of commodities
which are close substitutes for each other. (Robinson, 1980 [1953], p. 222,
emphasis added)
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This distinction arises out of Robinson's observation that the ﬁrms of an industry are
characterised by similar modes of production rather than the mutual substitutability of
their goods. As one industry can serve many diﬀerent markets, and one market can be
served by many diﬀerent industries, the degree of monopoly of an industry obviously is
not the same as the degree of monopoly of a market (Robinson, 1980 [1953], pp. 222-223).
Which of the two is relevant for price formation, though? Joan Robinson's answer to
this question can be found in the following statement:
The degree of concentration in an industry, measured by the proportion of its
output produced by, say, the three largest ﬁrms, or the degree of monopoly
in the sense of the closeness of the organization binding the ﬁrms, may have
little relation to the degree of monopoly in the markets which it serves, in
the sense of power to control prices. (ibid., p. 223)
Thus, Robinson seems to suggest that it is the degree of monopoly in the market which
is relevant to price formation rather than the degree of monopoly in the industry. On the
other hand, it is obvious that her deﬁnition of the degree of monopoly in the market, that
is, a measure of the power to control prices, corresponds to Kalecki's deﬁnition of the
degree of monopoly of an industry. Thus, upon closer consideration it becomes appar-
ent that Robinson advocated a very diﬀerent understanding of `industry' than Kalecki.
While Kalecki gives interdependencies of pricing decisions a main deﬁnitional role for the
industry, Robinson locates them in the sphere of the market. This observation is quite
confusing for the reader as these conceptual diﬀerences are by no means acknowledged
or followed-up. It thus remains uncertain whether Robinson was fully aware of those
diﬀerences and what theoretical consequences she may have drawn from them.
5.2.2 The degree of monopoly
Unsurprisingly, this unacknowledged mix-up can be found also in Robinson's discussion
of the degree of monopoly. In their 1973 textbook Introduction to modern economics
Robinson and Eatwell wrote:
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In every case, the prices that any seller can charge are mainly determined by
the prices that other sellers charge for similar products or for commodities
that, from the buyer's point of view, are close substitutes for them. (Robinson
and Eatwell, 1974, p. 154)
Here again, they are referring to the market rather than the industry, whilst at the same
time referring to Kalecki's theory. In her paper Michaª Kalecki which was published in
1977 Robinson comes back to a discussion of the degree of monopoly. Stating that the
concept has been misunderstood by its critics, she goes on to explain what Kalecki really
meant:
What it means is the absence of price competition (there are other forms
of competition in salesmanship, product diﬀerentiation etc.). The weaker is
price competition in any market, the greater is the freedom of ﬁrms to set
prices in excess of costs. The ratio of margins to prices is a symptom of the
degree of monopoly. (Robinson, 1980 [1977][a], pp. 188-189)
The absence of price competition, however, should not be interpreted as a general lack
of competition. Robinson stresses the fact that price competition is neither the only nor
the most important form of competition in advanced capitalist economies (Robinson,
1980 [1953], p. 228). Competition has many faces. Robinson lists seven major forms of
competition:
(1) imitation of products; (2) diﬀerentiation of products  and these may be
in respect of qualities which aﬀect practical usefulness or pleasure to the con-
sumer, qualities which appeal to snobbishness or to pseudo-scientiﬁc notions,
or simply methods of packing and labelling artcles [sic!]; (3) services of all
kinds, prompt delivery, long credit; (4) advertisement; (5) pure salesmanship,
in the sense of the persuasiveness of travellers, etc.; (6) higher price  giving
the impression of better quality; (7) lower price. (ibid., p. 228)
A high degree of monopoly only signiﬁes a lack of (7), that is, price competition. It does
not say anything about the state of the other forms of competition. This interpretation
leads Robinson to doubt the explanatory power of the degree of monopoly, stating that
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[...] the hypothesis that the pattern of gross margins for various commodities
can be explained solely by the degree of monopoly was in the nature of a
shot in the dark. (Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], pp. 18-19)
She then goes on to argue that the mark-up on costs is inﬂuenced also by overhead
and selling costs such as the expenses of nonprice competition (ibid., p. 19). These
costs have been accounted for by Kalecki as inﬂuences upon the degree of monopoly.
It thus appears that Kalecki had a more comprehensive understanding of the degree
of monopoly than Robinson. While Robinson promoted a narrow understanding of the
degree of monopoly, claiming the consideration of other factors in the determination
of the mark-up, Kalecki integrated all these inﬂuences under the roof of the degree of
monopoly. Kalecki thus could be interpreted as putting a stress on the interrelations
between the diﬀerent parameters.
5.2.3 Robinson's critique of Kalecki's pricing theory
This diﬀerence in approach might partly be due to Robinson's concern with long-period
developments. Robinson criticised Kalecki for concentrating solely on the short period,
arguing that
[...] there must be some long-period element in the relation of prices to costs.
The ratio of overheads to prime costs, which varies between industries for
technical reasons, must have some inﬂuence on the gross proﬁts that they
require. (Robinson, 1980 [1977][a], p. 189)
Furthermore, in Solving the Stagﬂation Puzzle (Robinson, 1979) she argues that
Keynes' crack that in the long run we are all dead was quite unfair  we
are living in the long period every week, from Monday to Friday. Long-
period movements are those that take place through capital accumulation
and technical change. They are slow relatively to swings of eﬀective demand
but, in prosperous times they are going on at quite an appreciable pace.
(ibid., p. 44)
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Technical change results in diﬀerences in the cost structure of production and conse-
quently inﬂuences the mark-up. These inﬂuences, according to Robinson, were not ade-
quately accounted for in Kalecki's theory (Robinson, 1980 [1977][a], pp. 188-189). It may
thus be argued that Robinson has put considerable eﬀort into dividing out short-period
and long-period inﬂuences. This could well be one reason for her diﬀerentiation between
the degree of monopoly in the narrow sense of the word and other factors inﬂuencing the
mark-up.
In conclusion, whilst in general supporting Kalecki's approach, Robinson was not con-
vinced that he succeeded in solving the enigma of price formation.
I wrote in 1942, It seems that economic science has not yet solved its ﬁrst
problem. What determines the price of a commodity? I think that this is
still largely true, but meanwhile we have made some advance in formulating
hypotheses that are worth pursuing. (Robinson, 1979, p. 41)
Kalecki, she argues, has pointed us in the right direction, asking the right questions, but
the answers he gives are not thoroughly worked out (Robinson, 1980 [1977][c], p. 18).
5.3 Thorstein Veblen
Price formation certainly played a more secondary role in Veblen's work compared to
Kalecki and Robinson. He did have a basic theory of price formation, however. In
what follows, I will lay out Veblen's analysis and discuss the diﬀerences and similarities
to Kalecki's and Robinson's work. Broadly, I will discuss Veblen's answers to two key
questions:
1. What determines prices?
2. What determines the proﬁt margin?
5.3.1 What determines prices?
In terms of inﬂuences on price formation Veblen describes three key factors :
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 The purchasing-power available for consumption (Veblen, 1996 [1923], p. 390)
 The degree of scarcity of the goods available for purchase (ibid., p. 388)
 The degree of competition amongst competing sellers (ibid., p. 349)
The ﬁrst two factors show that at the heart of Veblen's analysis lies an understanding
of prices being determined by supply and demand. Everything that exerts an inﬂuence
on either the supply- or the demand-side changes the prices. Veblen does not regard the
interplay of supply and demand as an independent mechanism, though. It can be and is
steered.
The purchasing-power of the people is highly inﬂuenced by the availability of credit.
The more easily credit is available, the higher the purchasing-power, the higher the level
of prices. Credit, according to Veblen, thus can be regarded as an important price-making
factor (Veblen, 1905, pp. 462-469). This brings us back to what has been discussed in
chapter 4.5 where we questioned the sustainability of loan-ﬁnanced consumption patterns.
There we argued that loan-ﬁnanced conspicuous consumption contributes to poverty
production in that it enables the capitalist class to keep wages low whilst at the same
time ensuring suﬃcient levels of eﬀective demand to maintain proﬁtable sales. In the
context of Veblen's theory of price formation another aspect of loan-ﬁnanced consumption
becomes apparent: on top of stabilising demand, credit also helps to maintain or even
raise the price-level. In chapter 4.5 it was argued that a system based on loan-ﬁnanced
conspicuous consumption is bound to collapse at some point because there comes the time
when people become unable to service their debts. Veblen refers to this problem in his
discussion of credit as a price-making factor, stressing the important role of government.
Government agencies, he argues, enhance prices by contributing to the security of this
expanded volume of credit and so helping to make it indeﬁnitely expansible without
risk (Veblen, 1996 [1923], p. 400). The events of the current economic crisis, with bank
bailouts being a regular phenomenon, seem to aﬃrm this view, whilst at the same time
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showing that this may reach dimensions where even governments are no longer able to
stabilise this high-risk strategy.
On the supply side, the major regulatory mechanisms are diﬀerent strategies of output
restriction which Veblen groups under the notion `industrial sabotage'. Whilst pointing
out that it is in the workers best interest to restrict the eﬃciency of their work, Veblen
nonetheless focuses his analysis of sabotage on the entrepreneurs. They are the main cul-
prits of industrial sabotage (Veblen, 1954 [1921]). As industrial sabotage will be discussed
at length in chapter 6, suﬃce it to say that it is a highly eﬀective means of output restric-
tion and thus supply regulation. Another possibility to create scarcity, at least on the
level of the individual ﬁrm, is through good salesmanship. Good salesmanship increases
sales and thus creates scarcity (provided that the output of the goods is restricted) and
thus raises prices. However, this strategy is always restrained by the purchasing-power
available for consumption and thus can only ever be successful for some entrepreneurs at
the expense of others (Veblen, 1996 [1923]).
The third inﬂuence on price-formation mentioned by Veblen, the degree of competi-
tion, shows that Veblen was not fully taken in by a simplistic framework of supply and
demand. He argues that, apart from the factors inﬂuencing supply and demand, the
extent of competition amongst ﬁrms is a major price-making factor (ibid., p. 349). The
argument develops as follows: as the accumulated productive capacity of ﬁrms exceeds
the purchasing-capacity of the market, free competition would quickly develop into `cut-
throat competition', minimising the earning capacity of the ﬁrms (ibid., p. 337). In order
to protect themselves from this `dangerous' level of competition ﬁrms fall back on dif-
ferent kinds of collusive behaviour and concerted action (ibid., p. 349). Thus minimising
price-competition they are able to maintain or even enhance the price-level. This ten-
dency towards less and less competition, according to Veblen, can be observed in most
key industries, with the exception of agricultural food products and crude oil (ibid.,
pp. 126-128). Diminishing price-competition, however, does not mean absence of compe-
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tition altogether. Rather it means a shift towards competition in salesmanship (Veblen,
1996 [1923], p. 385). Increasing competition in salesmanship results in rising sales-costs
and thus an increasing part of turnover being spent on sales-promotion (ibid., p. 312).
These expenditures, according to Veblen, become imperative because none of the com-
peting sellers can aﬀord to fall short in his expenditures on salesmanship (ibid., p. 304).
Otherwise he would risk to fall behind his competitors in non-price competition. This
form of collusion, according to Veblen, has one important positive eﬀect on the economy:
it provides stability. Unhindered competition, from the point of view of business, for the
reasons laid out above, is impracticable in times of excess capacity. Concerted action is
needed in order to guarantee a viable business environment. In order to satisfactorily
fulﬁl this task concentration must go as far as to create monopolies; oligopolies still entail
competition and thus a destabilising element (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 257-263).
5.3.2 What inﬂuences the proﬁt margin?
On top of these more general observations of price formation, Veblen also hints at how
the mark-up4 is determined. The mark-up can be enlarged via two diﬀerent strategies
(Veblen, 1996 [1923], p. 390):
 The increase of sales-prices
 The reduction of production-costs
How to inﬂuence sales-prices has already been discussed extensively above; I will thus
only add a few remarks on the second strategy, namely cost-reduction.
Veblen argues that there is usually not much room for manoeuvre in the negotiation
of raw-material prices. Consequently, cost-reduction most often is reached through the
reduction of wage-costs (ibid., p. 287). This, Veblen stresses, obviously creates resistance
amongst the workers but they are unlikely to be able to organise themselves well enough
4Veblen calls it the margin of sales-prices over production-costs (Veblen, 1996 [1923], p. 403).
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to eﬀectively defend themselves against wage-cuts any time soon (Veblen, 1996 [1923],
p. 287). The dynamic arising from this distributive struggle is best summed up in the
following quote from Absentee ownership (ibid.):
While the business men are endeavoring to enhance the reasonable gains of
business by expanding the volume of capital and lifting the level of prices, and
so widening the margin of sales-prices over production-costs, the organized
workmen are forever cutting in on the same margin by pushing up the labor
cost. (ibid., p. 403)
However, whilst depicting the workers in a weak position, Veblen also stresses the danger
of failing eﬀective demand due to these distributional imbalances. For the realisation of
proﬁt entrepreneurs (at least partly) rely on the purchasing power of the workers (ibid.,
p. 214). The strategy of escaping this problematique via the creation of credit has already
been discussed in some detail above.
Another possibility to cut costs is through technical progress. This option is only ever
available to those who employ the newest and most eﬃcient means of production. As
technical progress, according to Veblen, develops quite rapidly, this diﬀerential advantage
usually is of short duration (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 229-230).
Comparing Veblen's analysis of pricing to Kalecki's and Robinson's work a number of
similarities and divergences become apparent: Veblen's assumption of capacity underutil-
isation and the wide-spread existence of imperfect competition, as well as his observation
that price competition is replaced by non-price competition and thus rising sales-costs
reminds of what Kalecki and Robinson wrote some 10 to 15 years later. The same holds
true for his assertion that agricultural food-products and crude oil are still sold on com-
petitive markets. Considerable diﬀerences can be spotted in the details of the analysis,
however.
Despite stressing the importance of imperfect competition, Veblen still holds on to the
basic price-making principle of supply and demand. The question of how these two can
be combined is not addressed by Veblen. In terms of how much collusion is needed in
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order to provide for stability Veblen goes even farther than Kalecki and Robinson stating
that only monopolies can provide for stability in the long run. On top of that, Veblen is
even more restrictive than Kalecki as regards the delineation of the competitive sectors
of the economy. While Kalecki includes all the raw material producing sectors of the
economy, Veblen only speaks of the sectors producing agricultural food products and
crude oil as exemptions to the rule.
In a nutshell, we can say that despite pricing not being amongst his major concerns,
Veblen's work includes many interesting thoughts on the matter. Indeed, it is astonishing
to see that spread throughout Veblen's work are the essentials of some of the ideas which
laid the ground for Kalecki's prominence some 10 to 20 years later. Despite touching
on many key issues of modern pricing theory, however, Veblen never ventured into the
details of the analysis.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have enquired into the processes of price determination at work in
advanced capitalist economies. These are of particular relevance for an analysis of poverty
producing processes because, as we have seen in chapter 2.1.3, the conditions of the
provision of goods do play a role in the creation of poverty.
I have opened this chapter with a thorough discussion of Kalecki's theoretical work on
pricing. Although the details of his analysis changed considerably throughout his long
career, Kalecki's core argument remained fundamentally unchanged. The great majority
of ﬁrms in advanced capitalism, Kalecki observes, operate on oligopolistic markets. On
these markets prices are set by a mark-up on costs. The size of the mark-up depends
on a variety of factors, an important one being the relative competitive position of the
respective ﬁrm. The mark-up consists of overhead costs and proﬁts and thus plays a
decisive role for the determination of the rate of proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The size of the
mark-up, consequently, in this framework, is to a considerable extent an outcome of
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the distributive struggle between workers and entrepreneurs. The power relations in
this struggle are highly unequal, however, as the ﬁrms always have the last say and the
workers' only way to exert pressure is through trade unions. One consequence of this is
that whilst wage bargaining may have a redistributive eﬀect, due to the interrelation of
wages and prices this eﬀect is likely to be rather small. Workers would thus be better
advised to concentrate their redistributive eﬀorts at enforcing price control.
Robinson often referred to Kalecki's work and primarily aimed at clarifying and com-
plementing parts of his analysis. I believe to have shown, however, that upon closer
reading these attempts appear to have resulted in even more confusion and fundamental
incompatibilities between these two authors' works rather than in clariﬁcation.
Veblen, on the other hand, whilst on the surface adopting a completely diﬀerent pricing
theory, was shown to have anticipated in many respects Kalecki's later work.
Overview of the main poverty producing eﬀects
It is in this broad context that I want to point out three instances related to mark-up
pricing which may be seen as contributing to the production of poverty:
Firstly, the most directly poverty producing eﬀect of mark-up pricing is simply the fact
that the lack of price competition tends to keep prices high and thus purchasing power
low. The higher the general price level the more income is needed to achieve a predeﬁned
standard of living. In cases when inﬂation is higher than wage increases and/or beneﬁts
are not adjusted for inﬂation, real incomes decline. This, in turn bears the risk of putting
people in poverty who formerly were able to make a living free from material deprivation.
Secondly, a more indirect poverty producing eﬀect of mark-up pricing can be found
in the fact that in this model entrepreneurs are understood to set prices after wage bar-
gaining is completed. Consequently, entrepreneurs always have the last say on the level
of real wages and thus purchasing power. Therefore, as wage increases are understood
to usually result in price increases, the workers' power to negotiate a fairer income dis-
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tribution is very limited. Even more so as wage dumping, according to Veblen, is one of
the favoured strategies to keep costs down and margins up.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the entrepreneurs' power to keep prices high and
wages low is reinforced by the phenomenon of increasing debt-ﬁnanced consumption de-
scribed in chapter 4. As consumption becomes increasingly independent of wage income,
entrepreneurs are not even seriously limited by the threat of a lack of eﬀective demand
resulting from the problematic combination of high prices and low wages. Their room
for manoeuvre for exploitatively enlarging proﬁts is increasing.
It can be observed that all of the poverty producing eﬀects discussed above concern
the material deprivation aspect of poverty. Furthermore, the second and third items on
the list conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of at least complementing the conventional deﬁnition of
poverty (an income of less than 60 percent of median income) with a measure of material
deprivation. Exclusive reliance on a nominal income measure would fail to take account
of important price-related inﬂuences on the real distribution of income.
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6 Poverty producing process n° 3:
Industrial sabotage
Industrial sabotage, Veblen argued, can be considered as the single most important
hindrance to social provisioning in modern capitalism. This makes it an obvious choice
to be included in the analysis of poverty production. This chapter starts with a detailed
discussion of Veblen's work on industrial sabotage. Next, the related Kaleckian notion of
`capacity underutilisation' will be outlined and the diﬀerences between the two theorists
are discussed. Subsequently, Robinson's approach to the topic is analysed and will be
shown to be situated in between the Veblenian and the Kaleckian approach. Finally,
the argument will be summed up and the main poverty producing eﬀects of industrial
sabotage will be mapped out.
6.1 Thorstein Veblen
The term sabotage, as Veblen explains at the beginning of The engineers and the price
system, derives from the French word `sabot' which denotes a speciﬁc type of wooden
shoe (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 1). Sabotage thus, according to Veblen, means
going slow, with a dragging, clumsy movement, such as that manner of foot-
gear may be expected to bring on. So it has come to describe any manoeuvre
of slowing-down, ineﬃciency, bungling, obstruction. (ibid., p. 1)
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In Veblen's time sabotage was primarily asociated with trade unions. Veblen, however,
pointed out that acts of hindrance and obstruction of the productive process can be and
indeed often are administered by the possessing classes as well (Veblen, 1954 [1921], pp. 3-
4). Thus he coined the term `industrial sabotage' to describe those business strategies
which make use of the power to control production in order to maximise pecuniary gain
(Clark, 2002, p. 419). In eﬀect, according to Veblen, everything that keeps production
short of productive capacity (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 8) is to be counted as industrial
sabotage.
Such manoeuvres of restriction, delay, and hindrance have a large share in
the ordinary conduct of business; but it is only lately that this ordinary line
of business strategy has come to be recognized as being substantially of the
same nature as the ordinary tactics of the syndicalists. So that it has not
been usual until the last few years to speak of manoeuvres of this kind as
sabotage when they are employed by employers and their business concerns.
But all this strategy of delay, restriction, hindrance, and defeat is manifestly
of the same character, and should conveniently be called by the same name,
whether it is carried on by business men or by workmen; (ibid., pp. 3-4)
Thus Veblen, as Samuels points out, had a symmetrical understanding of sabotage, treat-
ing workers and captialists alike (Samuels, 1994, pp. 1249-1250). Nonetheless, the focus
of his work was decidedly on industrial sabotage. As will be seen in this chapter, this is
most probably due to its potentially great negative impact on social provisioning.
At the heart of the phenomenon of industrial sabotage lies a double conﬂict of interests.
While the capitalists are interested in pecuniary gain only, the community is interested
in the suﬃcient supply of necessary goods at reasonable prices (Veblen, 1919, pp. 91-
93). The provision for the material well-being of the community, however, is not part
of the incentive structure of capitalists. To put it bluntly, they do not care whether
the underlying population's needs are provided for or whether they are going hungry. In
Veblen's view, they have little scruple to curtail the material well-being of the community
as long as this serves their aim of proﬁt maximisation (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 28-29).
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As I have shown in chapter 5.3 Veblen subscribed to a supply-and-demand pricing
framework. Thus, in Veblen's understanding, capitalists' primary means of keeping up
prices (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 15) and maximising proﬁt is the curtailment of production,
that is, industrial sabotage (Veblen, 1919, p. 91). It thus becomes apparent that the
interests of capitalists regularly run counter to the interests of the community at large.
This conﬂict of interests is further aggravated by the fact that capitalists are interested
in the vendibility of their products, not in their serviceability (Veblen, 1932 [1904], p. 51).
Veblen concedes that a modicum of serviceability, for some purpose or other, the output
must have if it is to be salable (ibid., p. 51) but he stresses the fact that a higher level
of serviceability does not necessarily coincide with better vendibility (ibid., p. 51). Two
diﬀerent interpretations of this observation are possible:
1. Producers prefer to produce luxury goods for the wealthy classes instead of produc-
ing necessary goods for the low-income classes because of diﬀerences in purchasing
power.
2. Due to psychological inclinations towards the consumption of conspicuous con-
sumption goods, people are more willing to pay for conspicuous goods than for
necessary goods. This interpretation would mean that the people themselves do
not act according to what would be best for them.
The ﬁrst interpretation would signify a misallocation of productive capacity due to dif-
ferences in purchasing power of social classes, the second interpretation would ascribe
causality to the psychological factor of invidious comparison. Veblen himself does not go
into the details of this assumption, but judging from the entirety of his work, it seems
reasonable to assume a certain relevance for both factors.
Alongside the conﬂict of interests of business men and the community as a whole,
modern capitalism has seen the emergence of a further interest group: the managers
of corporate capital. Their sole interest lies in the vendibility of the corporate capital
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under their management. Theirs is a purely short-period perspective, they are in no way
interested in the long-term development of the ﬁrm. Thus, their interest is even farther
removed from the interest of the community as a whole than the business men's and their
potential to do harm even greater (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 158-159). Veblen leaves little
doubt as to whose interests he expects to become dominant in this unequal constellation -
he predicts the growing dominance of business and capital interests (Veblen, 1954 [1921],
p. 100).
This development also ﬁnds expression in a re-deﬁnition of the notion of `common
welfare'. Whereas it used to turn[ed] on the ease and certainty with which enough of
the means of life could be supplied (Veblen, 1932 [1904], p. 177), common welfare is now
interpreted as the proﬁtability of business. Or, to put it another way:
Prosperity now means, primarily, business prosperity; whereas it used to
mean industrial suﬃciency. (ibid., p. 178)
This new benchmark for economic well-being has also led to the emergence of the notion of
`overproduction' which is often refered to as a legitimation for the limitation of output.
According to Veblen, overproduction is a pure business phenomenon (ibid., pp. 215-
217). In The Theory of Business Enterprise he remarks that [t]he supply of consumable
goods is, practically, never greater than the community's capacity for consuming them
(ibid., p. 215). Overproduction thus means not the production of more goods than the
community could use, but the production of more goods than the community is able
or willing to buy at prices which the entrepreneurs regard as reasonable (ibid., pp. 216-
217). In this context it is important to add that, according to Veblen, [a] reasonable
proﬁt always means, in eﬀect, the largest obtainable proﬁt (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 13).
Overproduction thus is not a phenomenon rooted in the scarcity of resources or the
saturation of demand, its sole point of reference are the expected proﬁts of entrepreneurs.
The level of employment of plant and man power accordingly is determined by what the
traﬃc will bear (Veblen, 1919, p. 91), that is,
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[P]rices are ﬁxed by consideration of what scale of prices will bring the largest
aggregate net earnings, due to regard being had to the eﬀect of a lower price
in increasing sales as well as to the reduction of cost through the increase of
output. (Veblen, 1932 [1904], p. 259)
As industrial planning always retains a certain level of uncertainty, to be on the safe side,
according to Veblen, conservative business management tends to produce less rather than
more than what they expect `the traﬃc to bear' (Veblen, 1996 [1923], pp. 67-68). As soon
as they see the danger of overproduction looming in the distance entrepreneurs start to
restrain production in order to maintain the proﬁtability of their investment.
This power of entrepreneurs to control production for their own beneﬁt originates in
the modern deﬁnition of property rights. The right of property, contrary to how it was
understood in earlier times, has come to be understood not only as the right to hold
property but also as the right to withhold property from productive use1 (ibid., pp. 66-
67). As the greatest part of the population in modern economies does not own means of
production, their subsistence depends on the will of those who do to put their property
to productive use. This vests the owners of the means of production with a considerable
power to impose terms and exact obedience (ibid., p. 65). Or, to put it diﬀerently,
[o]wnership confers a legal right of sabotage (ibid., p. 66).
All the above combined, that is the right to withhold their property from produc-
tive use in combination with the class interests of entrepreneurs and their avoidance of
overproduction, according to Veblen results in the chronic perturbation (Veblen, 1932
[1904], p. 34) of modern industry. This disruption, however, is only partial. Despite not
being interested in production per se, capitalists' earning capacity is ultimately bound up
with the production and sale of goods. Productive capacities left completely idle usually
do not obtain proﬁts (Veblen, 1996 [1923], p. 66).
As regards his evaluation of the overall eﬀects of an economic system marked by im-
portant amounts of industrial sabotage, Veblen seems to have grown more and more
1For a more detailed discussion see Commons' Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Commons, 1995 [1924]).
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pessimistic throughout his career. He started out with a rather optimistic appraisal in
The Theory of Business Enterprise, arguing that
While it is in the nature of things unavoidable that the management of in-
dustry by modern business methods should involve a large misdirection of
eﬀort and a very large waste of goods and services, it is also true that the
aims and ideals to which this manner of economic life gives eﬀect act forcibly
to oﬀset all this incidental futility. These pecuniary aims and ideals have a
very great eﬀect, for instance, in making men work hard and unremittingly,
so that on this ground alone the business system probably compensates for
any wastes involved in its working. There seems, therefore, to be no tenable
ground for thinking that the working of the modern business system involves
a curtailment of the community's livelihood. It makes up for its wastefulness
by the added strain which it throws upon those engaged in productive work.
(Veblen, 1932 [1904], p. 65)
15 years later, in The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts he comes to a
very diﬀerent conclusion:
But it is also evident that the private gain which the business concerns come
in for by this management entails a loss on the rest of the community, and
that the loss suﬀered by the rest of the community is necessarily larger than
the total gains which these manoeuvres bring to the business concerns; inas-
much as the friction, obstruction and retardation of the moving equilibrium
of production involved in this businesslike sabotage necessarily entail a dis-
proportionate curtailment of output. (Veblen, 1919, pp. 93-94)
Veblen then goes on to soften this argument by adding that
However, it is well to call to mind that the community will still be able
to get along, perhaps even to get along very tolerably, in spite of a very
appreciable volume of sabotage of this kind; even though it does reduce the
net productive capacity to a fraction of what it would be in the absence of all
this interference and retardation; for the current state of the industrial arts
is highly productive. (ibid., p. 94)
But still, the argument has obviously shifted. Far from crediting the business class with
an overall positive eﬀect of their management, Veblen states that the community may
have enough to live on despite the considerable negative impact of business management.
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This is due to technical progress and the incredible productivity of modern industry. The
following quotation should give an impression of how dramatic Veblen seems to have
judged the negative consequences of industrial sabotage:
But it should be kept in mind and should be duly credited to the good
intentions of these businesslike managers, that the ulterior object sought by
all this management is not the 100 per cent of mischief to the community but
only the 10 per cent of private gain for themselves and their clients. (Veblen,
1919, p. 106)
This resounds another recurrent theme in Veblen's work, namely the cumulative nature
of social change. Similar to what is known as multiplicator eﬀects in modern macro-
economics, Veblen argued that modern economies are so close-knit and interdependent
that slight disturbances in one area quickly spread throughout the whole system and in
a kind of domino eﬀect result in far greater disturbances than what would be expected
judging from the original cause (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 16-18).
In The Engineers and the Price System Veblen restates the gloomy prediction made
two years earlier:
The experience of the past few years teaches that the usual management
of industry by business methods has become highly ineﬃcient and wasteful,
and the indications are many and obvious that any businesslike control of
production and distribution is bound to run more and more consistently at
cross purposes with the community's livelihood, the farther the industrial arts
advance and the wider the industrial system extends. (Veblen, 1954 [1921],
p. 100)
It should not go unmentioned, however, that earlier on in the same book he writes:
It should not be diﬃcult to show that the common welfare in any commu-
nity which is organized on the price system cannot be maintained without a
salutary use of sabotage  that is to say, such habitual recourse to delay and
obstruction of industry and such restriction of output as will maintain prices
at a reasonably proﬁtable level and so guard against business depression.
(ibid., p. 7)
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This should not be misinterpreted as meaning that Veblen was in favour of industrial
sabotage, however, as seems to be done by LaJeunesse (LaJeunesse, 2004). The above
statement, I would argue, is related to Veblen's analysis of economic crises. Depression,
according to Veblen, is primarily a malady of the aﬀections (Veblen, 1932 [1904], p. 241)
of the business men. Depression occurs when the proﬁt expectations of business men get
frustrated (ibid., p. 213). Nonetheless, Veblen stresses the fact that depression, despite
being a psychological phenomenon originating with the business class, has grave conse-
quences for industry and for the material welfare of the community outside the range of
business interests (ibid., p. 238). It is thus in everybody's interest to ensure `reasonable'
proﬁts for business men in order to avoid the even more detrimental eﬀects of economic
crisis which impend in the case of a loss of business conﬁdence (ibid., pp. 237-238). The
above statement thus is simply a recognition of systemic necessities. Veblen concedes
that within a system based on pecuniary relations, it is of utmost importance for the
community to ensure proﬁts high enough to keep the business men willing to invest and
to produce; this does not mean that he believes this system to be the best in terms of
the common good, however (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 7). Veblen is very explicit about this
in The Engineers and the Price System where he argues that a new economic system
should be created under the leadership of a soviet of technicians (ibid., p. 134) with
the aim of heightened eﬃciency and improved social provisioning.
All this paints a rather unsympathetic picture of the business men. They are portrayed
as solely pecuniarily motivated, selﬁsh individuals with no social conscience whatsoever.
In his Theory of the Business Class Veblen mitigates this picture a bit, stating that
In common with other men, the business man is moved by ideals of service-
ability and an aspiration to make the way of life easier for his fellows. Like
other men, he has something of the instinct of workmanship. No doubt such
aspirations move the great business man less urgently than many others, who
are, on that account, less successful in business aﬀairs. Motives of this kind
detract from business eﬃciency, and an undue yielding to them on the part
of business men is to be deprecated as an inﬁrmity. Still, throughout men's
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dealings with one another and with the interests of the community there runs
a sense of equity, fair dealing, and workmanlike integrity; and in an uncertain
degree this bent discountenances gain that is got at an undue cost to others,
or without rendering some colorable equivalent. Business men are also, in a
measure, guided by the ambition to eﬀect a creditable improvement in the
industrial processes which their business traﬃc touches. These sentimental
factors in business exercise something of a constraint, varying greatly from
one person to another, but not measurable in its aggregate results. (Veblen,
1932 [1904], pp. 41-42)
He hastens to add, though, that all these ethical restraints operate within the ethics of
capitalist enterprise.
It touches primarily the dealings of man with man, and only less directly
and less searchingly inculcates temperance and circumspection as regards the
ulterior interests of the community at large. Where this moral need of a
balance between the services rendered the community and the gain derived
from a given business transaction asserts itself at all, the balance is commonly
sought to be maintained in some sort of pecuniary terms; but pecuniary terms
aﬀord only a very inadequate measure of serviceability to the community.
(ibid., pp. 43-44)
Whilst restraining the unfolding of capitalist greed, the ethical restraints observed by
Veblen thus never question the capitalist logic of the dominance of proﬁt over service-
ability itself (ibid., pp. 43-44).
Veblen also points toward the structural necessity of proﬁt-maximising behaviour on
the part of the business class. He asserts that business men, in order to survive under
modern economic conditions cannot aﬀord to let themselves be guided by non-pecuniary
motives to a large extent. If they did, they would not survive for long (Veblen, 1954
[1921], pp. 13-14). Thus, as long as the foundations of our economic system remain
unchanged, the conﬂict of interest on which industrial sabotage is based is indissoluble.
6.2 Michaª Kalecki
In Kalecki's work we ﬁnd a very diﬀerent perspective on those phenomena which Veblen
causally ascribed to the workings of industrial sabotage. Indeed, Kalecki himself never
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used the term `industrial sabotage', instead he worked on the assumption of surplus
capacity (Kalecki, 1991 [1942], p. 487). This diﬀerence in terminology points towards a
fundamental conceptual discrepancy: whilst Veblen, as I have shown above, was highly
critical of the regular employment of industrial sabotage as one of the major causes of
problems of social provisioning, Kalecki locates the problem elsewhere. In Kalecki's point
of view, industries are producing below capacity level because there is not enough de-
mand to sell full capacity output. The limiting factor in this framework is demand, not
supply. The enhancement of the level of capacity utilisation is thus contingent upon the
stimulation of eﬀective demand and therefore on income redistribution. Redistributing
income from higher income groups to low income groups with a higher propensity to
consume, as I have pointed out in chapter 4.3, would increase eﬀective demand and in
direct consequence capacity utilisation. Veblen's understanding of entrepreneurs artiﬁ-
cially limiting output in order to raise prices only makes sense in a supply-and-demand
pricing framework. In a Kaleckian framework based on mark-up pricing, prices are ﬁxed
ﬁrst and output is then adjusted to demand. The dependent variables diﬀer in the two
frameworks: in one case it is price, in the other it is output.
The only instance in which Kalecki questions the assumption of capacity underutili-
sation is his discussion of bottle-necks in production. Whilst granting that production
may reach the level of full capacity utilisation in times of boom, he still counters:
It seems, however, that as a result of the availability of reserve capacities and
the possibility of increasing the volume of equipment whenever bottlenecks
occur, this phenomenon is not frequently encountered even in booms. In
general, it seems to be restricted to war or post-war developments, where
shortages of raw materials or equipment limit severely the supply in relation
to demand. (Kalecki, 1965 [1954], p. 20)
Contemporary capitalism, Kalecki holds, is characterised by the existence of unused pro-
ductive capacity (Kalecki, 1991 [1971], p. 103). This assertion is related to Kalecki's
assumption of imperfect competition being the dominant modus operandi of contem-
176
porary capitalism. In perfectly competitive capitalism ﬁrms could not survive on only
partial employment of capital (Kalecki, 1991 [1938], p. 10).
In a nutshell, it seems that whilst both adopting the assumption of unused productive
capacity, Veblen and Kalecki still arrive at diverging conclusions. Veblen's understanding
of industrial sabotage seems to be incompatible with a Kaleckian theoretical framework.
Nonetheless, in the next section I will show how Robinson once again to a certain extent
managed to fuse the two approaches and point us towards a more multifarious analysis.
6.3 Joan Robinson
Similar to Kalecki, Joan Robinson never explicitly discussed industrial sabotage. None-
theless, she considered certain phenomena which Veblen would have classiﬁed as acts
of industrial sabotage. This puts her into an interesting intermediary position between
Veblen's exclusive focus on output limitation and Kalecki's exclusive focus on demand
management.
The starting point of Robinson's analysis from her early writings onwards was the
assumption of the predominance of imperfect competition and the wide-spread existence
of buyer's markets (Robinson, 1968, p. 28). A buyer's market is a market in which the
existing capacity to produce exceeds the ability or willingness of the consumers to buy
the goods oﬀered at a price which the entrepreneurs consider appropriate (Robinson,
1986 [1956], pp. 188-190). That is, to put it in Kalecki's terms, a buyer's market is a
market with constant capacity underutilisation. Just like Kalecki, Robinson concedes
the possibility of a seller's market, that is demand exceeding supply, but holds that this
is the (temporary) exception rather than the rule in advanced capitalism (Robinson and
Eatwell, 1974, pp. 153-154). As far as the degree of utilisation of existing productive
capacities is concerned, Robinson's argumentation is thus fully in line with both Veblen
and Kalecki.
As regards pricing, we have seen in the last chapter that Robinson considers prices
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on imperfectly competitive markets as being determined by a mark-up over primary
production costs. Thus, prices are set by the entrepreneurs themselves and not via the
interplay of supply and demand. In such a framework it would be nonsensical to assume
output restriction as a means to regulate prices. There is no need for entrepreneurs to
take this detour.
Nonetheless Robinson concedes a certain relevance to supply-restraining practices. Her
starting point is very similar to Veblen's: she detects a major conﬂict of interests between
the entrepreneurs and the rest of the population. Whilst the material well-being of the
community as a whole feeds on the suﬃcient supply of goods at low prices, entrepreneurs
are only secondarily interested in production. Their primary interest lies with the max-
imisation of proﬁt, an aim which may sometimes better be served by producing less and
selling it at a higher price. The decisive variable for entrepreneurs is maximum proﬁt
and this may be reached either through selling large amounts of goods with a low proﬁt
margin or by selling less with a high proﬁt margin (Robinson, 1943a, pp. 4-8). Being faced
with the choice entrepreneurs, according to Robinson, prefer the second option to the
ﬁrst one. However, entrepreneurs are not interested in output restriction per se either,
they aim at selling as much as possible at a price which they regard as reasonable. Thus,
the preferred business strategy of entrepreneurs is to expand and conquer new markets,
be that through geographical expansion or the development of new technologies and new
products (Robinson, 1980 [1977][c]; Robinson, 1971, p. 103). Only if these strategies do
not suﬃce to ensure their expected proﬁts, which they hardly ever do, entrepreneurs fall
back on measures of output restriction (Robinson, 1942, p. 402). This business strategy
obviously runs counter to common interest.
Whilst being highly critical of the negative social outcome of these business strategies
Robinson nonetheless holds that one should not blame the business men for they have
to play according to the rules of the game in order to survive (Robinson, 1943a, p. 7).
In line with Kalecki, Robinson argues that the necessity for strategies of output lim-
178
itation arises not from a defect of needs or wants but from the fact that the wealthy
classes (who have a relatively low propensity to consume) are cornering ever larger parts
of the national income and thus destroying the purchasing power of the underlying pop-
ulation (Robinson, 1943a, pp. 4-5). Responding to the lack of demand each enterprise by
itself employs a conservative business strategy, trying to make sure not to produce more
than they can sell at existing price levels. Each, to be on the safe side, produces less
rather than more than what can be sold (Robinson, 1943b, p. 12). This results in the
curtailment of employment and subsequently a decline in the wage share. As workers
have a higher propensity to consume than capitalists, the resulting loss of purchasing
power leads to an absolute fall in eﬀective demand and thus from the entrepreneurs'
point of view necessitates a further reduction of output; then the whole process starts
anew (Robinson, 1943a, pp. 4-5). As the capitalist economic system is highly integrated,
a small fall in output in one industry quickly gains momentum and spreads over large
parts of the economy. Thus, what is a perfectly reasonable business strategy from the
individual entrepreneur's point of view develops into a highly disruptive, socially harmful
vicious circle. In eﬀect, the cumulated outcome is not only harmful to the workers but
even to the entrepreneurs themselves as they end up facing ever higher deﬁcits in eﬀective
demand (Robinson, 1949, p. 13).
The tendency to fall into this deadlock is inherent in a private enterprise
economy, and exists even under competition. Under monopoly it is much
exaggerated. (Robinson, 1943b, p. 12)
Thus, on imperfectly competitive markets output restriction is always a response to eﬀec-
tive demand lagging behind the expansion of productive capacity. Nonetheless, on some
occasions, Robinson described a second rationale for output restriction which resembles
what Veblen labelled `industrial sabotage': destroying part of the output in order to
create artiﬁcial scarcities and keep prices up (Robinson, 1943a, p. 6).
It was a common feature of the inter-war period that productive resources
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were actually destroyed in order to keep up the value of what remained. The
Brazilians found that it paid them better to burn part of their coﬀee crop
rather than to lower the price of coﬀee by throwing the whole crop on to the
market. A special company was formed in this country to smash up shipyards,
to prevent new ships from being built to compete with those already aﬂoat,
and so to reduce freight rates. Such blatant examples are only an extreme
form of a process of limitation of output which runs, in greater or less degree,
throughout the proﬁt system. For wherever any group of producers can get
together and control the supply of the commodity they produce, it will pay
them better, up to a certain point to sell less at a higher price rather than
more at a lower price. (Robinson, 1943a, p. 6)
As the artiﬁcial creation of scarcities makes sense only in a supply-and-demand pricing
framework, the inclusion of the shipping industry seems to be very diﬃcult to reconcile
with Robinson's mark-up pricing framework. Consequently, in The Accumulation of
Capital Robinson restricts the relevance of these practices to the competitive primary
industries:
One of the most dramatic paradoxes of the capitalist rules of the game is
the spectacle of primary producers trying to cancel the eﬀect of increased
productivity by organising schemes to burn a proportion of their output and
so keep the price of the remainder at a level which enables them to live.
(Robinson, 1986 [1956], p. 362)
Prices on primary goods markets in the mark-up pricing framework are conceptualised
as being determined through supply-and-demand. In these cases, thus, the creation of
artiﬁcial scarcities seems to be a reasonable proﬁt maximisation strategy. Nonetheless,
I would argue that even in a perfectly competitive scenario output restriction is rather
unlikely. In a truly competitive scenario, with no collusion whatsoever, entrepreneurs
would ﬁnd themselves in a prisoner's dilemma situation: limiting output and thus sta-
bilising or even raising prices collectively would provide the best outcome for all; if a
single entrepreneur limits his output and the others do not, the single producer would
loose, the others gain; if none of them limit their output, all of them loose. So, in order
for output restriction to be a reasonable strategy for proﬁt maximisation, a certain level
of market imperfection needs to be assumed. In a competitive environment there would
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always be an incentive for low-cost producers to produce more and undercut the prices
of others.
On top of the above quoted rather traditional examples of industrial sabotage Robinson
describes another business strategy which, as I would argue, is fully in line with Veblen's
discussion of industrial sabotage: the entrepreneurs' ability and willingness to reduce the
durability of commodities in order to raise the demand for their goods (Robinson, 1962,
p. 133). To put it in Robinson's words:
Suppose that a manufacturer has discovered a way, without extra cost, to
make his products more durable. Should he adopt this method, so as to ben-
eﬁt his customers, or should he rather consider the danger of satisfying their
demands and reducing the market for replacements? Would he not be well ad-
vised to turn his research workers on to ﬁnd a less durable material, provided
that it can be made to look as attractive and is not much more costly? Here
the doctrine that the most proﬁtable is the most socially beneﬁcial course of
conduct hits an awkward snag. (ibid., p. 133)
This phenomenon has in the meantime become (in)famous under the label `planned
obsolescence'. Planned obsolescence is a strategy of entrepreneurs to indirectly raise
prices through enforcing frequent replacement. Another way to achieve this has been
described by Robinson under the name `psychological obsolescence':
There are many objects of daily use, untouched by fashion, in which resis-
tance to wear and tear is a great beneﬁt to the buyer. The producer, of
course, prefers frequent replacement. The producer controls design and qual-
ity. Moreover it is to the producer's interest to speed up the wheel of fashion
and spread its inﬂuence over ever wider ﬁelds, inducing psychological obso-
lescence of models already sold by making small improvements in new models
or merely by changing appearances, so as to appeal to the consumer's desire
to show oﬀ to the Joneses. (Robinson, 1968, p. 62)
This, however, whilst often being highly manipulative can hardly be considered an act
of industrial sabotage as it is understood here.
In this subchapter I have shown that in Joan Robinson's work we ﬁnd aspects of both
Veblen's concern with the harmful eﬀects of consciously set acts of industrial sabotage
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and Kalecki's stance of output restriction as a mere reaction to a lack of eﬀective demand.
As these matters were not at the heart of Robinson's analysis no carefully elaborated
discussion exists, but she still provides us with valuable inspiration for theory develop-
ment.
6.4 Excursus: Alternatives to business eﬃciency
In his denunciation of industrial sabotage Veblen has eﬀectively done away with busi-
ness eﬃciency as a valid guideline for economic action. In modern capitalism the key
criterion to decide between diﬀerent lines of investment and thus allocation of resources
is proﬁtability. Resources are allocated where they are expected to create most proﬁt
for the possessing classes. As Veblen clearly and repeatedly highlights that he regards
this focus on business eﬃciency as being highly detrimental to the common good, the
question arises what alternatives he would suggest. In the institutionalist literature we
ﬁnd a diversity of diﬀerent and often contradictory answers to this question.
Hobson for example argues that the question of alternative ends cannot be answered
because Veblen does not provide us with any criteria as to how to determine the most
socially beneﬁcial allocation of resources (Hobson, 1994 [1936], pp. 134-135).
Knoedler, on the other hand, is quite conﬁdent in stating that Veblen clearly employed
a deﬁnition of technical eﬃciency that was inﬂuenced by the work of a group of progressive
young engineers of his time (Knoedler, 1997, p. 1011). An economy in this understanding
can be seen as technically eﬃcient
when interdependent mechanized production processes throughout the econ-
omy worked together in an eﬃcient manner, without idleness, waste, and
hardship [Veblen 1988, 18] to produce the maximum possible amount of
output, using the most technologically sophisticated industrial techniques
available. (ibid., p. 1011)
She contrasts this view with the now-dominant approach which sees eﬃciency as being
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represented by the minimum point on a U-shaped long-run average total cost curve
(Knoedler, 1997, p. 1011). This, Knoedler holds, is a very diﬀerent understanding of
eﬃciency compared to Veblen's appeal for the maximisation of physical output.
Knoedler's interpretation is contradicted by Samuels who agrees with an anonymous
referee of his journal article that
Veblen was talking about a kind of normal working capacity output notion
that would be well short of maximum possible output, perhaps not all that
diﬀerent from minimum average cost output. Veblen's concern was with idle
plant or plant that was obviously underutilized and not with running the
plant at an absolute maximum. (Samuels, 1994, p. 1250)
It is obvious that this interpretation of Veblen is diametrically opposed to Knoedler's
point of view. Whilst discussing the same alternative conceptions, that is, maximum
possible output of goods vs. minimum average cost output, the two authors arrive at
very diﬀerent conclusions as to which of the two applies to Veblen's work. Interestingly
enough, Samuels goes on to contradict himself and argue along the lines of Knoedler
when two pages after the above cited paragraph he stresses that we must consider what
Veblen's argument implies: production should be undertaken at its maximum physical
technological level (ibid., p. 1252). This is a line of argument which is most likely to ﬁnd
Knoedler's full approval.
A fourth interpretation of Veblen is put forward by LaJeunesse in his article Keeping
labor productive. He argues that
Clearly, Veblen was not intent on running the plant at an absolute maxi-
mum but on ﬁnding some harmony among the vested interests of capitalists,
workers, and consumers. His salient concern was with an underutilization of
capacity that detracted from real living standards. (LaJeunesse, 2004, p. 618)
Thus, whilst subscribing to the interpretation that Veblen did not aim for maximum
capacity output, LaJeunesse adds yet another dimension when arguing that the optimum
output is determined through a compromise between the interests of the diﬀerent social
groups rather than by minimum average costs.
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Which of these interpretations best covers Veblen's own understanding of the matter
is diﬃcult to tell as I would agree with Hobson that Veblen did not provide us with much
guidance. Certainly, throughout his writings he stresses the importance of removing
business constraints on production but, as Hobson suggested, this does not yet provide
us with a deﬁnite answer as to his alternative ends. Is it the minimisation of cost that
should regulate industry, as suggested by Samuels, or is it yet another aim?
What can be said with reasonable conﬁdence, however, I would argue, is that the
interpretation put forward by LaJeunesse is least covered by Veblen's own writings. In
the last chapter of his book The Engineers and the Price System Veblen concludes by
describing what he thinks would need to be done in order to establish a new, more
eﬃcient economic order (Veblen, 1954 [1921]). One of the imperatives he keeps stressing
is that
To avoid persistent confusion and prospective defeat, it will be necessary to
exclude from all positions of trust and executive responsibility all persons
who have been trained for business or who have had experience in business
undertakings of the larger sort. [. . . ] What is wanted is training in the ways
and means of productive industry, not in the ways and means of salesmanship
and proﬁtable investment. (ibid., p. 146)
Veblen's determination to eliminate all kinds of business-induced waste does not leave
much room for LaJeunesse's proposed line of argumentation. Veblen does not not seem
to be willing to make any concessions to business interests in his utopian new order.
Having presented all these diverging contemporary interpretations of Veblen, it appears
most reasonable to agree with Tilman's evaluation that the exact nature of the new order
will probably remain a matter of debate for Veblen scholars (Tilman, 1972, p. 315).
Nonetheless I want to put forward yet another diﬀerent conception of eﬃciency which
can be found in contemporary institutionalist literature, namely `social eﬃciency', and
argue that this may prove to be a promising way forward in the quest for alternatives to
the regime of business eﬃciency and capitalistic sabotage.
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Social eﬃciency, or instrumental eﬃciency as it is also called, has come to be widely
accepted as the value principle characteristic for contemporary institutional economics
in the Veblenian tradition (see for example the contributions to Clark, 1995). The most
accurate deﬁnition of social eﬃciency to my knowledge can be found in Miller's book
chapter on Institutional Economics and the Theory of Social Value:
Social eﬃciency is measured in real, rather than in pecuniary, terms. Ef-
ﬁciency is identiﬁed with the consequences, in terms of serviceability and
reasonableness, of the application of particular policies to speciﬁc problems.
It is a matter of how well the community can be made to work for its in-
habitants; the extent to which productive participation, the realization of
potential, the nurture and protection of the vulnerable and the powerless is
facilitated; and the extent to which polarization and isolation is thwarted.
(Miller, 1995, p. 126)
This deﬁnition, as Miller herself acknowledges, has the drawback of not being easily
quantiﬁable and thus making it hard to formulate measurable policy objectives (ibid.,
p. 126). Yet, Miller counters, the same could be said of the neoclassical conception of
Pareto eﬃciency and still it is widely accepted as a standard (ibid., p. 126).
I would argue that the multidimensionality of the deﬁnition of social eﬃciency reﬂects
the multidimensional nature of social life. It provides us with a value criterion that avoids
the social and moral pitfalls of business eﬃciency without at the same time falling prey to
a purely mechanistic output maximisation framework. Regardless of the question whether
the absolute maximisation of output would be socially desirable in an economy with as
high productive potential as ours, Hobson's question as to the allocation of resources
between diﬀerent uses would still remain unresolved in Knoedler's purely mechanistic
conception. The concept of social eﬃciency, on the other hand, provides us with some
guidance on how to choose between possible alternative uses of resources.
On top of that, I want to argue that there is a paragraph in Veblen's The Engineers and
the Price System which may be taken to indicate that Veblen subscribed to a view not
all that diﬀerent to what today is known as `social eﬃciency'. In the following paragraph
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Veblen describes the key challenges of a new industrial administration:
The incoming industrial order is designed to correct the shortcomings of the
old. The duties and powers of the incoming directorate will accordingly con-
verge on those points in the administration of industry where the old order
has most signally fallen short; that is to say, on the due allocation of resources
and a consequent full and reasonably proportioned employment of the avail-
able equipment and man power; on the avoidance of waste and duplication
of work; and on an equitable and suﬃcient supply of goods and services to
consumers. (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 142)
Whilst having a far more pronounced focus on industry than Miller's deﬁnition of social
eﬃciency (which can at least partly be explained by the important economic changes
since the time of Veblen's writing), parts of the argument still sound familiar:
1. Veblen's stress on the importance of the reasonably proportioned employment of
resources.
2. The focus on the equitableness of supply.
3. The ever present urge to avoid waste resembles Miller's claim for the realisation of
potential.
Thus, I would argue that despite his inclination towards industrial eﬃciency Veblen
indeed had a multidimensional understanding of eﬃciency which may be circumscribed
as social eﬃciency.
Furthermore, I want to argue that Joan Robinson as well might have had subscribed
to the concept of social eﬃciency had she known of it. Spread throughout Robinson's
writing we ﬁnd a number of criteria against which to judge economic performance and
policy making:
 The availability of decent housing for all citizens (Robinson, 1980 [1962], p. 124).
 A good health service (ibid., p. 124).
186
 A suﬃcient supply of necessary goods and services (e.g. food, clothing and enter-
tainment) (Robinson, 1943a, p. 1).
 [T]he best possible education (Robinson, 1980 [1962], p. 124) for the population.
She also stresses the fact that these basic human needs should be provided for equitably
and thus irrespective of means to pay (ibid., p. 124). Thus, I would argue that Robinson
seems to have implicitly subscribed to a social ideal that is fully in line with what is known
in contemporary institutionalist theory as social eﬃciency.
Concluding remarks
Industrial sabotage, according to Veblen, constitutes the major hindrance to produc-
tive eﬃciency and social provisioning in advanced capitalist economies. It comprises all
business strategies aimed at the limitation of output in order to maximise pecuniary
gain. As modern economies are highly interdependent, instances of industrial sabotage
quickly spread throughout the economy and through cumulative reinforcement result in
far greater disruption than would have been expected judging from the initial cause. The
origin of this phenomenon lies in a fundamental conﬂict of interest between the business
men, the owners of corporate capital and the working class.
Despite also starting from the assumption of class conﬂict, Kalecki never problema-
tised industrial sabotage. He did speak of capacity underutilisation but regarded it
as a consequence of a lack in demand rather than an important explanatory variable.
This can be explained by the diﬀerences in the pricing theories underlying Veblen's and
Kalecki's work: as Kalecki, contrary to Veblen, conceptualised entrepreneurs as price
makers rather than price takers, the limitation of production in order to raise prices
would seem nonsensical from his point of view.
Robinson, I have argued, to a certain extent integrates the basic ideas of industrial
sabotage into a post-Keynesian theoretical framework. Whilst, analogous to Kalecki, she
stresses the importance of eﬀective demand, she still cites some historical examples of
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industrial sabotage. On top of that, her discussion of planned obsolescence points us
towards a new form of industrial sabotage which Veblen omitted from his analysis and
which is perfectly compatible with the Robinsonian-Kaleckian theoretical framework. In-
deed, it was argued that planned obsolescence has signiﬁcantly gained in importance and
can probably be regarded as one of the most important instances of industrial sabotage
in advanced capitalist economies.
Finally, the last section of this chapter considered the question as to what alternatives
to the business understanding of eﬃciency underlying industrial sabotage Veblen and
Robinson propose. It was shown that this question is diﬃcult to settle to the last instance,
but a case was made for a multidimensional understanding of eﬃciency as discussed in
contemporary institutionalism under the label of social eﬃciency.
Overview of the main poverty producing eﬀects
Industrial sabotage can be argued to contribute to poverty production in two ways:
First and foremost, poverty may be produced by planned obsolescence. The strategic
decision of entrepreneurs to deliberately limit the durability of their products is likely to
have a direct impact on the material deprivation aspect of poverty. In its oﬃcial measure
of deprivation, the material deprivation rate, the EU for example includes, amongst
others, not being able to aﬀord a TV set, a washing machine, a car or a telephone
as indicators for material deprivation. Now, if it were common practice, as it is often
suspected, that the producers of such devices regularly furnish their products with a built
in `expiry date' of a little more than the legal warranty of two years, it would mean that in
order to attain the accepted minimum standard of living people would need for example
to buy a new TV approximately every two years. The eﬀect on poverty, I would suspect,
would be similar to the eﬀect of a direct price increase. The validity of this argument
is not conﬁned to items included in the material deprivation rate, however. It can be
extended to all kinds of products which are commonly considered to be a precondition
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for the full participation in society. Further examples may be light bulbs, mobile phones,
computers or printers.
Secondly, poverty may be produced by industrial sabotage in the original sense of
the term. Entrepreneurs may resort to strategies of deliberate restriction of output
with the aim of inﬂuencing prices. Broadly speaking, entrepreneurs have two possible
options: they can either restrict production from the outset, or destroy parts of their
produce in case the necessity to stabilise prices arise. Whichever of these two options
they choose, the aim of this undertaking is to stabilise prices at a higher level than would
otherwise be the case. We have seen above that, in a mark-up pricing framework this
strategy is only available on markets producing raw materials and unprocessed foodstuﬀ.
A possible consequence of industrial sabotage could thus be a situation in which the
price of food is kept artiﬁcially high, thus resulting in higher costs of living and possibly
material deprivation. Whether this scenario is of actual practical relevance in our age of
abundance, however, would need to be investigated empirically.
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7 Poverty producing process n° 4:
Hegemonic policy-making
Hegemonic policy-making, the poverty producing process to be discussed in this chapter,
diﬀers from the processes discussed before in several respects. First, none of the authors
discussed in this thesis, to my knowledge, ever used the expression `hegemonic policy-
making'. Certainly not in a systematic way. In fact, as I could not ﬁnd an accurate
expression in either Robinson's, Kalecki's or Veblen's work I made an exemption to my
rule to stick to the authors' own labels and chose the term `hegemonic policy-making'
to describe certain phenomena analysed by the authors. Second, and closely related to
the ﬁrst diﬀerence, hegemonic policy-making does not denominate one clearly speciﬁed
poverty producing process; rather, it should be understood as an umbrella term covering
a diverse set of diﬀerent, yet closely related processes. I decided to subsume under this
heading all those poverty producing processes which can directly be ascribed to public
policy.
As government-initiated poverty producing processes are a wide ﬁeld of enquiry the
speciﬁc processes discussed below can only provide an exemplary list. Due to the na-
ture of the present study I focus on the processes which Robinson, Kalecki and Veblen
focused on, namely the political business cycle, taxation, inﬂation targeting, government-
administered conspicuous waste and government-administered sabotage. This brings me
to yet another peculiarity of hegemonic policy-making as a poverty producing process:
except maybe for government-administered sabotage and government-administered con-
190
spicuous waste, none of the policies listed above is poverty producing per se. What makes
them qualify as poverty producing processes is that they represent the outcome of a choice
between diﬀerent social aims. Inﬂation targeting and the sound ﬁnance paradigm, for
example, produce poverty because they conﬂict with and are opposed to employment
policy. The poverty producing element in these examples is that they stand for a policy
mix which is biased in favour of the interests of the possessing classes.
The argument develops as follows: First, I provide an overview of the potentially
poverty producing public policies discussed by Kalecki, namely the political business
cycle and taxation. Then follows a discussion of Robinson's analyses of taxation and
inﬂation targeting. Next, by outlining Veblen's discussion of government-administered
sabotage and government-administered conspicuous waste a radically diﬀerent perspec-
tive on public policy-making is presented. Finally, the chapter is concluded by a short
summary of the key arguments and an overview of the main poverty producing eﬀects.
7.1 Michaª Kalecki
Apart from his writings on rationing during World War II discussed in chapter 4 Kalecki's
focus in the analysis of public policy certainly was on the preconditions for and hindrances
to the achievement of full employment. His work on full employment had two major foci:
Firstly, the question of whether full employment is actually achievable on the political
level; secondly, assuming the general achievability of full employment, he analysed the
advantages and disadvantages of diﬀerent policies for achieving full employment.
As the aim of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive overview of Kalecki's
policy analyses but rather to point out the poverty producing processes described in his
work, I will focus on two topics: the political business cycle ﬁrst described by Kalecki in
1943 and his analysis of taxation. These, I want to argue, are the main poverty producing
processes to be found in Kalecki's analysis of the political sphere.
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7.1.1 The political business cycle
In Political Aspects of Full Employment Kalecki (1990 [1943]) analysed the question
why governments do not secure permanent full employment even though the tools for
doing so - Keynesian demand management - have already been developed. The answer,
Kalecki reasons, lies in big business' opposition to government intervention in general
and employment policy in particular (Kalecki, 1990 [1943], pp. 349-350). This failure of
governments, it can safely be argued, constitutes a major poverty producing element.
Kalecki lists three reasons for big business' opposition to full employment policy:
1. Business is opposed to government pursuing an active ﬁscal policy because this is
very likely to lessen their own political inﬂuence. So far, public policy had been
greatly constrained by the importance of securing `business conﬁdence'. Economic
growth and employment levels ultimately were seen as dependent on business' con-
ﬁdence in the proﬁtability of investment. Upsetting business conﬁdence was very
likely to have important negative eﬀects and thus had to be avoided at all cost.
Kalecki predicted that governments learning to secure economic growth and full
employment through public investment would quickly discover that they need not
be considerate of the state of business conﬁdence in their decisions on economic
policy-making. Thus, business would lose much of its political inﬂuence. It does
not come as a surprise then, that business leaders, according to Kalecki, do every-
thing in their power to keep governments from reaching this conclusion in the ﬁrst
place. Thus, they are generally opposed to government intervention (ibid., p. 350).
The only government intervention which might ﬁnd business leaders' support is the
stimulation of private investment. This, however, whilst often being politically op-
portune, according to Kalecki is not an advisable policy for two reasons: Firstly, the
stimulation of private investment is not a directly employment-generating measure.
Rather its eﬀectiveness is dependent upon the entrepreneurs' reaction to govern-
mental stimuli. It is easily possible to imagine a scenario in which entrepreneurs
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decide not to increase investment despite major reductions in interest or taxa-
tion. According to Kalecki this is most likely to happen in times of low business
conﬁdence. In such situations the outcome for governments would be all costs
and no gain. The stimulation of private investment, because of being an indirect
measure, thus is a highly unreliable strategy for achieving full employment. It
keeps governments dependent upon the mood of the entrepreneurs (Kalecki, 1990
[1943], pp. 353-354). Secondly, in order to be eﬀective in the long-run, a strategy
of stimulating private investment would have to entail regular interest or tax rate
reductions. It does not suﬃce to reduce the interest rate once; in order to keep
investment ﬂowing governments have to continually lower the interest rate. Sooner
rather than later, this cumulative process would reach a point where the interest
rate is zero or even negative. Continuous reductions of the interest or tax rates
thus, in Kalecki's eyes, even if they were eﬀective, are not a sustainable strategy
for achieving full employment (ibid., p. 350)1.
2. The business class is particularly critical of some forms of government spending,
namely all kinds of subsidies and public investment. The opposition to public in-
vestment results from the fear that governments may start to interfere in proﬁtable
private markets and thus compete with business interests. Subsidies, on the other
hand, are opposed on purely ideological grounds because, according to the pre-
vailing business ethic, one should not get something for nothing. Or, to put it in
Kalecki's words,  `you shall earn your bread in sweat'unless you happen to have
private means (ibid., pp. 350-351). Consequently, despite being a highly eﬃcient
measure, Kalecki observes, direct consumption beneﬁts are among the most ﬁercely
opposed policy measures. Direct beneﬁt payments, thus, in spite of being highly
advantageous from a policy point of view are often diﬃcult to implement politically
(ibid., pp. 350-351).
1see also Kalecki (1990 [1945]).
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3. On top of being opposed to government intervention in general and government
investment and consumption subsidies in particular, business leaders are highly
apprehensive of the social eﬀects of long-term full employment. They are afraid
that permanent full employment would shift the power balance to the workers'
beneﬁt, thus causing unrest in the factories and political instability (Kalecki, 1990
[1943], p. 351).
Summing up, it can be said that the business class is opposed to government interven-
tion for three reasons: they oppose the government discovering its power to steer the
economy and thus government spending as such. They particularly dislike direct gov-
ernment investment and consumption subsidies. Finally, independent of the particular
policies employed, they fear the social consequences of long-term full employment. Con-
sequently, the business class is likely to mobilise all its political inﬂuence in order to
impede far-reaching government intervention. At the same time, however, due to theo-
retical and historical developments - the development of the full employment doctrine
(ibid., p. 349) in economics and the experience of very high levels of employment during
WWII - governments can no longer aﬀord a strict laissez-faire policy. People demand
that the government take responsibility for securing high levels of employment (ibid.,
p. 353). Thus, governments, in Kalecki's understanding, are torn between the conﬂicting
demands of workers and business. As a consequence, Kalecki predicts the development
of a political business cycle which replaces the purely economic business cycle (ibid.,
pp. 354-355).
This political business cycle unfolds as follows:
When elections are approaching or in times of slump when unemployment levels are
getting unacceptably high, governments adopt a policy of active state involvement in
order to create employment. It is in their own interest to do so because they need the
workers' support in order to be re-elected. But as we have seen above, business interests,
despite pecuniarily proﬁting from it, are opposed to prolonged periods of government-
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induced full employment for political reasons. Thus they start to mobilise their political
inﬂuence to stop government intervention (Kalecki, 1990 [1943], pp. 354-355). They often
do so, Kalecki reasons, by declaring the government's ﬁnancial situation unsound (ibid.,
p. 355) and unsustainable, thus forcing it to return to a more passive role. Consequently,
the unemployment level is going up again. With the next election approaching or unem-
ployment nearing dangerously high levels, political pressure for government intervention
increases and the political business cycle starts anew again (ibid., p. 355).
The political business cycle diﬀers from the conventional business cycle in two respects:
Firstly, the political business cycle can be expected to be far less violent than the regular
business cycle. Secondly, the development of the political business cycle can be ascribed
to the government rather than to the vagaries of business enterprise as such (ibid., p. 355).
In a nutshell, the argument can be summarised as follows: despite having developed
the policy tools for creating and maintaining full employment and thus eliminating the
up- and downturns of the business cycle, governments only use them very partially.
This is due to the great political inﬂuence of the business class. The inﬂuence of the
business class upon governmental policy-making, however, is always counter-balanced
by the requirement, in modern democracies, to assure certain minimum standards for
the working class in order to be re-elected and avoid public unrest. This means that,
although it often serves them well, government cannot be said to be fully instrumentalised
by economic elites.
Nevertheless, Kalecki concludes that in order for permanent full employment to be
possible
`Full employment capitalism' will, of course, have to develop new social and
political institutions which will reﬂect the increased power of the working
class. If capitalism can adjust itself to full employment, a fundamental reform
will have been incorporated in it. If not, it will show itself an outmoded
system which must be scrapped. (ibid., p. 356)
Despite its length of only ten pages, The Political Aspects of Full Employment certainly
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is one of Kalecki's best known and most cited works. Accordingly, it is not surprising
that the accuracy of Kalecki's predictions and the continuing validity of his theses have
been re-evaluated on several occasions by diﬀerent authors.
In 2004 Arestis and Skuse published an article enquiring into the continued relevance
of The Political Aspects of Full Employment at the close of the twentieth century (Arestis
and Skuse, 2004). Having summarised the main features of Kalecki's argument, the au-
thors re-evaluate his predictions in light of the major political and economic changes in
the UK and Europe since the time of his writing (ibid., p. 10).
The ﬁrst major change Arestis and Skuse point out are the changing economic power
relations between the ﬁnancial and the real sector of the economy. Whereas Kalecki used
to assume the dominance of the real sector the situation has changed considerably over
the last decades. The ﬁnancial sector has grown ever more important and ﬁnally gained
dominance over the real sector (ibid., pp. 14-15).
This has resulted in dramatic changes in economic policy-making. Firstly, governments
have replaced their engagement in ﬁscal policy by an increasingly exclusive focus on
monetary policy (ibid., p. 15). Secondly, responsibility for monetary policy has largely
been handed over to independent central banks (ibid., p. 15). These have been given the
sole objective of price stability, and interest rate manipulation is the primary instrument
(ibid., p. 15). According to Arestis and Skuse this move was largely motivated by the
desire to assure the ﬁnancial elite of freedom from politically motivated interference and
thus keep in check the volatility of ﬁnancial markets (ibid., p. 15). In this connection
the authors quote Galbraith who spoke of the surrender of economic policy (Galbraith,
1996) and reasoned that [t]o accept a balanced budget and the unchallenged monetary
judgement of the Federal Reserve is, by deﬁnition, to remove macroeconomics from the
political sphere (ibid.). Thirdly, these changes, according to Arestis and Skuse, have
culminated in
the attempt to take economic policy out of politics, thus throwing into ques-
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tion the notion of a `political business cycle' (Arestis and Skuse, 2004, p. 16)
The authors thus observe an ideological shift towards the increasing dominance of market
ideology (ibid., p. 16).
Concluding from these changes, the authors argue that a fourth major constraint on
economic policy-making which was not included in Kalecki's original argument has arisen:
the fear of inﬂation (ibid., p. 22). They even go as far as arguing that
This has probably become the most powerful constraint in turning govern-
ments and policy-makers away from concern with the goal of full employment
[. . . ]. (ibid., p. 22)
Notwithstanding these important political and economic changes, the authors argue that
Kalecki's main theses concerning the political business cycle still remain valid. None-
theless, they reason, the major changes of the past decades certainly imply a need for
modernisation of Kaleckian theory (ibid., p. 25). This modernisation of the Kaleckian
framework remains for future generations of Kaleckians to achieve.
Another often cited re-evaluation of Kalecki's political business cycle has been con-
tributed by Feiwel. In Reﬂection on Kalecki's Theory of Political Business Cycle (Feiwel,
1999) he summarises the main argument of Kalecki's paper, then proceeds to introduce a
further constraint on ﬁscal policy which, as he argues, has not been mentioned by Kalecki
the intrinsic [business class'] apprehension of resulting redistribution of in-
come. (ibid., p. 542)
I want to argue that it is at the very least debatable whether the fear of redistribution
really constitutes a novel political constraint not mentioned in Kalecki's original paper.
Despite not explicitly mentioning redistribution in the context of his analysis of the
political business cycle, Kalecki's whole oeuvre was marked by questions of class conﬂict
and the struggle over the distribution of income. The quest for redistribution and the
opposition to redistribution respectively can thus be regarded as major undercurrents of
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Kalecki's thought. In addition to that, it seems to be quite clearly implied in Kalecki's
third constraint, that is the opposition to permanent full employment per se for fear of
power shifts to the workers' beneﬁt. Introducing the intrinsic apprehension of resulting
redistribution of income (Feiwel, 1999, p. 542) as an additional fourth constraint, in my
opinion, would thus mean to seriously misunderstand Kalecki's original work. Having
said this, let me come back to Feiwel's re-evaluation. Overall, Feiwel arrives at broadly
the same conclusion as Arestis and Skuse, arguing that
His political business cycle is in many respects a brilliant and perceptive
piece. One should remember that it was written in 1943, and one could not
expect the `prophet' to be right in every smallest detail or to foresee all the
ramiﬁcations. But this compact work germinated with ideas. A tentative
attempt at scrutinizing to what extent Kalecki's predictions of the political
business cycle have been applicable to the U.S.A. and U.K. supports the view,
that the concept of the political business cycle was strikingly in advance of
its time, though it has not been borne out in all respects. (ibid., p. 546)
Feiwel also presents an extended quote from the preface to a collection of essays - amongst
them The Political Aspects of Full Employment - in which Kalecki reﬂects on the accuracy
of his predictions with the hindsight of about twenty years:
Were the forecasts I made then accurate? I suppose so, but as usual with
historical forecasts, not always in every detail. After analyzing the nature of
the opposition of big business to stimulating economic activity by government
expenditure, I foresaw that future crises will be mitigated that way, but not
entirely eliminated. Furthermore, I foresaw that government intervention in
the course of the business cycle will give rise to a political business cycle.
It appears that current events correspond grosso modo to these forecasts.
(Kalecki 1962 quoted in ibid., p. 548)
Thus it seems that Kalecki's own re-evaluation, published some twenty years after the
original paper, broadly corresponds with the later re-evaluations by Arestis and Skuse
and Feiwel. All agree that despite some errors in detail, history has more or less validated
Kalecki's predictions made in 1943.
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7.1.2 Taxation
In his analysis of taxation Kalecki primarily refers to capital and income taxation with
some discussion of commodity taxes (Kalecki, 1990 [1937]). In what follows I will brieﬂy
summarise his major ﬁndings concerning the advantages and drawbacks of the diﬀerent
forms of taxation as a policy for achieving full employment. Furthermore, a short excursus
will point out some more recent theoretical developments aiming at the better integration
of Kaleckian tax theory into Kalecki's general theoretical framework.
By capital taxation Kalecki refers to a tax payable on all forms of capital - reinvested
or not - and levied in an equal manner on ﬁrms and persons (Kalecki, 1990 [1944], p. 363).
Kalecki reasons that capital taxation may be the best tool to achieve full employment
and income redistribution (Kalecki, 1990 [1937], p. 325). Firstly, because unlike in the
case of public investment ﬁnanced by deﬁcit spending, governments do not have to take
on debt (ibid., p. 325). Secondly, in terms of income redistribution capital taxation is
likely to be far more eﬃcient than for example wage bargaining for, unlike wages, capital
taxes do not aﬀect prime costs and thus do not kick oﬀ the inﬂationary wage-price-
spiral (Kalecki, 1990 [1939], p. 285). On top of that, as it has to be paid in an equal
manner out of all forms of capital, capital taxation leaves the comparative advantage
[...] unchanged (Kalecki, 1990 [1944], p. 363) and thus should not aﬀect the proﬁtability
of investment (ibid., p. 363). However, Kalecki concedes, capital taxation runs counter to
the principle of private property (Kalecki, 1990 [1937], p. 325) and thus is very likely
to encounter strong political opposition. This leads him to the pessimistic conclusion
that [i]t is diﬃcult to believe, however, that capital taxation will ever be applied for this
purpose on a large scale (ibid., p. 325).
As regards income taxation, Kalecki detects the same potential for social change as
for capital taxation with one important diﬀerence: unlike capital taxation, taxes levied
on income reduce the proﬁtability of investment and thus the incentive to invest. Thus,
it risks having an adverse eﬀect on private investment (Kalecki, 1990 [1944], p. 364).
199
In order to avoid this, Kalecki proposes to introduce a modiﬁed income tax which he
describes as follows:
Imagine that income tax is charged on gross income, i.e. before deduction of
wear and tear. On the other hand, all investment in ﬁxed capital, whether for
the sake of replacement or expansion, is deducted from the taxable amount.
(If it exceeds the taxable income, the excess is carried over for deduction in
subsequent years.) It is easy to show that such a tax does not aﬀect the rate
of proﬁt expected on new investment. (Kalecki, 1990 [1944], p. 364)
This modiﬁed income tax, he holds, would not aﬀect the proﬁtability of investment and
would thus represent an equally good alternative to capital taxation (ibid., p. 364).
In addition to these general thoughts about income taxation, in A Comment on Mone-
tary Policy Kalecki (1990 [1946]) discusses Mints' proposition to raise income tax exemp-
tion limits in order to increase eﬀective demand. Whilst conceding that such a measure
would certainly have the desired result of a heightened eﬀective demand, he still holds
that
This is, however, by no means the best way of stimulating consumption,
either from a social or from an economic point of view. People below the
exemption limit at the moment of the application of the measure, that is, the
poorest, would not beneﬁt from it. Moreover, with the reduction of income
tax revenue achieved by stepping up the exemption limits, the rich would
share in tax reductions to an increasing extent. Apart from the social aspect,
this would gradually diminish the eﬀectiveness of the tax reduction because
people in higher income brackets spend a smaller part of the addition to their
income. The larger the reduction of income tax revenue, the lower in relation
to it would be the consequent increase in consumption. (Kalecki, 1990 [1946],
p. 404)
Thus, raising the income tax exemption limits, he concludes, is neither an eﬀective nor
an eﬃcient means for achieving full employment (ibid., pp. 403-404).
As regards commodity taxation, in Commodity, Income and Capital Taxation Kalecki
(1990 [1937]) argues that commodity taxes merely redistribute purchasing power between
diﬀerent groups of workers. This evaluation, however, is based on the - in my opinion
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most unrealistic - assumption that all income which is raised through commodity taxa-
tion is then paid out in the form of doles and salaries for government oﬃcials (Kalecki,
1990 [1937], p. 320). Laramie and Mair, on the other hand, point out that commodity
taxation in a Kaleckian framework can be shown to redistribute income to the detriment
of the workers. This is primarily due to the fact that workers have a higher propensity to
consume and thus would have to spend relatively larger parts of their income on commod-
ity taxes. Commodity taxes, being part of primary cost, in a Kaleckian mark-up pricing
framework would raise prices (Laramie and Mair, 2000, p. 452). Thus, nominal wages
left constant, this tax-induced rise of prices would signify a fall in purchasing power of
the workers. Commodity taxation can therefore be expected to reduce eﬀective demand
by workers.
These diﬀerences in argumentation between Kalecki and Laramie and Mair - who claim
to build on Kalecki - are most likely due to a major defect of Kalecki's analysis of taxation
highlighted by the latter, namely its missing integration into Kalecki's overall theoretical
framework (Laramie, 1991, p. 583). In an attempt to correct this, Laramie (1991) and
Laramie and Mair (1996) thus proceed to devise a Kaleckian tax incidence theory, further
elaborating upon the distributive eﬀects of taxation. These, according to Laramie, are
primarily determined by the following three elements:
the types of taxes levied, ﬁrms' treatment of taxes (as prime costs or as
overheads), and the impact of taxation on the markup. (ibid., p. 587)
A few years later Laramie and Mair then go on to formulate a Kaleckian tax incidence
theory which
is concerned with the macroeconomic impact of taxation and demonstrates
that the legal incidence and economic incidence of taxes diﬀer in both the
short and the long run. (Laramie and Mair, 1996, p. 452)
These aspects are of utmost importance for analyses of the real economic incidence of
taxation. And tax incidence theory, the authors hold, is, after all, applied income
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distribution theory (Laramie and Mair, 1996, p. 461). Tax incidence theory, Laramie
argues, extends the analysis of class struggle [. . . ] to the revenue side of the state's
budget (Laramie, 1991, p. 589). He also points out that
Conﬂicts over the distribution of income at the industry level, in part through
the prompting of industry itself, have been and are likely to continue to be
transferred to the political level and muted or coopted by industry's control
over key centers of power in the state [. . . ]. (ibid., p. 590)
Thus, the distributive struggle can be said to have increasingly been transferred to the
political arena (ibid., p. 590). This means that the thorough analysis of the distributive
eﬀects of taxation and other public policies is gaining in importance.
Summing up, two important poverty producing moments can be found in Kalecki's
analysis of the politico-economic nexus. His study of the political business cycle points
towards the strong political inﬂuence of the business class resulting in a tendency for
policy-makers to neglect policies favouring the interests of the economically vulnerable
parts of the population. Kaleckian analysis of taxation - developed further by Laramie
and Mair (Laramie, 1991; Laramie and Mair, 1996) - on the other hand, points towards
the importance of scrutinising not only the expenses but also the revenue side of the
state's budget. Again due to the strong political inﬂuence of the business class, a high risk
exists of taxation not being as progressive as would be desirable from a social provisioning
point of view, or even being outright regressive, thus degrading the relative economic
position of the poor.
Issues of taxation have also received considerable attention from Robinson's part and
will thus be further discussed in the next subchapter.
7.2 Joan Robinson
Robinson agrees with Kalecki's evaluation that the primary aim of public policy should
be to ensure sustained full employment. As unemployment, as we have seen in chapter 2,
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is often regarded as one of the primary causes of poverty in advanced capitalist economies,
full employment policy can be argued to be of primary importance for the ﬁght against
poverty. Consequently, all of Robinson's analysis of full employment policy may be
worth including in this chapter. However, in order to stay focused on the major poverty
producing processes arising from public policy-making I will limit myself to two aspects
of the analysis: taxation and inﬂation targeting.
7.2.1 Taxation
Joan Robinson never formulated a coherent theory of taxation. Nevertheless, as her work
was very policy-oriented, at various points in her career she was concerned with issues
of taxation. Certainly, not all parts of her analysis were particularly well elaborated -
some arguments are only hinted at in half-sentences or short paragraphs. The following
discussion thus necessarily contains a certain element of interpretation of these brief
remarks in the light of Robinson's general theoretical oeuvre. In what follows, I will give
a structured overview of Robinson's thoughts on taxation. Firstly, I will enquire into the
most fundamental question with regard to taxation, that is: `Why do we want to tax
people? What aims do we want to achieve through taxation?' Secondly, I will analyse
the more speciﬁc questions of whom and what to tax and how to design the tax system
in detail.
One general issue that needs to be raised with regard to taxation is that it cannot be
evaluated in the abstract. The social and economic eﬀects of taxation depend entirely
upon the structure of the tax system as a whole and of ﬁscal policy more broadly. Taxa-
tion simply denotes a process of the state collecting money. Concretely, this can be done
in a way as to redistribute income from lower income groups to higher income groups, to
redistribute income from higher income groups to lower income groups, or, theoretically,
to leave income distribution unaﬀected (Robinson, 1980a, p. 165). The concrete eﬀects
of taxation depend on the answers to three questions:
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 Who is taxed?
 What is taxed?
 How much is it taxed?
Dependent on the speciﬁc design of the tax system, taxation can have important poverty
producing eﬀects.
Unfortunately, in Robinson we do not have much detailed discussion of the social
and economic consequences of diﬀerent taxes. She highlights the relevance of the above
questions for public policy and - as I will show below - provides us with some general
guidelines for taxation, but does not go into a detailed discussion of the speciﬁcs of
diﬀerent forms of taxation. Thus, the task to evaluate in detail the distributive eﬀects of
diﬀerent tax regimes remained to be completed by younger generations of economists.
What aims do we want to achieve through taxation?
From Robinson's writings, I want to argue, arise at least four diﬀerent goals which may
be pursued through taxation.
1. A government may decide to design its tax system so as to take from those with high
incomes and use the money to subsidise those on low incomes. That is, taxation
may simply be used as a means for the redistribution of income (Robinson, 1949,
p. 22).
2. Income redistribution through taxation may be pursued as desirable in itself, or
alternatively can be regarded as a necessity for the regulation of purchasing power
and thus eﬀective demand (Robinson, 1944, p. 88). Taxing high income groups
with a low propensity to consume and using the money to subsidise low income
groups with a high propensity to consume can be used as an important demand
regulating strategy (Robinson and Eatwell, 1974, p. 299). Alternatively, in speciﬁc
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circumstances, governments may aim at restricting the purchasing power of the
public in order to avoid inﬂation. As we have seen in chapter 4 this problematique
only arises in supply-restrained markets where demand exceeds supply. Taxation
as part of a deﬂationary policy aimed at the reduction of total purchasing power
of the population accordingly used to be a highly important ﬁscal policy measure
during World War II when the supply of goods for general consumption was low
and employment levels high. In peace time, however, excessive demand is not likely
to be a problem that governments struggle with.
3. Again closely related to what has been said before, taxation obviously is also
amongst the most important ways for governments to raise the money they need to
ﬁnance their outlays, be it on administration, subsidies or other (Robinson, 1949,
p. 34). Particularly, Robinson argues that taxation is necessary to provide the funds
for the provision of those basic necessities which for whatever reason do not lend
themselves to mass production (Robinson, 1980 [1962], p. 124). This resounds a
very old argument, already formulated in 1776 by Adam Smith2, stating that there
exists a number of public goods which fulﬁl an important social function and thus
should be provided by the state and (at least in part) irrespective of the individ-
ual's ability to pay for them. Education and the health system are examples of
such public goods. Another government expense which may need to be covered by
taxation are interest payments on public debt (Robinson, 1949, p. 34).
4. Last but certainly not least, government may make use of taxation to direct in-
vestment. They may do so in two diﬀerent ways: First, governments may try to
inﬂuence the general level of investment. They may do so, for example by designing
a tax regime which is favourable to the interests of entrepreneurs, or by levying
lower taxes on re-invested proﬁts (Robinson, 1980a, p. 165). Second, in a more
direct way, governments may use tax receipts for ﬁnancing direct government in-
2see his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1976 [1776]).
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vestment rather than encouraging private investment (Robinson, 1944, pp. 93-94).
Also, I want to add, even if this has only been hinted at by Robinson, governments
may direct investment through favouring certain lines of investment over others
(through tax exemptions or diﬀerent tax rates) and thus creating a pecuniary in-
centive to invest where government thinks it to be desirable.
Summing up, it can be said that governments may choose to pursue a variety of social
and economic aims through taxation. The prioritisation of those diﬀerent aims has a
large inﬂuence on the speciﬁc design of the tax regime. This brings us to our second
question, namely what tax regime would Robinson recommend and why?
Guidelines for taxation
From Robinson's writings three guidelines for taxation can be discerned:
Firstly, in order to avoid negative economic eﬀects, governments should try to tax
away only income which would otherwise be saved (Beveridge Committee, 1943, p. 1).
Taxing income which would be spent on consumption reduces the purchasing power of
the population and thus eﬀective demand. Consequently, there is a risk of creating con-
tractionary economic eﬀects which run counter to the aims pursued through taxation.
Assuming, for example, that a government levies taxes in order to ﬁnance employment
measures, reducing the purchasing power of the population is likely to result in fur-
ther unemployment which would have to be oﬀset by even more government investment
(Robinson, 1944, p. 85). If this again is ﬁnanced by taxing income that would otherwise
be spent on consumption the same dynamic would start all over again. Thus, a cumu-
latively self-reinforcing vicious circle is likely to develop resulting in ever greater needs
for government expenditure. In order to avoid this, Robinson recommends to aim at the
taxation of savings.
Closely connected to this is the second rule: the tax system should be progressive
(ibid., p. 90). That is, the tax rate should be higher on high incomes than on low incomes.
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This can be justiﬁed in two ways: Firstly, allowing the tax burden to fall primarily on
higher incomes reduces the risk of adversely aﬀecting consumption as described above.
Secondly, progressive taxation usually redistributes income from higher to lower income
groups and thus has an equalising eﬀect on the distribution of income. Apart from maybe
being desirable from an ideological point of view, this redistribution of income potentially
raises the purchasing power of the low income groups, thus raising eﬀective demand and
stimulating the economy (Robinson and Eatwell, 1974, p. 299).
There are, however, limits to the progressiveness and of taxation. Robinson discusses
two problems which may arise in connection with high levels of taxation: it may reduce
the willingness to invest, and it may reduce the supply of capital available for investment
(Robinson, 1944, p. 92).
Entrepreneurs may not be willing to take the risk of investing their income if large
parts of future proﬁts may have to be paid in taxes. In modern capitalism the drive to
invest and work harder most often results from expectations of pecuniary gain. If these
expectations are drastically curtailed by taxation, this may indeed dampen the willing-
ness to perform of entrepreneurs (ibid., pp. 91-92). This problem, however, according to
Robinson may be solved by the right choice of tax. She proposes to introduce
a tax assessed on capital wealth, at rates which would normally be paid
out of income. Such a tax would fall on wealth whether it was invested in
safe or risky lines, or merely kept in the chimney, and would therefore not
discriminate against enterprise. (ibid., p. 92)
Another possibility to progressively raise taxes without adversely aﬀecting enterprise
would be through the collection of death duties (ibid., p. 92). Taxation thus does not
necessarily run counter to entrepreneurial motivation; the tax system can be designed in
a way as to foster the motivation to reinvest proﬁts and to stimulate economic growth
just as well as to foster consumption (Robinson, 1980a, p. 165).
In a similar vein, Robinson shows that high levels of taxation do not necessarily result in
a lack of capital available for investment. She argues that the only real limiting factor for
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productive investment is the availability of natural resources and capital goods. As long
as the resources and material goods needed for an expansion of productive capacities and
production are available, investment is possible. Robinson's main argument, however, is
that there is no guarantee that those ﬁrms who make most proﬁts are best suited for
further investment (Robinson, 1944, p. 93).
A system of distribution of capital on the principle of to him who hath shall
be given sets up a vicious circle. Industries which have been depressed in
the past are those most in need of modernisation. New, expanding ﬁrms
which have not yet made great proﬁts have a higher claim to share in new
development than old ﬁrms which may have sunk into inertia and excessive
conservatism. The distribution of new capital according to who happens to
have funds cuts entirely across any rational scale of priorities. (ibid., p. 93)
She thus concludes that the best way to ensure eﬀective investment would be for govern-
ments to centrally plan investment and directly invest according to this plan. Alterna-
tively, the state could make loans available for private investment projects which comply
with national development goals (ibid., pp. 93-94). Nevertheless, on another occasion
Robinson reasons that establishing a centralised public investment regime is a necessary
but not a suﬃcient condition for the achievement of a sustainable, socially balanced in-
vestment regime. The state itself is a locus of power struggles and thus governmental
policy, at least partly, depends on existing power structures rather than considerations
of the common good.
True enough  the State would have the power. But who is the State? In
whose interests will its power be exercised? Unless there is a real change in
the balance of forces within society, mere nationalisation of this and that can
produce only superﬁcial changes. (Robinson, 1942, p. 405)
Thus, Robinson's proposition - the nationalisation of investment planning - is highly
dependent on a fundamental shift in societal power structures. This precondition, in my
point of view, makes it a highly unlikely strategy to be successfully employed with the
aim of promoting social change and social justice.
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Robinson appears to have come to a similar conclusion, when, in spite of her above
discussed strategies to circumvent the negative eﬀects of taxation on investment, she still
concedes that, without profound systemic changes, at the end of the day there may still
be a limit to the progressiveness of taxation:
in peace time an economic system which depends on the money motive will
not function unless the individual can keep at least a substantial part of the
money that he gets for himself. (Robinson, 1949, p. 22)
Tax rule number three to be deduced from Robinson's writings is that
[. . . ] when unemployment is threatening, taxation should not be increased,
and expenditure should not be cut. (Robinson, 1944, p. 81)
This again relates closely to what has been discussed above and links the question of
taxation to another often discussed matter of public policy: the controversy of deﬁcit
spending versus sound ﬁnance.
A regime of sound ﬁnance, that is a permanently balanced budget, is often advocated
with recourse to the unsustainability of deﬁcit spending. As we will see below, Robinson
disagrees on this evaluation. She does not think that a continuously growing budget
deﬁcit is necessarily problematic (ibid.).
Generally speaking, a government has two options when deciding to take on a loan: it
can borrow money from its own people or it can borrow abroad. Whilst mentioning the
latter option in passing, Robinson concentrates her analysis on the case of a government
being indebted to its own people. In this case, she argues, there is no limit to public
debt.
A nation which is in debt has to pay interest to its own citizens (a foreign
debt is a diﬀerent story and is much more like a private debt). That is to
say, the Government has to raise taxes from Peter and Paul and pay interest
to Paul and Peter. Taking the country as a whole, there is no burden of the
debt. Moreover, the debt need never be repaid. As one lot of bonds fall due
to be redeemed a fresh lot can be sold to the public. If the debt is ﬁnally
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repaid, it is repaid out of the wealth of the citizens of the country, and this,
like interest payments, is merely a swap round among the members of the
community. (Robinson, 1949, p. 34)
Thus the money, to use one of Robinson's analogies, stays within the family. Now, as
a nation obviously is a very big family the question presents itself whether those who
receive interest payments and those who have to pay for them through taxation really
are the same members of the family. Although this might be the ideal case, Robinson
concedes that in reality this often does not apply (ibid., p. 34). Thus she concludes that
we may still feel that there is something wrong in endlessly piling up paper
claims on the wealth of the nation in the hands of a group of the nation's
citizens  in fostering the growth of a rentier class whose only claim on society
is that they happened to be well enough oﬀ to save while loan-expenditure
was going on. I think there is a great deal in this view. (Robinson, 1944,
p. 84)
Nevertheless, from Robinson's perspective the advantages of deﬁcit-ﬁnanced public in-
vestment outweigh the drawback of strengthening a rentier class. The most important
advantage of deﬁcit-ﬁnanced public investment as opposed to tax-ﬁnanced investment is
that deﬁcit spending does not impair the purchasing power of the people. On the con-
trary, as government loans are taken out of the voluntary savings of the wealthy classes,
public investment is likely to have an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the overall pur-
chasing power of the population. It is thus a more eﬀective means to ﬁght unemployment
and invigorate the economy (ibid., pp. 83-86).
As far as taxation is concerned, Robinson was quite outspoken with regard to provid-
ing general guidelines for taxation but rather less concerned about a detailed analysis
of the distributive eﬀects of taxation. Nonetheless, two potentially poverty-producing
elements can be discerned: Firstly, every reduction in the progressivity of the tax system
is potentially poverty-producing. Second, a government's failure to devise a tax system
which minimises the negative eﬀects on eﬀective demand produces unnecessary economic
hardship and poverty.
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Another directly poverty-producing process analysed by Robinson is the political focus
on inﬂation targeting at the expense of employment policy. This will be discussed in some
detail below.
7.2.2 Inﬂation targeting
A second major policy issue arising from Robinson's writings is the often-assumed trade-
oﬀ between full employment and inﬂation. Inﬂation, it is widely argued, is primarily
caused on the labour market. High levels of employment strengthen the bargaining posi-
tion of the unions and thus ignite the never-ending inﬂationary wage-price spiral. From
this it is concluded that in order to prevent inﬂation a certain amount of unemployment
- just enough to discipline the workers and keep the unions from getting too demanding -
has to be accepted (Robinson, 1980 [1958], p. 278). This conclusion, Robinson points out,
originates in Keynes who in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money has
shown that
[. . . ] unemployment is not just an accidental blemish in a private-enterprise
system  it has a function. The function of unemployment in the laisser-faire
system is to preserve the value of money. (ibid., p. 271)
Despite acknowledging this interpretation, in Full Employment and Inﬂation (ibid.)
Robinson stresses that she would not want to be so pessimistic (ibid., p. 278). A big
part of the inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ, she argues, can be ascribed to the speciﬁc
historical situation in which this theory has been formulated. High levels of employment
during the twentieth century were obtained in times of war and thus high military ex-
penses, be that during World War II or the Cold War. In these situations, Robinson
reasons, inﬂation is created by the fact that much productive capacity is used for the
production of armaments. Increasingly high levels of employment and purchasing power
are facing an unchanging or even decreasing supply of consumption goods, thus creat-
ing inﬂationary pressure. Had high levels of employment been facing high productive
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investment, that is investment in the production of investment and consumption goods,
a resulting inﬂationary tendency may well have been checked by increases in supply
(Robinson, 1980 [1958], p. 278). Thus, Robinson concludes that
It seems to me that the question of whether it is possible to have full em-
ployment without a falling value of money cannot be answered until we know
whether it is possible to have full employment without the cold war. (ibid.,
p. 279)
Nevertheless, in the mean time, governments are torn between two conﬂicting policy aims
to an extent that, according to Robinson, leaves them almost paralysed (Robinson, 1976,
p. 7). Or, to put it in Robinson's words
Nowadays, it seems that even the political trade cycle has come to an end,
and the governments of all the capitalist nations are stuck in immobility,
dithering between the fear of inﬂation and the fear of unemployment. (ibid.,
p. 7)
This problematique is further exacerbated by the fact that unemployment and inﬂation
aﬀect diﬀerent parts of the population in diﬀerent ways (Robinson, 1979, p. 45). Whilst
unemployment is most detrimental for lower income groups, inﬂation is most harmful
for middle and higher income groups, such as rentiers, professionals and business exec-
utives, civil servants and politicians (ibid., p. 45). The political question as to whether
to prioritise the ﬁght against unemployment or inﬂation is yet another instance of the
fundamental conﬂict of interest between classes.
The strong political focus on inﬂation targeting which can be observed in many coun-
tries, thus can be understood as an important example of a potentially poverty producing
hegemonic policy.
In a nutshell, quite similar to Kalecki, in Robinson's writings we can ﬁnd references
towards important poverty producing processes on both the revenue and the expenses
side of the state's budget. On the revenue side we have the regressiveness or lack of
progressiveness of taxation as well as possible adverse macroeconomic eﬀects of the tax
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regime. On the expenses side, on the other hand, we ﬁnd a reluctance to use active ﬁscal
policy paired with a strong political focus on the stabilisation of the value of money.
7.3 Thorstein Veblen
Whereas with Kalecki and Robinson the state had the ambiguous role of being both
potentially poverty producing and poverty reducing, Veblen was far more pessimistic
as regards the beneﬁcial potential of public policy. These diﬀerences in the evaluation
of public policy, it must be stressed however, can to a great extent be explained by the
diﬀerent historical circumstances in which the authors were living. Veblen lived in the US
and died shortly before the Great Crash of 1929, thus he indeed experienced the State in
a very passive role. Robinson and Kalecki, on the other hand, were deeply inﬂuenced by
their experiences of the Great Crash and the active state policy during and after WWII.
Having said this, it can be observed that Veblen did not develop a sophisticated theory
of the state. His analysis of the political sphere remained rather sketchy. Nonetheless,
from what he wrote on the matter it becomes clear that Veblen regarded the state as
catering solely to the interests of the business community (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 268-
269). He even went as far as saying that [r]epresentative government means, chieﬂy,
representation of business interests (ibid., p. 286). Government oﬃcials, in Veblen's
view, are recruited from members of the business class and thus ﬁrmly embedded in
its habits and values. Consequently, it is not surprising that their work, even though
pursued with the best intentions should ﬁrst and foremost promote business interests.
The recruitement process of these oﬃcials, on the other hand, according to Veblen,
follows some sort of cultural selection process. Business values have become so dominant
in modern economies that they serve as a general reference point. Life is increasingly
conceptualised in pecuniary terms. Thus, it follows logically that the management of
national interest should be entrusted to citizens with good knowledge of and ample
experience in pecuniary business aﬀairs. Citizens with no background in business would
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not be regarded as capable of the management of the nation's economic interest. Thus,
the cultural dominance of business values directly secures the political dominance of
business interests (Veblen, 1996 [1923], pp. 404-406).
Taking into account this conceptualisation of national politics Veblen's pessimistic
assessment of public policy is hardly surprising. In particular, Veblen mentions two
broad categories of public policy favouring business interests to the detriment of the
common good:
1. Government-administered sabotage
2. Government-administered conspicuous waste
Both of these policies are evidently closely connected to the poverty producing processes
discussed at length in chapters 4 to 6 and will thus only be explained in brief.
7.3.1 Government-administered sabotage
It has been argued in chapter 6 that large-scale industrial sabotage is one of the main
preconditions for modern business success. As achieving the necessary modicum of
sabotage (Veblen, 1954 [1921], p. 19) is such a vital and at the same time highly sensitive
task, it has come to be partly assigned to the government's control. Government oﬃcials
are regarded as having the advantage of better being able to overlook the whole industrial
system and thus being capable of `ﬁne-tuning' the required amounts of sabotage (ibid.,
p. 18). On top of that, the nation state being in eﬀect a licenced predatory concern, is
not bound by the decencies of that code of law and morals that governs private conduct
(Veblen, 1996 [1923], p. 35). Thus, governments have greater power than the business
men themselves to enforce pecuniarily advantageous - but morally questionable - business
dealings (ibid., p. 35). Examples for government-administered sabotage listed by Veblen
are: the protective tariﬀ, the prohibition or rationing of speciﬁc goods such as drugs,
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alcohol and explosives3, or regulations concerning the properties of certain products4.
All these policies have in common that they are aimed at limiting supply in order to
keep up prices (Veblen, 1954 [1921], pp. 20-21).
7.3.2 Government-administered conspicuous waste
The policy of government-administered conspicuous waste is based on the recognition
that private consumption by itself is not capable of generating the level of eﬀective
demand which would be needed to accommodate the incredible eﬃciency of modern in-
dustrial production. Thus, the government steps into the breach, generating additional
demand through public spending. Contrary to Kalecki and Robinson, for reasons out-
lined above, Veblen does not expect government spending to be geared towards socially
beneﬁcial investments (Veblen, 1932 [1904], pp. 255-257). Rather, he expects it to fund
large-scale conspicuous consumption.
Armaments, public ediﬁces, courtly and diplomatic establishments, and the
like, are almost altogether wasteful, so far as bears on the present question.
They have the additional advantage that the public securities which represent
this waste serve as attractive investment securities for private savings, at the
same time that, taken in the aggregate, the savings so invested are purely
ﬁctitious savings and therefore do not act to lower proﬁts or prices. (ibid.,
p. 256)
Thus, what in a Robinsonian or Kaleckian framework would have been regarded as po-
tentially poverty-reducing policies, from Veblen's perspective, with a strong focus on the
wasteful use of national resources, turns out to bear a strong risk of actually exacerbating
poverty. On top of that, Veblen concludes that
however extraordinary this public waste of substance latterly has been, it
is apparently altogether inadequate to oﬀset the surplus productivity of the
3Veblen concedes that sabotage may not be the sole or indeed primary reason for restricting or pro-
hibiting the sale of these goods.
4This is one important obstruction of international trade which has been recognized by the EU upon
foundation of the common market and which it is trying to abolish by legislation on the free movement
of goods.
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machine industry, particularly when this productivity is seconded by the great
facility which the modern business organization aﬀords for the accumulation
of savings in relatively few hands. (Veblen, 1932 [1904], p. 257)
Thus, government spending, in Veblen's view, is not even capable of achieving its primary
aim, that is the control of the business cycle. This is where the second policy described
above, government-administered sabotage, comes into play. All in all those two strategies
can be regarded as complementary: Sabotage aims at restraining supply whilst conspic-
uous waste keeps up demand - the two strategies combined ensure high prices and thus
high proﬁt margins. As has already been pointed out earlier, this analysis in its original
formulation is contingent upon a Veblenian supply-and-demand pricing framework and
thus fundamentally incompatible with a post-Keynesian mark-up pricing framework.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has been devoted to the discussion of a rather peculiar group of poverty pro-
ducing processes. These processes diﬀer from those discussed in earlier chapters in that
they are located at the intersection of the political and the economic sphere. The poverty
producing processes discussed were: taxation, inﬂation targeting, the political business
cycle, government-administered conspicuous waste and government-administered sabo-
tage. All of these processes describe the outcome of policy choices with detrimental eﬀects
for the poor. Most often governments have to establish political priorities as to whose
interests to support in practical policy-making. In case they regularly choose to side with
business interests at the expense of the standard of living of the economically vulnerable,
these policy choices can eﬀectively be classiﬁed as poverty producing processes.
Overview of the main poverty producing eﬀects
Three ways can be identiﬁed in which public policy may contribute to the production of
poverty:
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Firstly, a government may decide to adopt a policy which has directly detrimental ef-
fects on ﬁnancially vulnerable parts of the population. Above all, this includes all sorts of
policies which redistribute income from the bottom to the top of the income distribution,
such as regressive taxation. It has been pointed out in the welfare state literature that
the redistributive eﬀects of diﬀerent welfare state regimes are insuﬃciently measured by
simply counting welfare expenses. Quite often, it has been shown, those states who grant
particularly generous welfare beneﬁts also levy high direct and indirect taxes and other
duties which have to be paid (also) out of beneﬁt income, thus eﬀectively curtailing the
disposable income of beneﬁt recipients. More generally speaking, the speciﬁc ﬁscal policy
regime of a country has a huge impact upon the disposable income at diﬀerent income
levels. Thus, whilst progressive taxation may be a powerful means for the alleviation of
poverty, regressive taxation regimes must be recognised as important poverty producing
factors.
Secondly, rather than actively producing poverty, governments may sustain poverty
by failing to provide support and protection to ﬁnancially vulnerable groups. This alle-
gation may be seen as corresponding to the legal charge of `non-assistance of a person
in danger'. In terms of examples for such governmental acts of non-assistance can be
named the failure to engage in active employment policy, or to provide essential public
services and social security. It may seem peculiar to include not doing something as
a poverty producing process, yet, I would argue that this can be justiﬁed on grounds
of the particular role accruing to democratically elected governments. Certainly, it can
not reasonably be expected, nor would it be advisable, that public policy only caters to
the needs of the poor. Policy-makers always need to ﬁnd a balance between diﬀerent
interests. In practice, however, we are rather more likely to encounter a tendency within
governments to attach disproportional weight to the vested interests of the more auent
classes.
Thirdly, governments may assist in the administration of industrial sabotage. Veblen
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uses the idea of government-administered sabotage to denounce public policies which
in his view favour the vested interests of industry to the detriment of the rest of the
population.
Of the poverty producing eﬀects discussed above, the ﬁrst two can be expected to im-
pact upon nominal incomes, while the second and third may exert considerable inﬂuence
upon material deprivation.
In conclusion, I may point out that `hegemonic policy making' has been included as a
poverty producing process as a means of highlighting Veblen's, Kalecki's and Robinson's
concern with the legal and political institutionals shaping everyday economic life. The
legal and political superstructure heavily impacts upon individual life chances and the
distribution of income. Thus, it can also be regarded as an important inﬂuence factor
on the (re)production of poverty. The approach to investigate the superstructure in
terms of individual processes has the advantage of emphasising an insight which appears
to have been self-evident to Robinson, Kalecki and Veblen but is all too often blinded
out in current political discourse: every single political act is based on a choice of one
versted interest over others. The theoretical legacy of Kalecki, Veblen and Robinson, I
want to suggest, encourages us to question and critically evaluate these choices. This is
particularly important when it comes to identifying and abolishing the causes of poverty
in advanced capitalism.
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8 Synthesis and evaluation
The following chapter starts oﬀ by answering the second research question posed in the
introduction, namely whether it is possible to synthesise the diﬀerent poverty producing
processes identiﬁed in this thesis into a theory of poverty production. It then goes beyond
that by asking whether this arguably new approach is really all that diﬀerent from estab-
lished economic analyses of poverty. Finally, potential routes for further development of
the poverty production approach are explored.
8.1 Is a synthesis of Veblen's, Kalecki's and Robinson's
thought possible?
In the introduction the question has been posed whether the analysis of poverty producing
processes presented in this thesis can actually be said to constitute a cohesive approach.
In order to answer this question, at ﬁrst diﬀerences and similarities between Kalecki,
Robinson and Veblen in their theoretical treatment of conspicuous consumption, mark-
up pricing, industrial sabotage and hegemonic policy-making will be recapitulated. Only
after that a ﬁnal evaluation of the overall coherence of the three authors' approaches will
be made.
Conspicuous consumption
Of the three authors, the only one who explicitly used the concept of conspicuous con-
sumption was Veblen. Robinson at some point approvingly referred to it, while Kalecki
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never even mentioned it. It can be argued that Veblen's and Robinson's work on con-
sumption can to a certain extent be regarded as complementary. Veblen described the
phenomenon of conspicuous consumption at great length and pointed out its immensely
important role in modern capitalism. He stressed the negative eﬀects likely to arise from
widespread conspicuous consumption but did not analyse them in much detail. Robinson,
on the other hand, did not develop a general theory of consumption but paid considerable
attention to an elaboration of the negative eﬀects of unregulated (conspicuous) consump-
tion. Thus, Robinson can be said to take the analysis of consumption up where Veblen
left it. Kalecki's position is far more diﬃcult to ﬁt in this picture because his theoretical
focus certainly lay elsewhere than on the analysis of consumption. Nevertheless, some
hints can be detected as to his thoughts on the topic. A recurring theme in Kalecki's
work is the diﬀerentiation between workers' consumption and capitalist consumption and,
accordingly consumption goods for workers and consumption goods for capitalists. As
has already been pointed out earlier, the diﬀerentiation between workers' consumption
goods and capitalists' consumption goods proves to be problematic when taken literally,
because obviously a considerable overlap exists between these two categories. Kalecki's
use of `luxury goods' as a synonym for consumption goods for capitalists has prompted
me to suggest that the diﬀerence between the two kinds of consumption goods may be
better understood along the lines of conspicuous and serviceable consumption. It must
be stressed, however, that this is my ex post interpretation rather than Kalecki's explicit
statement. Being such a peripheral issue in his work, Kalecki's analysis of consump-
tion remained underdeveloped, and thus very little can be said about it with absolute
certainty.
To sum things up it can be said that some level of complementarity can be detected
in Veblen's and Robinson's work on consumption, while a positive evaluation of the
compatibility of Kalecki's thoughts on that issue rests on far more speculative grounds.
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Mark-up pricing
In the present thesis, pricing theory has turned out to be most interesting in terms of
comparison. Even when considering the development of Kalecki's theory on its own, a
complex picture emerges, combining fundamental changes of some aspects with consid-
erable continuity with regard to others. When it comes to comparisons with Veblen and
Robinson, things get even more complex.
It has been pointed out in the literature that, despite considerable changes in the
details of the analysis, the theoretical core of Kalecki's pricing theory remained the same
throughout his long career. Kalecki consistently argued that oligopolistic markets are
the rule in modern capitalist economies and that on these markets prices are determined
via a mark-up on primary costs. The size of the mark-up, in turn, depends on the
level of competition in the industry. A central assumption of this framework is that
entrepreneurs ultimately are price makers - they decide on the mark-up and thus the price
of their products. Robinson has often referred to Kalecki's mark-up pricing framework
and pointed out that, while imperfect, it is the best existing pricing theory. Consequently,
she often built upon Kalecki's mark-up pricing framework in her own theoretical work.
Robinson introduced conceptual clariﬁcations of some key concepts, however. Thus, she
discussed the deﬁnitions of `industry' and of the `degree of monopoly'. As argued in
chapter 5, it becomes apparent upon a close reading of Robinson's elaborations that
rather than just clarifying Kalecki's use of these key concepts, Robinson indeed put
forward her own distinct interpretations. This is far from obvious upon more superﬁcial
reading, however, and has never been acknowledged by Robinson herself. Thus, the
question whether she was aware of these rather far-reaching diﬀerences in interpretation
remains unanswered. In spite of these diﬀerences, the established understanding is that
Robinson and Kalecki based their work on the same pricing theory.
Veblen, on the other hand, is said to have adopted a very simple supply-and-demand
pricing theory. As pricing certainly was not at the centre of Veblen's theoretical interest,
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no detailed elaboration of this issue can be found in his writings. Most often, Veblen in-
deed simply relies on evoking the mechanism of supply-and-demand. Nevertheless, some
bits and pieces of a more elaborate pricing theory can be found in his work too: just
like Kalecki, Veblen diﬀerentiated between competitive and non-competitive markets,
stressing that the latter are the rule in modern capitalism. Non-competitive markets,
according to Veblen, are characterised by capacity underutilisation and non-price compe-
tition. Veblen further acknowledged the importance of the degree of competition for price
determination. The lower the competition, the higher the mark-up which can be charged
by entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding these important similarities to Kalecki's approach,
considerable diﬀerences in the details of the analysis remain. Veblen continuously holds
on to supply-and-demand as the basic price making principle. The fact that this contra-
dicts some of his other ideas is left unacknowledged. Furthermore, Veblen's deﬁnition of
competitive markets was even more restrictive than Kalecki's in that he did not include
all primary goods markets.
Everything considered, the result of the present analysis is that Veblen's pricing theory
is underdeveloped and lacks theoretical coherence. Surprisingly, it nevertheless already
includes some of the key ﬁndings of Kalecki's later mark-up pricing framework. Thus,
whilst their theories certainly can not be said to be fully compatible, I would argue that
Kalecki's theory might be interpreted as a more advanced version of the pricing theory
only hinted at in Veblen.
Industrial sabotage
Industrial sabotage as it was originally deﬁned by Veblen was based on a supply-and-
demand pricing framework. Veblen employed the concept to describe those situations
in which entrepreneurs curtail production in order to keep their goods artiﬁcially scarce
and thus raise their prices. Through these interventions, Veblen held, entrepreneurs were
sabotaging production and as a consequence social provisioning. According to Veblen,
222
the partial retreat to industrial sabotage is the entrepreneurs' response to the immense -
and constantly increasing - productivity of the modern industrial system. Business logic
requires them to curtail supply in order to keep prices from falling continuously. The
imperatives of modern business enterprise notwithstanding, Veblen declared industrial
sabotage to be the single most important hindrance to social provisioning in modern
capitalism.
Kalecki, on the other hand, was not particularly concerned about acts of industrial
sabotage. In fact, this concept does not exist in the Kaleckian framework. The closest
equivalent to industrial sabotage to be found in Kalecki is his assumption of wide-spread
capacity underutilisation. Whilst these two concepts describe the same empirical situa-
tion - the less than full utilisation of productive capacities - their interpretations diﬀer
fundamentally. In the Veblenian understanding, supply is ﬁxed by the entrepreneurs
and prices react. Capacity underutilisation, on the other hand, conceptualises the en-
trepreneur as limiting production in response to a lack of demand. The limiting variable
in this framework is demand, not supply. It would be nonsensical from this point of
view to assume the deliberate curtailment of supply. Accordingly, Kalecki was far more
concerned about price regulation than about the prevention of industrial sabotage.
Despite subscribing to the same mark-up pricing framework as Kalecki, Robinson seems
to attribute a certain relevance to acts of industrial sabotage. She never actually uses
the term `industrial sabotage', but describes situations which correspond to Veblen's
deﬁnition of industrial sabotage. Upon ﬁrst reading Robinson's position appears to be
theoretically inconsistent. The question arises as to how she could possibly adopt a
mark-up pricing framework and still employ a concept that presupposes a simple supply-
and-demand pricing mechanism. Robinson never explicitly discusses this question and
indeed some insurmountable contradictions can be found in her early writings. In later
writings, however, she appears to restrict the relevance of industrial sabotage to per-
fectly competitive primary goods markets. This limitation enables Robinson to reconcile
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the mark-up pricing framework with the concept of industrial sabotage. In addition
to these rather limited applications Robinson described another phenomenon which, as
pointed out above, might well be considered a contemporary variant of industrial sab-
otage: planned obsolescence. This phenomenon does not strictly ﬁt in with Veblen's
original deﬁnition because it does not involve any curtailment of supply. Indeed, it
constitutes a more subtle strategy, as it curtails the durability of the goods supplied.
In eﬀect, fully in line with Veblen's original conceptualisation, this strategy increases
demand in the long-run and indirectly raises prices through shortening the economic
lifetime of commodities. Planned obsolescence can thus be regarded as another example
of the successful reconciliation of two apparently irreconcilable theoretical ideas.
Consequently, it can be argued that Robinson has unwittingly shown that, despite
great initial diﬀerences, the theoretical frameworks of Veblen and Kalecki are not as
irreconcilable as they may appear to be with regard to industrial sabotage.
Hegemonic policy-making
In terms of comparison hegemonic policy-making certainly is the most demanding poverty
producing process outlined in this thesis. As I have subsumed under this label a diversity
of diﬀerent poverty producing processes originating in the political sphere, relatively little
overlap can be found between the diﬀerent authors. Thus, the comparative analysis will
be restricted to the key question of what economic role the three authors assign to
governments. Here again, considerable diﬀerences can be made out between Veblen on
the one hand and Kalecki and Robinson on the other hand.
Veblen regarded the government as being fully instrumentalised by business elites.
Therefore, his evaluation of public policy was devastating: rather than beneﬁting the
common good, governments, in Veblen's view, partake in large scale conspicuous waste
and industrial sabotage.
Kalecki and Robinson were far more sympathetic to public policy. In fact, they re-
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garded the governments of modern capitalist economies to be among the key agents in
the ﬁght against poverty. Governments, in their view, can be expected to fulﬁl an impor-
tant economic and social responsibility through stabilising the vagaries of the economic
business cycle. This, they argue, should be primarily achieved through active demand
management and employment policy. Nevertheless, Kalecki and Robinson were very
well aware of the fact that governments often do not live up to their responsibilities for
political reasons. In their understanding, economic elites do not manage to fully instru-
mentalise public policy, but still exert a strong inﬂuence. Governments are thus torn
between the diverging interests of the diﬀerent social classes and public policy always is
the result of a power struggle between those interests.
These great diﬀerences in the conceptualisation of the political sphere can be attributed
to a large extent to the diﬀerent historical contexts in which the authors were living.
Veblen lived in the US during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He died
just before the Great Crash of 1929. Therefore, the politics he experienced were indeed
far more passive and in line with business interests than those experienced by Kalecki
and Robinson, whose writings were highly inﬂuenced by their experiences of the Great
Crash and WWII. Robinson and Kalecki - who died in 1983 and 1971 respectively -
indeed experienced the golden age of Keynesian policy making. Thus, they had every
reason to be more optimistic than Veblen.
A possible synthesis
The detailed comparison of Veblen's, Kalecki's and Robinson's theoretical treatment of
the poverty producing processes identiﬁed in this thesis suggests the conclusion that the
three authors can hardly be regarded as constituting a coherent school of thought. It
is of little surprise that Kalecki and Robinson share more commonalities than Kalecki
and Veblen, but even between those two authors important diﬀerences have emerged.
Robinson has been shown in many cases to occupy middle-ground between Veblen and
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Kalecki.
Yet, despite these undeniable theoretical diﬀerences, the ﬁndings of the present thesis
allow for a fruitful integration of the three authors' approaches into one coherent frame-
work. It appears that simple diﬀerences in theoretical focus are unproblematic in this
respect, as they do not hinder synthesis but rather broaden the explanatory scope of
the approach. However, as already pointed out above, there are two more fundamental
diﬀerences in theoretical approach which demand further attention: diﬀerences in the
conceptualisation of the political sphere on the one hand and diﬀerent pricing theories
on the other hand.
The theoretical diﬀerences regarding the political sphere have been shown to be largely
due to changes in historical circumstances and therefore should not be overestimated.
Contemporary applications of these theories need to identify the conceptualisation which
best represents the current political situation and adapt the theory accordingly.
The diﬀerent pricing theories, however, can not simply be attributed to diﬀerences in
historical context. Nevertheless, I have shown that Veblen's very rudimentary formu-
lation of a pricing theory already included most of the key elements of Kalecki's later
formulation. Thus, I want to suggest to interpret Veblen's theory as a little elaborated
precursor to the mark-up pricing framework and to make the latter the price-theoretical
core of the new integrated approach. The analysis of industrial sabotage would then have
to be adapted accordingly and most likely follow the lines of what I have deduced from
Robinson's writings. The analysis of conspicuous consumption should not be diﬃcult to
be ﬁtted in with this new approach as diﬀerences between the authors can be said to be
primarily due to diﬀerent theoretical foci.
The resulting integrated approach - henceforth called `poverty production approach' -
combines important insights of Veblen, Kalecki and Robinson and thus provides us with
a relatively comprehensive understanding of the key economic processes underlying the
production of wealth and poverty in contemporary capitalism. It goes without saying
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that in order to unfold its full potential, the approach sketched out above needs to be
further developed. Promising routes for further (theoretical) work in this ﬁeld will thus be
discussed in section 8.3. The following section compares the poverty production approach
to mainstream economic and Marxist poverty research. It has been argued in chapter
2 that the welfare state literature, overall, appears to be primarily concerned with the
analysis of speciﬁc policies rather than with an attempt to causally understand poverty.
Due to this fundamentally diﬀerent foci, it will not be included for comparison.
8.2 Diﬀerences and similarities to other approaches
Rather than simply criticising the work of others, as has been done in the literature
review, the explicit aim of this thesis was to succeed at developing a better alternative.
In order to evaluate the merits of this thesis' approach, it will be necessary to point out the
diﬀerences between the established and the new theories. The starting point for this will
be to brieﬂy restate the original criticism of mainstream economic and Marxist poverty
research put forward in chapter 2 and contrast it with the novel poverty production
approach.
8.2.1 Mainstream economic poverty research
The present enquiry started from the assertion that mainstream economic poverty re-
search is wanting on two levels: ﬁrstly, its methodological focus on individualism results
in a very disembedded and partial analysis. Secondly, as regards content there is a
strong focus on measurement, behaviouristic explanations and the empirical analysis of
the correlation between inequality and growth. Many other important hypotheses remain
underresearched.
On the methodological level the major criticism to be brought forward against main-
stream economic poverty research is its strict individualism. This narrow focus on in-
dividual behaviour results in a tendency to `blame the victim' and to overlook greater
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social relations. The poverty production approach, on the other hand, follows a more
holistic approach, considering individual as well as institutional and structural inﬂuences.
It must be noted, however, that - due to Kalecki's, Robinson's and Veblen's methodolog-
ical focus on social class - the details of the analysis presented in this thesis might be
slightly better developed on the institutional and structural level. Individual agency,
whilst being acknowledged as an important inﬂuence factor, often seems to be highly
constrained by the class position of the individual and its institutional environment. In
order to avoid slipping into the same methodological monodimensionality as mainstream
economic poverty research, this tendency has to be dealt with very carefully in future
research. There is great potential for the development of a truly holistic approach but
also a great risk of slipping into a simple collectivist methodology.
On the level of content, the major points of criticism have been the relative neglect of
theoretical analysis on the one hand and the incompleteness of the existing theoretical
explanations on the other hand. The measurement of poverty as well as behaviouristic
explanations of poverty have been identiﬁed as the main theoretical foci of mainstream
economic poverty research.
The measurement of poverty has not been discussed at all in the present study, as it is
of no particular relevance to the objectives of this thesis. The focus of the present study
was not on the measurement of poverty but rather on a better theoretical understanding
of the processes causing poverty. Nevertheless, in future research measurement issues will
have to be taken up in order to be able to combine theoretical and empirical analysis.
Even if disregarding diﬀerences in the emphasis on measurement issues, the main-
stream economic analysis of poverty and the poverty production approach developed in
this thesis could hardly be more diﬀerent. Very little theoretical overlap can be found.
While behaviouristic explanations are dominant in mainstream theory, they are irrelevant
in the poverty production approach. The four poverty producing processes identiﬁed and
discussed in this thesis, on the other hand, are virtually absent from most mainstream
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accounts of poverty. There are some notable exceptions, however. Surprisingly, a con-
siderable number of the issues discussed in this thesis under the headings of conspicuous
consumption, mark-up pricing, industrial sabotage and hegemonic policy-making are
taken up in a small fraction of the mainstream economic literature on poverty.
In Poverty in Europe, for example, Tony Atkinson indirectly acknowledges the rele-
vance of conspicuous consumption and mark-up pricing for the understanding of poverty.
He starts from the observation that a comprehensive account of poverty in advanced
capitalism needs to take into account the sphere of production as well as the sphere of
distribution - a central theme of the poverty production approach. Atkinson then goes
on to argue that the increasing demand for some goods by the better-oﬀ parts of the
population may lead to price increases and thus exclude poor people from consumption.
Atkinson's argument is based on the assumption of competitive markets and a simple
supply-and-demand mechanism. The same phenomenon is discussed in this thesis in
the section on the special case of conspicuous consumption on supply-restrained mar-
kets. It goes without saying, however, that Atkinson would most probably disagree with
the judgement that competitive markets constitute a `special case' in modern capitalism
and indeed argue that non-competitive markets should be regarded as the exception.
Nonetheless, Atkinson acknowledges the importance of non-competitive markets for the
analysis of poverty and goes on to analyse the pricing behaviour of monopolists. Mo-
nopolists, he argues, are free to choose whatever proﬁt-making strategy they like and
to set prices at whichever level they ﬁnd most proﬁtable. This may lead monopolists
to decide to charge high prices and supply their goods only to the wealthy part of the
population that is able to aﬀord them. Atkinson stresses that this business strategy is
particularly detrimental when it comes to the provisioning of basic necessities such as
electricity, which historically have often been supplied by monopolists. He thus demands
that such markets be regulated and the monopolists pledged to supply their goods at
prices which everyone can aﬀord. This argument is very similar to those put forward
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in the discussion of mark-up pricing in chapter 5 of this thesis. There are some impor-
tant diﬀerences, however: ﬁrstly, as has already been pointed out above, contrary to
the mark-up pricing framework, Atkinson seems to take competitive markets to be the
rule and monopolistic markets to be the exemption. Secondly, Atkinson only considers
monopolistic markets and does not mention oligopolistic market structures, whilst the
mark-up pricing framework only applies to oligopolistic markets.
Following this brief discussion of the inﬂuence of prices on poverty, Atkinson goes on to
argue that another potentially poverty-creating factor is the limited availability of basic
necessities. This limited availability may, on the one hand, be due to the diversion of
productive capacities away from the production of goods which are in demand by the poor
strata of society and on the other hand it may result from shops closing down in poorer
neighbourhoods. Whatever the reason, Atkinson holds, the question of the quantity and
quality of goods available for purchase needs to be considered in the analysis of poverty.
This again brings us back to what has been discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis.
Finally, Atkinson also enquires into the redistributive eﬀects of public policy, showing
that it has tended to become less progressive. He concludes that the analysis of public
policy needs to be included in poverty research. This, as has been shown in chapter 2,
has been achieved in part by Blank and Blinder who have demonstrated that the US
tax system has become increasingly regressive and thus has exacerbated the problem of
poverty. Blank and Blinder have also discussed the question of whether inﬂation targeting
beneﬁts or harms the poor. Thus, a considerable number of the issues raised in chapter 7
of this thesis have at least been acknowledged in mainstream economic poverty research.
Having pointed out the overlaps between mainstream economic accounts of poverty and
the poverty production approach, a number of qualiﬁcations need to be made: ﬁrstly,
while these overlaps do exist, they are limited to the writings of only a few authors,
since the majority of the profession does not cover these questions. Secondly, for the
greatest part these issues are analysed only superﬁcially in mainstream theory and are
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far from being integrated into a comprehensive theoretical account of poverty. Thus,
the mainstream economic accounts of the poverty producing processes identiﬁed in this
thesis can be shown to be very limited. When adding this observation to the important
methodological diﬀerences pointed out above, it can be concluded with some conﬁdence
that the poverty production approach represents a fundamentally distinct attempt at the
explanation of poverty which in many respects is more comprehensive than mainstream
economic poverty research.
8.2.2 Marxist poverty research
The diﬀerences between the poverty production framework and Marxist poverty research
can be said to be far less pronounced. Both start from a conﬂictual world view, stressing
the fact that the poverty of some to a certain extent constitutes the wealth of others.
Furthermore, both approaches highlight the importance of the sphere of production for
the explanation of poverty. The two approaches thus can be said to share an embedded
understanding of poverty and to regard poverty as an inherent feature of capitalism.
Indeed, a large extent of agreement can be observed between the two approaches. I
would even go as far as arguing that both approaches could be conceived of as `poverty
production approaches' insofar as both regard poverty as being systematically produced
and make the structures and/or processes causing poverty their analytical starting point.
Nonetheless, some noteworthy diﬀerences between the two approaches can be detected
too.
Broadly speaking, I want to suggest that, on the methodological level, the poverty
production approach may be shown to pay more attention to questions of agency than
parts of the contemporary Marxist literature. This is most pronounced in its discussion
of consumption and public policy. Nonetheless, the fact that the poverty production
approach too builds upon a class-based understanding of society means that it shares the
risk of overly relying upon a collectivist methodology. As pointed out above, this risk
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deserves to be kept under close observation. Still, provided that this pitfall is avoided,
the poverty production approach may succeed at putting economic poverty research on
a slightly more holistic foundation.
On the theoretical level the most pronounced diﬀerence between the two approaches
seems to be a diﬀerence in focus. Broadly speaking, Marxist analyses of poverty tend
to display a focus on the exploitative nature of the wage-relation, the inherent tendency
of capitalism to generate unemployment and diﬀerent processes of social stratiﬁcation
within the working class. On top of this, they have developed quite diﬀerentiated cate-
gorisations of diﬀerent groups of poor people.
The poverty production framework developed in this dissertation, on the other hand,
in its present, very tentative and preliminary formulation, focuses on the role of consump-
tion, pricing, industrial sabotage and policy-making. It would certainly beneﬁt from a
better coverage of some of the themes that emerge from the Marxist literature, most
notably: a thorough discussion of wage diﬀerentiation and the causes of unemployment.
Furthermore, given the complexity of the phenomenon, it may be more acurate to adopt
a diﬀerentiated understanding of poverty, analysing the speciﬁc circumstances of diﬀerent
groups of poor people rather than discussing poverty in general. Such an analysis may
be able to build upon the categorisations developed by Wright and Wachtel respectively.
Summing up, plenty of potential for theoretical integration of the analysis developed in
this dissertation and the Marxist approach can be detected. Whether such a synthesis can
be achieved depends largely on whether a way can be found to bridge the methodological
and theoretical diﬀerences which continue to exist in other parts of the analysis.
Having argued that the poverty production approach indeed constitutes a distinct
new approach to the economic analysis of poverty, the next question to be answered is
what is needed for this approach to develop to its full potential. This question will be
preliminarily explored in the next section.
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8.3 Promising ways forward
As pointed out above, the poverty production approach is still in its ﬂedgling stages. In
order to unfold its full potential, further development of the approach is needed. Gener-
ally speaking, theoretical amendments of the poverty production approach may originate
in diﬀerent schools of thought within economics or even in related disciplines. It is of ut-
most importance, however, to ensure that these contributions respect the methodological
and theoretical core principles of the poverty production approach. On the methodolog-
ical level, the principles which must be abided by are historicity, openness, holism and
interdisciplinarity. With regard to theoretical assumptions these core principles can be
described as the acknowledgement of the conﬂictual nature of social reality, of power dif-
ferentials and of the existence of - even if only loosely deﬁned - social collectives or interest
groups. Failure to conform to these principles signiﬁes that a theoretical perspective is
incompatible with the poverty production approach.
The ﬁnal part of the present chapter is devoted to the discussion of four propositions of
promising routes for further theoretical development of the poverty production approach
and two suggestions for its empirical operationalisation.
The integration of recent theoretical developments
The obvious ﬁrst step to take is to extend the theoretical framework through the inclu-
sion of more recent theoretical developments in the post-Keynesian and institutionalist
literature. This has two important advantages: ﬁrstly, contemporary contributions may
be able to ﬁll the gaps in Veblen's, Kalecki's and Robinson's analyses. Examples of such
gaps are the personal distribution of income, the integration of a more diﬀerentiated
class structure and a more detailed analysis of the distributive eﬀects of public policy.
Secondly, one of the basic methodological principles of the poverty production approach
has been shown to be its historicity. Theories are understood to be context-speciﬁc.
Thus, it goes without saying that the theoretical framework sketched out in this thesis
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needs to be re-evaluated regularly with regard to its continual applicability to a changing
social and economic environment - and, if necessary, adapted accordingly. A prime ex-
ample for a fundamental economic change which still awaits theoretical accommodation
in the poverty production framework but has been covered in the post-Keynesian and
institutionalist literature is the increasingly dominant role of ﬁnancial markets.
Strengthening of the interdisciplinarity of the approach
Closely related to the ﬁrst reason identiﬁed above for the integration of contemporary
institutionalist and post-Keynesian thought - the need to ﬁll explanatory gaps in Ve-
blen's, Kalecki's and Robinson's analysis - is an appeal for the further expansion of
the interdisciplinarity of the poverty production approach. Much could be gained from
closer collaboration with sociological poverty research, social psychology or the political
sciences. The political sciences, for example, may provide a more nuanced conceptu-
alisation of the political sphere. Sociological poverty research, on the other hand, has
a long tradition of enquiring into a diversity of empirically-proven poverty-related fac-
tors such as disability, old age and bad education. Whilst not being economic in the
strict sense, these factors have repeatedly been shown to exert considerable inﬂuence
upon economic results. Sociological poverty research may provide some ideas as to po-
tential poverty producing processes arising from these conditions without falling prey to
deterministic culture-of-poverty theses. Social psychology, again, may contribute impor-
tant insights into a number of psychological factors which have been touched upon in
post-Keynesian and institutionalist theories but got stuck in a very ad hoc formulation.
The social psychology of legitimacy, for example, might increase our understanding of
poverty-sustaining myths and institutions considerably.
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The integration of ﬁndings from feminist economics
It has repeatedly been shown in empirical poverty research that women bear a far greater
risk of experiencing poverty than men. This important gender dimension has been ne-
glected in the poverty production approach so far. Yet, an important feminist economic
literature exists, showing that women tend to be integrated into and aﬀected by economic
structures diﬀerently. These gender-speciﬁc diﬀerences between the economic situation
of women and men are likely to have considerable poverty-producing eﬀects. Therefore,
it is imperative for the poverty production approach to take into account the gender
dimension of the problem of poverty.
Empirical research on economic poverty production
As the present analysis has explicitly focused on the development of a theoretical frame-
work, an empirical analysis of the poverty producing processes identiﬁed in this thesis
is obviously missing so far. As has been pointed out already, economic poverty research
is far stronger on empirical than on theoretical analysis. Relevant empirical data could
thus be expected to be widely available. While this may certainly be true for some
aspects of the analysis, the overall theoretical approach is so distinct in other respects
that the necessary data are likely to be more diﬃcult to obtain. Even if all data needed
for an empirical study of economic poverty production were available, a fundamentally
diﬀerent interpretation of the data would be required. Thus, there is ample space for
methodological innovation in the empirical analysis of poverty production.
I want to suggest that a case study approach combining quantitative and qualitative re-
search methods may be a promising route to explore in the empirical analysis of poverty
production. The exclusive reliance on quantitative methods which is common in eco-
nomics is unlikely to be able to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon under
study.
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Development of a `social budgeting' framework
The need to integrate an analysis of the gender-speciﬁc eﬀects of public budget man-
agement is starting to be widely recognised. An important result of this study was to
show that equal consideration should be given to its poverty-producing eﬀects. It is thus
imperative to develop a framework for the analysis of public budgets with respect to their
likely poverty-producing eﬀects. In short, a poverty-production equivalent to the gender
budgeting framework is required.
An analysis of economic poverty production in developing countries
Finally, the poverty production approach could theoretically be extended in order to
be able to explain economic poverty production in developing countries. As considerable
diﬀerences between advanced capitalist economies and developing economies undoubtedly
exist, this would most certainly need to entail a reconsideration of fundamental theoretical
propositions. Yet, in this case too, a good starting point might well be found in the works
of Robinson and Kalecki as both have published extensively on developing economies.
However, the analysis of economic poverty production in the developing world must be
considered an independent and distinct theoretical project.
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9 Conclusion
Economic poverty research can be considered to be a predominantly empirical discipline.
Nevertheless, theoretical contributions exist across all schools of thought. Theoretical
poverty research in mainstream economics, broadly speaking, tends to be largely be-
haviouristic. Amongst the behaviouristic explanations oﬀered are the simple marginal
productivity story, the somewhat more complex culture-of-poverty thesis defended, amongst
others, by Akerlof and Lawrance's attempt to justify poverty by referring to the impa-
tience of the poor. Due to its focus on the behaviour of the poor, mainstream economic
poverty research has an overall tendency to neglect the analysis of possible institutional
or structural inﬂuences on poverty. Marxism, on the other hand, provides us with a
rich analysis of the structural causes of poverty. As important explanatory variables for
understanding the problem of poverty have been identiﬁed, amongst others, the exploita-
tive nature of the wage-relation, the changing composition of capital, the existence of an
industrial reserve army and processes of social stratiﬁcation within the working class. A
weak point of many Marxist analyses, however, appears to be a relative neglect of indi-
vidual scopes of action. Finally, a review of the literature in other heterodox schools of
thought - not exclusively but primarily in the post-Keynesian and institutionalist tradi-
tion - shows that a considerable variety of theoretical accounts of poverty can be deteced.
These accounts cover a broad range of possible inﬂuence factors, not least among which
are luxury consumption of supply-restrained markets, questions of social validation of
diﬀerent occupations and processes of social exclusion. These nnn On top of that some
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of the aspects of the problem of poverty which are well covered in the Marxist litera-
ture, broadly speaking, appear to receive little attention. I have thus concluded from my
review of the literature that a framework which helps to integrate the rich diversity of
diﬀerent - and often seemingly complementary - approaches to the problem of poverty
might be needed.
The poverty production approach advanced above is meant to be a step in this direc-
tion. It aims to provide a framework for integrating the multiplicity of partial theoretical
explanations of poverty which can be found in the post-Keynesian, institutionalist and
- if some methodological and theoretical incompatibilities can be overcome - Marxist
literature. Its major contribution may thus be argued to be methodological rather than
theoretical. The poverty production framework does not so much aim at building a the-
ory, rather it extends an invitation to adopt a novel, processual perspective on poverty.
Conceptualising the production of poverty via the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc poverty pro-
ducing processes, I want to suggest, has two advantages: on the one hand the framework
is succiﬁciently open to allow for the integration of a diversity of variables from diﬀer-
ent spheres of social life. On the other hand, it forces us to surmount the oldfashioned
dichotomy of individual and structural explanations and brings us to focus on diﬀer-
ent kinds of institutions. Thus, the poverty production approach may be regarded as a
thoroughly institutionalist approach to the study of poverty.
The post-Keynesian-institutionalist synthesis sketched out in the last chapter identiﬁes
a ﬁrst set of poverty producing processes around which a more comprehensive analysis
might be built in the future. This may be achieved simply by scanning existing contri-
butions for (even if sometimes only implicit) descriptions of poverty producing processes
which then can be used to complement the theoretical framework established in this the-
sis. Generally speaking, every theoretical contribution can thus be integrated into the
poverty production approach as long as it respects the fundamental methodological and
theoretical principles of the new approach. Contributions which violate these principles
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must be regarded as incompatible with the poverty production framework.
The strengths of this novel framework for the analysis of poverty are:
1. Through its stress on the dimension of agency it breaks up the wide-spread `harmony-
myth' which claims that it were in everyone's interest to reduce poverty. Only
through the acknowledgement of the conﬂictual dimension of poverty eradication
can eﬀective policies be devised.
2. Through its focus on speciﬁc poverty producing processes rather than the charac-
teristics of the poor people themselves, it enables us to arrive at a more embedded
understanding of poverty. Of course, analysing the speciﬁc milieus of people liv-
ing in poverty or at risk of poverty, can provide us with valuable hints as to the
origins of their problems. This is, however, only one side of the coin and must
be complemented by an enquiry into the causal factors lying outside of the poor
person.
3. The identiﬁcation of poverty producing processes clearly shows that policies aiming
at the eradication of poverty in order to be eﬀective, ﬁrst and foremost need to stop
poverty production. As long as poverty production is not brought to a halt, anti-
poverty measures can be little more than a drop in the ocean. This approach thus
suggests a fundamental reorientation of public policy. Not only does it question
the strict separation of social and economic policy, it is also highly critical of anti-
poverty measures which are exclusively targeted at the poor. Public policy, too,
needs to arrive at a more embedded understanding of poverty.
4. Through questioning the exclusive focus on the poor and pointing out the necessity
to enquire into economic processes more generally, the poverty production approach
integrates economic poverty research into broader economic discourse.
5. The poverty production approach provides us with a dynamic tool for the analysis
of poverty. Whilst the details may change, we will most likely always be able
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to identify poverty producing processes as long as poverty persists. The poverty
producing processes discussed in this thesis, I would argue, are situated at an
intermediary level of abstraction which makes it likely that they can be observed
at diﬀerent points of time and in many diﬀerent advanced capitalist nations. Thus,
whilst allowing considerable room for historically speciﬁc adaptations, the poverty
production framework presented here also avoids the pitfall of becoming completely
relativist.
The previous chapters have sketched out a preliminary formulation of the poverty pro-
duction approach based on the economic thought of Robinson, Veblen and Kalecki. Four
major poverty producing processes have been identiﬁed: conspicuous consumption, mark-
up pricing, industrial sabotage and hegemonic policy-making. These processes generate
a multiplicity of poverty producing eﬀects. Abstracting from the process-speciﬁc details,
these can be summarised in four categories:
 The artificial creation of scarcity. This category includes such diﬀer-
ent eﬀects as the diversion of productive capacities resulting from conspicuous
consumption, scarcity arising from conspicuous consumption on supply-restrained
markets, output restriction through industrial sabotage and the negative eﬀects of
government-administered conspicuous waste and sabotage.
 A high-price policy of entrepreneurs. Apart from the obvious, that is
high prices resulting from high mark-ups, this category includes price increases
through conspicuous consumption on supply-restrained markets, indirect price in-
creases through planned obsolescence, as well as in some cases price increases re-
sulting from industrial sabotage in its original Veblenian interpretation, that is the
obstruction of the production process or even the destruction of already produced
commodities.
 Increasing unemployment. This is the only category included in this list which
240
does not cut across diﬀerent poverty producing processes. According to the present
theoretical framework responsibility for unemployment can be ascribed at least in
part to the unwillingness of governments to adopt an active employment policy.
It goes without saying that further unemployment-related poverty producing pro-
cesses may be identiﬁed in other sectors of the economy. These will have to be
covered in future extensions of this approach, however, and are not part of its
present preliminary formulation.
 The low wage - debt spiral. This category originates in the discussion of
debt-ﬁnanced conspicuous consumption, but is also related to mark-up pricing.
The combined eﬀects of the relative inelasticity of the demand for conspicuous
consumption goods and the ready availability of consumer credit put entrepreneurs
in a problematic position when judged from a social provisioning persepctive. They
are vested with considerable power to inﬂuence the distribution of income to their
beneﬁt.
The above categories describe the major poverty producing eﬀects of the four central
poverty producing processes analysed in this thesis. They can thus be understood as
delineating important focal points of the production and sustainment of poverty in ad-
vanced capitalism.
Whilst certainly including some of the most important poverty producing processes
in contemporary capitalism, however, the list of poverty producing economic processes
identiﬁed in this thesis can not be said to be exhaustive. The comprehensiveness of the
present study is limited by the methodological approach followed. As in essence this thesis
represents an exercise in the history of economic thought, the resulting analysis can only
ever be as comprehensive as the theories which are drawn upon. Thus, for example, as
Kalecki and Robinson were primarily concerned with the functional distribution of income
and Veblen's analysis remained rather vague, little can be said in this context about
processes inﬂuencing the personal distribution of income. Consequently, further research
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is needed in order to complement the present analysis and to arrive at a comprehensive,
theoretically well founded understanding of the economic causes of poverty. Promising
ways forward would be to include more recent theoretical developments in institutional
and post-Keynesian thought, to integrate ﬁndings from feminist economics as well as
to strengthen the interdisciplinarity of the approach through closer collaboration with
sociological poverty research, social psychology and political science.
Notwithstanding the obvious incompleteness of the poverty production approach in its
present formulation, one conclusion can already at this stage of research be drawn with
some conﬁdence: poverty producing processes are deeply engrained into the structure of
our modern capitalist economies. The processes described in this thesis - i.e. conspicuous
consumption, mark-up pricing and industrial sabotage - play a pivotal role in ensuring
the continued functioning of our modern economies. Therefore, poverty can be regarded
as a functional core element of the modus operandi of modern capitalism. Eﬀorts aiming
at the eradication of poverty will thus need to entail fundamental systemic changes in
order to be successful.
The next step therefore should be to develop alternatives to the identiﬁed poverty
producing processes. How could these processes be altered or stopped in order to bring
poverty production to a halt? This is the big question looming in the background. And,
as diﬃcult as it may be, this question urgently needs to be addressed in order to allow
for everyone to share in the abundance of modern capitalism.
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